Ledoue v. Attorney General of the United States
462 F. App'x 162
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Ledoue, a Haitian citizen and lawful permanent resident since 1988, was convicted in Delaware of aggravated menacing under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 602(b) on two counts, with suspended sentences totaling six months.
- After completion of the state sentence, the Government charged Ledoue as removable for having committed an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) based on the offense being a crime of violence.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held the Delaware aggravated menacing statute constitutes a crime of violence, making Ledoue an aggravated felon under the INA.
- An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially granted Ledoue's motion to terminate removal proceedings, reasoning the offense did not meet § 16(a)’s force element.
- On review, the BIA remanded and ultimately reaffirmed that the Delaware offense is a crime of violence under § 16(a), not merely a possession of a deadly weapon offense.
- Ledoue filed a petition for review challenging the BIA’s interpretation and urging de novo review of the legal question under the INA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Delaware aggravated menacing is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 | Ledoue argues the statute lacks the force element required by § 16(a) and thus is not an aggravated felony. | Government contends the threat inherent in displaying what appears to be a deadly weapon satisfies § 16(a) as a crime of violence. | Yes; the offense qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(a). |
| Whether the BIA violated due process by applying § 16(a) when filings addressed § 16(b) | Ledoue claims due process was violated by the BIA’s § 16(a) use without briefing on that provision. | Government contends the BIA properly reviewed the legal question de novo and the error, if any, was not prejudicial. | No; BIA's de novo review of the governing law did not violate due process. |
| Does Johnson v. United States affect Ledoue’s classification as an aggravated felon | Ledoue argues Johnson undermines treating the Delaware offense as a crime of violence. | Government distinguishes Johnson, noting the offense involves intentionally placing another in fear of, not mere physical contact. | Johnson does not undermine the result; the conduct fits § 16(a) as the threatened use of force. |
Key Cases Cited
- Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2006) (held that Pennsylvania simple assault qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(a))
- Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (S. Ct. 2010) (defined physical force in ACCA as violent force; distinguished mere contact)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (formal categorical approach to evaluating prior offenses)
- Ng v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2006) (applied the categorical approach to state offenses for aggravated felonies)
- Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (recognizes state offenses can be aggravated felonies under INA)
- Pitts v. Delaware, 646 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussed elements related to aggravated menacing and threat concepts)
- Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2004) (board may review questions of law de novo)
- Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2010) (due process considerations in administrative review contexts)
- Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (discusses jurisdiction and review standards in INA removals)