531 P.3d 326
Cal.2023Background
- Sarah Plott Key borrowed $2.4 million from Law Finance Group to fund probate litigation; the loan charged compounded interest and fees and included an arbitration clause.
- After Key prevailed in probate and repaid principal, she refused to pay interest/fees as unlawful under the California Financing Law; Lender sought about $3.5 million in arbitration.
- The arbitrators found some charges unlawful, reformed the contract to simple interest, and awarded Lender roughly $800,000 plus fees; award was served September 19, 2019.
- Lender filed a petition to confirm (Oct. 1, 2019); Key’s counsel and Lender’s counsel agreed to a joint briefing/hearing schedule and to extend response timing; Key filed a petition to vacate on Jan. 27, 2020 (130 days after service) and a response to the confirmation petition on Feb. 5, 2020 (139 days after service).
- The trial court vacated the award on the merits; the Court of Appeal reversed, holding Code Civ. Proc. §1288.2’s 100‑day deadline jurisdictional and thus not subject to extension; Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1288.2’s 100‑day vacatur deadline is jurisdictional | §1288.2 is not jurisdictional; parties can rely on §1290.6 or equitable doctrines | §1288.2 is jurisdictional; courts lack power to hear late vacatur requests | §1288.2 is nonjurisdictional; presumption against statutes limiting fundamental jurisdiction applies |
| Whether §1288.2 is subject to equitable tolling or estoppel | Equitable tolling/estoppel should excuse Key’s late filings given counsels’ agreement and conduct | Equitable doctrines cannot override the statutory deadline (if jurisdictional) or were not appropriate here | §1288.2 is subject to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel; remand to determine if relief warranted |
| Whether §1290.6’s 10‑day response rule can extend or displace §1288.2’s 100‑day limit when responding to a confirmation petition | A response filed within §1290.6’s time is timely even if beyond 100 days from award | Both deadlines apply: a response seeking vacatur must meet §1290.6 and §1288.2 | Both deadlines apply; §1290.6 does not extend §1288.2’s 100‑day outer limit |
| Whether a claim that the underlying contract is illegal can be raised at any time regardless of procedural deadlines | Illegality forecloses enforcement and may be raised even if vacatur request is late | Illegality defenses can be forfeited if not timely raised under the Act | Illegality claims are not categorically immune from forfeiture; timely raising or equitable relief is required |
Key Cases Cited
- Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist., 7 Cal.5th 798 (Cal. 2019) (presumption that statutes do not limit fundamental jurisdiction absent clear intent)
- Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, 2 Cal.5th 330 (Cal. 2017) (mandatory procedural rules not necessarily jurisdictional)
- Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health, 9 Cal.5th 710 (Cal. 2020) (presumption that statutory deadlines permit equitable tolling absent clear contrary intent)
- Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363 (Cal. 2003) (statutory text and purpose can preclude equitable tolling)
- Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 1992) (claims of illegality can be forfeited if not timely raised)
- Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603 (Cal. 1949) (judicial review may be warranted when arbitrators enforce an illegal contract)
- McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., 45 Cal.4th 88 (Cal. 2008) (equitable tolling principles and background presumption)
- Richey v. AutoNation, Inc., 60 Cal.4th 909 (Cal. 2015) (limits on judicial review of arbitration awards)
