Todor Krumov Simeonov, a native and citizen of Bulgaria, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) final order dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision denying his request for suspension of deportation pursuant to Section 203 of the Nicaraguаn Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Title II of Pub.L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, as amended by Pub.L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (“NACARA”). We have jurisdiction under former 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, and § 309(c) of the transitional rules set forth in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), as amended by the Act of October 11, 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (“IIRI-RA”), and we deny thе petition.
I
The facts are undisputed. On August 6, 1990, Simeonov arrived at Miami International Airport with no documentation, seeking admission to the United States. 1 The INS denied his admission, placed him in exclusion proceedings, and paroled him into the United States pending resolution of those proceedings. The Miami IJ denied his requests for asylum and withholding of deportation, and on October 29,1991 ordered him excluded and deported. The BIA affirmed the order and denied Simeo-nov’s subsequent motion to reopen on August 13, 1992. Nevertheless, as the government candidly admits, “for reasons that are not clear from the record, the INS did not enforce the exclusion order and Mr. Simeonov remained in the United States, moving to Seattle, Washington, working, and going to school.”
On November 19, 1997, Congress passed NACARA, which amended IIRIRA’s transitional rules so that qualified aliens from *535 Bulgaria (and other former Soviet Bloc countries) could obtain suspension of deportation under more lenient rules than IIRIRA’s standard for cancellation of removal. See IIRIRA § 309(c)(5), as amended. On September 11, 1998,' Simeonov successfully moved to reopen his case to apply for relief under NACARA and to change venue to Seattle, Washington. Thereafter, on June 11, 1999, Simeonov applied for suspension of deportation pursuant to NACARA § 203. Because he was in exclusion proceedings before IIRIRA took effect on April 1, 1997, Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) § 244(a) governed Simeonov’s application for suspension of deportation. See IIRIRA § 309(c)(l)-(3). Thus, Simeonov argued under the pre-IIRIRA criteria that he had been in the United States for the requisite seven years, was of good moral chаracter, and that deportation to Bulgaria would cause him extreme hardship. After a merits hearing, the IJ issued a written decision denying Simeonov’s application for failure to establish extreme hardship to himself. Simeonov appealed to the BIA, challenging the IJ’s hardship determination.
On May 2, 2002, the BIA, relying on In re Torres, 19 I. & N. Dec. 371, 372-73 (BIA 1986), issued a per curiam order, in which it concluded that Simeonov is statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation because he is an alien in exclusion proceedings. The BIA dismissed Simoe-nov’s appeal solely on that ground; it did not reach the merits of his claim. Simeo-nov timely filed a petition for review of the BIA’s order.
II
Where, as here, the BIA conducts a
de novo
review and issues its own decision, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision as its own, we review the BIA’s decision.
See Kankamalage v. INS,
Ill
A
Among other things, IIRIRA eliminated the distinction between “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings, rеpealed INA § 244 and the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation, and established a new form of discretionary relief called “cancellation of removal.” INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Compared to the more lenient requirements for suspension of deportatiоn under INA § 244, IIRIRA’s cancellation of removal provision raised the bar to relief. Section 240A increased the number of years required to establish “continuous presence” in the United States from seven to ten- years, heightened the standard for demonstrating hardship, and crеated a new “stop-time” rule. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), (d). The new stop-time rule (1) deems the alien’s period of continuous "presence to end when he is served with a ■notice to appear or commits certain offenses, id. § 1229b(d)(l), and (2) treats a departure from the United States for a period in excess of 90 days (or periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days) as a failure to maintain continuous presence, id. § 1229b(d)(2).
*536
Application of IIRIRA’s new rules to aliens already in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of April 1, 1997 is governed by the transitional rules of IIRIRA § 309(c).
See Marquez v. INS,
Focusing upon this language, Simeonov argues that NACARA § 203 allows him to apply for pre-IIRIRA suspension of deportation dеspite his final order of deportation entered well before April 1, 1997, and that the BIA therefore erred in refusing to address the merits of his application. One fundamental problem with this argument is that IIRIRA and the transitional rules are inapplicable to Simeonov becаuse his exclusion order became final years before IIRIRA’s effective date of April 1, 1997.
See Marquez,
Thus, what Simeonov actuаlly seeks in this appeal is a ruling that NACARA entitles him as a substantive matter to apply for suspension of deportation even though he was placed in exclusion proceedings and has been under a final order of exclusion since 1992. This creates a second fundamentаl problem for Simeonov’s petition, to which we now turn.
B
The BIA ruled here that, regardless of NACARA, Simeonov is ineligible for suspension of deportation because he is an alien in exclusion proceedings. The relevant provisions of the INA and a long history of cases intеrpreting those provisions support this conclusion.
