Legalforce RAPC Worldwide PC v. United States Patent and Trademark Office
2:24-cv-03437
D. Ariz.May 22, 2025Background
- LegalForce RAPC Worldwide PC and Raj Abhyanker originally brought four constitutional claims against the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and others, related to alleged improper disciplinary actions and structural defects at the USPTO.
- The case concerns whether LegalForce (the law firm) has standing to assert claims arising from alleged harm to its business and attorneys, including costs, reputational harm, and compliance burdens, distinct from those asserted by Abhyanker personally as a subject of USPTO disciplinary proceedings.
- The Court previously dismissed LegalForce and Mr. Abhyanker but invited reconsideration of its decision regarding LegalForce after an initial motion clarified possible ambiguity and procedural confusion about who was seeking reconsideration.
- Upon review, the Court recognized an error in its blanket approach to standing and concluded that a claim-by-claim analysis is required when plaintiffs assert multiple claims with potentially different standing implications.
- LegalForce demonstrated, at least at the pleading stage, sufficient injury to support Article III standing for some claims. The Court agreed that LegalForce's business harm extended beyond generic litigation costs and may arise from alleged government targeting.
- The Court denied Abhyanker's motion for reconsideration, found his new facts irrelevant to the original dismissal, granted LegalForce's reconsideration in part, reopened the case as to LegalForce (but not Abhyanker), and ordered the action transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia for judicial economy and to avoid duplicative or conflicting rulings with ongoing administrative proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| LegalForce organizational standing | LegalForce suffers direct, unique harm | Harm is generic and not specific to LegalForce | Court agrees LegalForce has pled sufficient injury for standing (at pleading stage) |
| Need for claim-by-claim standing analysis | Not distinctly addressed | Not distinctly addressed | Court holds it erred by considering standing in gross and requires claim-by-claim review |
| Jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 32 | LegalForce not respondent, statute inapplicable | No court has jurisdiction if statute applies | Court finds statute does not facially strip jurisdiction over LegalForce's claims |
| Transfer to Eastern District of Virginia appropriate | Accepts transfer, requests stay | Advocates transfer | Court orders transfer for efficiency and to avoid conflicting rulings |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (standing is claim- and relief-specific; not dispensed in gross)
- Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (standing is not a generalized concept, must be shown for each claim)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (elements of Article III standing must be supported at each stage)