Lessard v. Cravitz
686 F. App'x 581
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Marcus Lessard (pro se) sent emails to a former girlfriend in 2009–2010 and was arrested in Colorado in 2010 for felony stalking after the girlfriend complained; he alleges the complainant and Boulder police fabricated facts to procure an arrest warrant.
- Lessard pleaded guilty to stalking as part of a deferred judgment and sentence requiring him to stay out of Colorado; after the deferred sentence expired the DA moved to withdraw the plea and dismiss the charge.
- Lessard later sought to vacate the protective order against him and mailed motions to the complainant; he was arrested in 2014 on protective-order violation charges (Class 4 felony) and was convicted on those charges on appeal.
- He filed a sprawling Second Amended Complaint asserting 19 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (malicious prosecution, conspiracy, due process, equal protection, retaliation, supervisory/municipal liability, etc.) against judges, prosecutors, police officers, the DA’s office, and defense counsel.
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal; the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, denied leave to amend, and denied reconsideration. Lessard appealed; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eleventh Amendment / jurisdiction over DA’s Office and official-capacity claims | Lessard pressed claims against the DA’s office and judges/officials | DA’s office and state courts are state instrumentalities entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity | Affirmed: Eleventh Amendment bars claims against the DA’s office and related official-capacity claims |
| Malicious prosecution / favorable-termination element | Lessard argued dismissal after deferred judgment and later withdrawal of plea shows favorable termination | Defendants: dismissal after deferred judgment is not termination indicative of innocence; some charges later resulted in conviction | Affirmed: completion of deferred judgment and dismissal do not plausibly show favorable termination indicative of innocence; many malicious-prosecution claims dismissed |
| Prosecutorial immunity / First Amendment retaliation | Lessard alleged prosecutor Johnson retaliated (preventing service, seeking extradition, filing for competency exam, disparaging remarks) | Prosecutors claim absolute immunity for functions intimately associated with judicial process; alleged acts fall within prosecutorial functions or are nonconstitutional insults | Affirmed: absolute immunity applies to extradition decision and competency request; other alleged acts not plausibly constitutional violations |
| Municipal and supervisory liability; leave to amend | Lessard alleged municipal liability from policies/customs and sought leave to amend to add facts | Defendants: underlying constitutional violations not adequately pleaded; many claims barred by immunity or failure to show favorable termination; complaint is prolix and conclusory | Affirmed: municipal claims dismissed because no underlying constitutional violation pleaded; denial of leave to amend not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claims challenging conviction/sentence barred unless conviction reversed/invalidated)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires unconstitutional policy/custom or final policymaker)
- M.G. v. Young, 826 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2016) (malicious-prosecution element requires favorable termination)
- Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016) (plea trade-offs affect malicious-prosecution claims)
- Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014) (prosecutorial absolute immunity for functions integral to judicial process)
- Slater v. Clarke, 700 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2012) (absolute immunity for extradition-related prosecutorial decisions)
- Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) (Heck inapplicable where deferred prosecution does not create an underlying conviction)