Lewis, Harlem Harold, Iii, AP-77,045

Background

Harlem Harold Lewis III was indicted by a Harris County grand jury for capital murder for allegedly shooting and killing Bellaire Police Corporal Jimmie Norman and a civilian, Terry Taylor, during the same criminal transaction (Dec. 24, 2012). Trial was to a jury; conviction for capital murder and a death sentence followed.
Prosecution witnesses included bystanders, Bellaire and Houston police officers, paramedics, crime-scene investigators, and forensic analysts; evidence included eyewitness accounts, photo/video exhibits, autopsy testimony, DNA and firearms analysis.
Lewis testified in his own defense: admitted driving the vehicle, causing the initial pursuit and collision, but denied recollection of firing at Norman and disputed aspects of the shooting and flight.
Appellant’s appellate brief raises multiple grounds: legal sufficiency of mens rea (intent/knowledge) for capital murder; instructional errors (burden-shifting, refusal to give felony-murder lesser-included); victim-impact evidence and courtroom audience conduct (uniformed officers, emotional family member) introduced at guilt phase; prosecutorial misconduct in closing; admission of extraneous-offense evidence; insufficiency of punishment-phase special-issue findings.
Trial court denied an instructed verdict, refused to limit uniformed officers in the gallery, overruled objections to prosecutor argument and to victim-impact testimony at guilt phase, and denied requested felony-murder instruction. Appellant seeks reversal or new trial and asks, in the alternative, reformation to life imprisonment.

Issues

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Legal sufficiency of mens rea for capital murder (intent/knowledge to kill both victims)	Evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis intentionally or knowingly caused both deaths; at most supports lesser culpability (recklessness/negligence) or only one intentional killing.	Jury saw sufficient evidence (shooting, eyewitnesses, custody identification) to find intentional/knowing killings during same transaction.	Appellant argues reversal/acquittal is required because the State failed to prove required mens rea for both deaths; brief asks Court to sustain. (This brief advocates reversal; outcome not supplied.)
2. Instructed verdict & lesser-included (felony murder) charge	Trial court erred by denying instructed verdict and by refusing to charge felony murder as a lesser-included offense; some evidence supported felony-murder alternative.	Court’s charge and denial appropriate; jury properly instructed on murder; no sufficient evidence to require felony-murder instruction.	Appellant contends error; requests reversal or new trial.
3. Jury charge burden-shifting	The charge phrased jury duty as to "determine guilt or innocence" effectively shifted burden to defendant after he testified; prejudicial error requiring reversal.	Trial court also instructed State bears the burden and defendant need not produce evidence; no harmful burden shift.	Appellant preserved objection; urges that at least "some harm" resulted and reversal is required.
4. Guilt-phase victim-impact, audience of uniformed officers, prosecutorial argument, extraneous offenses	Admission of victim-impact testimony and pointing out grieving widow during guilt phase, presence of many uniformed officers in gallery, repeated improper prosecutorial appeals and extraneous-offense evidence cumulatively deprived Lewis of a fair trial and influenced punishment findings.	State relied on witness testimony and permitted courtroom attendance; arguments were permissible pleas for law enforcement and reasonable deductions; extraneous evidence admissible for relevant issues at punishment.	Appellant argues cumulative and individual errors were prejudicial and reversible, including egregious harm from propensity/extraneous evidence and impermissible victim-impact at guilt phase.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (insufficiency review asks whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (requirement that State prove every element beyond reasonable doubt)
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (prohibits jury instructions that shift burden of proof or create impermissible presumptions)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless-error standard for constitutional errors)
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (victim-impact evidence permissible at sentencing/punishment phase)
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (double-jeopardy/acquittal remedy where evidence insufficient)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (constitutional constraints on factfinding for capital sentencing enhancements)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing punishment must be found by jury beyond reasonable doubt)
Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415 (Texas case on sufficiency and due process in criminal convictions)
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Rule 403 and admissibility balancing guidance; limits on unfair prejudice)

(These citations are those the appellant relied on in arguing insufficiency, jury-charge error, victim-impact limits, prosecutorial-argument standards, and admission of extraneous offenses.)