Lawrence v. TVS Supply Chain Solutions North America, Inc.
4:19-cv-00169
E.D. Mo.
Jul 25, 2019

Background

  • Plaintiff Gregory Lawrence, employed as a materials analyst at TVS’s Wentzville, MO facility, has disabilities (mycosis fungoides and PTSD) and requested a third (overnight) shift as an accommodation in late 2017.
  • TVS and the Union executed a memorandum of agreement (Sept. 2017) adjusting shifts and later a CBA (Apr. 2018) containing layoff/recall seniority rules; plaintiff was placed on second shift then moved to third shift based on seniority.
  • Plaintiff alleges delay in granting his accommodation, sexual-harassment complaints involving a supervisor (Brand), and retaliation leading to disciplinary action and layoff in June 2018; he was recalled and returned to work in November 2018.
  • Plaintiff sued in state court alleging three counts under the Missouri Human Rights Act (failure to accommodate, wrongful discharge, and retaliation). TVS removed to federal court, arguing LMRA §301 complete preemption because claims are intertwined with the memorandum and CBA.
  • The court considered whether resolution of MHRA claims requires interpretation of the CBA (LMRA preemption) and whether any MHRA claim could survive in federal court as non-preempted (supplemental jurisdiction applied where appropriate).

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether MHRA failure-to-accommodate and wrongful-discharge claims are preempted by LMRA §301 Lawrence: claims can be resolved by examining employer conduct and motive without interpreting the CBA TVS: claims are inextricably intertwined with the memorandum/CBA (seniority/layoff/recall provisions) Preempted: LMRA §301 completely preempts these MHRA claims because causation and adverse actions turn on CBA provisions
Whether MHRA retaliation claim is preempted by LMRA §301 Lawrence: retaliation claims arise from employer conduct and discrimination complaints, separable from CBA TVS: retaliation claim is tied to actions (delay, layoff, discharge) governed by the CBA Partially not preempted: retaliation claim insofar as it seeks damages for a hostile work environment/unrelated emotional harms is not preempted and retained under supplemental jurisdiction
Whether plaintiff can prove causation under amended MHRA without interpreting the CBA Lawrence: the motivating-factor inquiry focuses on employer motive and conduct TVS: Missouri’s amended ‘‘because of’’ standard requires examining whether CBA procedures authorized the adverse actions Held: the amended MHRA causation standard makes disentangling motive from CBA-controlled actions impossible, leading to preemption for claims tied to transfer/layoff/termination
Whether the court should remand the case to state court Lawrence: removal improper because claims are state-law and not dependent on CBA interpretation TVS: federal jurisdiction proper due to §301 preemption over core MHRA claims Denied: remand denied; federal court retains preempted claims and supplemental jurisdiction over non-preempted retaliation theory

Key Cases Cited

  • Pudlowski v. The St. Louis Rams, LLC, 829 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2016) (affidavits may be considered in jurisdictional fact inquiries)
  • Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (complete preemption doctrine)
  • Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914) (well-pleaded complaint rule)
  • Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) (federal preemption can make removal proper)
  • Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2017) (LMRA §301 preemption analysis)
  • Schuver v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 154 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1998) (LMRA preemption principles)
  • Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§301 authorizes federal law for CBA enforcement)
  • Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (two-category §301 preemption framework)
  • Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (state-law claims defining contractual relationship preempted)
  • Boldt v. Northern States Power Co., 904 F.3d 586 (8th Cir. 2018) (start with state-law claim text to assess whether CBA interpretation is required)
  • Davis v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 21 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 1994) (MHRA disability claim preempted where resolution required examining CBA seniority rights)
  • Fant v. New England Power Serv. Co., 239 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (state-law claim depends on CBA if resolution hinges on CBA interpretation)
  • Medley v. Valentine Radford Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 315 (Mo. App. W.D.) (elements of Missouri retaliation claim)
  • Diaz v. Autozoners, LLC, 484 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. App. W.D.) (hostile-work-environment/retaliation under Missouri law)
  • Mignone v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 546 S.W.3d 23 (Mo. App. W.D.) (MHRA damages for emotional harms)
  • Senior v. NSTAR Elec. and Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206 (1st Cir.) (memoranda of agreement can be §301 contracts)
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