Leonard Rowe v. Willie E. Gary, 703 F. App'x 777

Plaintiffs (Rowe, Rowe Entertainment, King, King Productions) previously lost a civil‑rights suit in SDNY; judgment on summary judgment affirmed on appeal.
In 2015 plaintiffs sued the Gary law firm and several former firm lawyers (including Sperando) in the Northern District of Georgia, alleging the firm and lawyers sabotaged the earlier suit in exchange for bribes (RICO and state claims).
Sperando, appearing pro se, filed a motion to dismiss and served (but did not file) a Rule 11 motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and their counsel; Rule 11 requires a 21‑day safe‑harbor before filing.
Plaintiffs moved for an extension to respond; the district court granted the extension but announced it would not consider sanctions motions until after ruling on motions to dismiss.
After oral argument the court said it might retain jurisdiction to consider sanctions if it dismissed the case, but its dismissal order expressly declined to entertain sanctions, citing plaintiffs’ subjective distress rather than applying Rule 11’s objective standard.
Sperando appealed the district court’s refusal to consider her sanctions motion; the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court properly refused to consider Rule 11 sanctions	Sperando argued the court should consider her Rule 11 motion and apply the objective standard to determine if claims were frivolous	Plaintiffs argued the court could decline sanctions consideration, emphasizing plaintiffs’ circumstances and apparent lack of bad faith	Reversed: court abused discretion by applying subjective reasoning; must apply Rule 11's objective two‑step test
Proper standard for Rule 11 sanctions	Rule 11 requires objective reasonable inquiry into law and facts before filing	(Implicit) sanctions inappropriate because allegations not "inherently frivolous" given plaintiffs’ distress	Court confirmed Rule 11 is objective and district court failed to apply it
Availability of sanctions under court’s inherent power and 28 U.S.C. § 1927	Sperando also sought sanctions under inherent power and § 1927	Plaintiffs asserted lack of bad faith and no dilatory conduct	Remand: district court should decide in first instance; inherent power requires bad faith (subjective); §1927 targets intentional delay
Recovery of attorney’s fees to a pro se attorney under Rule 11	Sperando requested attorney’s fees as sanction recipient	Plaintiffs would be ordered to pay fees to Sperando	Court noted Rule 11 forbids awarding attorney’s fees to a pro se litigant, even if an attorney; such fees cannot be imposed

Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir.) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of sanctions denial and discussion of §1927 standard)
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. 1991) (discussing court’s inherent power and Rule 11's objective standard)
Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (U.S. 1991) (affirming Rule 11's objective reasonable‑inquiry requirement)
In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.) (two‑step test for Rule 11: objectively frivolous; signer should have known)
Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir.) (parties who did not sign complaint may still face Rule 11 sanctions)
Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.) (inherent‑power sanctions require subjective bad faith)
Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.) (Rule 11 cannot award attorney’s fees to a pro se litigant)
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (U.S.) (noting Byrne was abrogated on other grounds)