Under the pre-IIRIRA statutory scheme, an alien such as Simeonov, who arrives at the border seeking admission and is deemed ineligible for entry and ordered excluded, may be placed in exclusion proceedings аnd paroled into the United States pending completion of his proceedings. That parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien,” INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and thus is not a “lawful entry of the alien into the United States,” INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Accordingly, that paroled alien is ineligible for the discretionary relief of withholding or suspension of
*537
deportation.
See Leng May Ma v. Berber,
NACARA did not undermine these well-established precedents. The purpose of NACARA is not to alter the legal landscape by creating a remedy of suspension of deportation for persons paroled into the Unitеd States and subject to a final order of deportation. Rather, NACARA’s purpose is to grant procedural relief to qualified aliens, allowing them to begin anew their ongoing proceedings without being subject to IIRIRA’s stop-time rule.
See Fieran,
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the languagе “regardless of whether the alien is in exclusion or deportation proceedings,” found at IIRIRA § 309(c)(5)(C)(i), as amended by NACARA § 203. For example, that language would apply to an alien whose exclusion proceedings were not final prior to April 1, 1997, and for whom the Attorney Gеneral had chosen to begin asylum proceedings anew. It would also apply to an alien previously erroneously placed in exclusion proceedings and then properly placed in deportation proceedings (before April 1, 1997) or remоval proceedings (after that date).
2
In each of these examples, NACARA would exempt the qualified alien in ongoing proceedings from IIRIRA’s stop-time rule by counting the time spent “in exclusion proceedings” for purposes of calculating his period of physiсal presence in the United States.
See Fieran,
Thus, even if Simeonov were to satisfy the requirements of NACARA § 203, he is nevertheless ineligible for suspension of deportation because he never legally entered the United States-and is subject to a final order of deportation. In light оf the plain language of IIRIRA § 309(c), as amended by NACARA, and legal precedent concluding that suspension of deportation is unavailable to aliens in exclusion proceedings, we find the BIA’s determination that Simeonov is ineligible for suspension of deportation to bе supported by the plain and sensible meaning of IIRIRA § 309(c) and INA § 244(a).
C
' Simeonov also argues: (1) that 8 C.F.R. § 240.31 required the BIA to reach the merits of his claim, and (2) that the BIA’s failure to do so violated his due process rights.
8 C.F.R. § 240.31 provides:
In determining cases referred for further inquiry'as provided in section 235 of the Aсt, immigration judges shall have the powers and authority conferred upon them by the Act and this chapter, including the adjudication of applications *538 for adjustment of status pursuant to [NACARA].... Subject to any specific limitation prescribed by the Act and this chapter, immigration judgеs shall also exercise the discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by the Act as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.
Simeonov asserts that § 240.31 “mandates the IJ to exercise the discretion and authority conferred for the adjudication of applications for adjustment of status pursuant to [NACARA],” and that the BIA therefore erred as a matter of law by finding him statutorily ineligible for relief. This misconstrues the plain language of the regulation, which simply means that an IJ has the power and authority to adjudicate a NACARA claim subject to any specific limitation prescribed by statute. Here, the IJ did adjudicate Simeonov’s NACARA claim, and found against him. Moreover, as discussed above, there are specific statutory limitations in this case; the only rеlief NACARA § 203 affords is suspension of deportation under the more lenient standard of INA § 244, which is unavailable to Simeonov in any event because he is subject to a final order of deportation. Because the BIA may dismiss summarily an appeal that “fails to meet essential statutory or regulatory requirements or • is expressly excluded by statute or regulation,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(H), the BIA’s dismissal was not in error.
With respect to Simeonov’s due process argument, it is well settled that the BIA has authority to conduct a
de novo
review of the record and issue its own decision.
See, e.g., Pal v. INS,
Thus, the BIA’s sua sponte analysis of Simeonov’s statutory eligibility for suspen-sión of deportation and its failure to reach the merits of his claim did not violate his due process rights. Even if we were to find such a violation, Simeonov’s сlaim nevertheless would fail because he suffered no prejudice: Assuming arguendo that Simeo-nov meets all of the requirements under NACARA § 203 and INA § 244(a), he is nevertheless ineligible for suspension of deportation as a matter of law.
PETITION DENIED.
Notes
. Simeonov explained at argument that his original plan was to apply for asylum in Canada on a layover en route from Mexico City to Madrid. Only after his flight was twice delayed, and the layover in Canada was can-celled, did Simeonov decide to fly to Miami to seek asylum there. Simeonov appeared before us pro se because his attorney, after filing Simeonov's brief, abruptly left the United States and later informed the Immigration Court that he did not intend to return and that he no longer represented his clients.
. Simeonov does not claim that he was inl-properly placed in exclusion proceedings.