Lauren Graham v. C. Gagnon
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13672
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- On Sept. 16–20, 2012 Falls Church police sought to arrest Colby Twinam on an assault/destruction warrant; officers went to his listed address where Twinam ran into the house and shouted that police were there.
- Twinam’s mother, Lauren Graham, 56, answered the front door, asked to see a warrant (officers said none with them), and twice went into the house to speak with Twinam; shortly thereafter Twinam came into view and officers entered, subdued, and arrested him.
- Officer Gagnon applied to a magistrate for a warrant to arrest Graham for obstruction of justice; the first magistrate denied the application. After reporting a new fact (that a storm door contacted an officer’s foot), a second magistrate issued a warrant and Graham was arrested four days later. The charge was later dismissed and expunged.
- Graham sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming Fourth Amendment arrest without probable cause; after discovery defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the district court granted it.
- The Fourth Circuit reviews the record in the light most favorable to Graham and assesses whether reasonable officers would have known there was no probable cause to arrest her under Virginia Code § 18.2-460(A) (obstruction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there probable cause to arrest Graham for obstruction under Va. Code § 18.2-460(A)? | Graham: her conduct (briefly going into house to persuade son to surrender) did not and could not have obstructed officers; Virginia caselaw requires more than making an arrest more difficult. | Officers: Graham’s actions hampered their arrest effort and may have actively encouraged flight; magistrate issued warrant. | Held: No probable cause as a matter of law under Virginia precedent; Graham’s conduct fell well outside the statute. |
| Are the officers entitled to qualified immunity? | Graham: the lack of probable cause was objectively clear; reasonable officers would have known arrest was unlawful. | Officers: they reasonably relied on a neutral magistrate’s issuance of a warrant and therefore are immune. | Held: Qualified immunity denied — issuance of a warrant is not dispositive where it was obvious no competent officer would have sought a warrant, and here officers unreasonably relied on the second magistrate after an initial denial. |
| What is the legal scope of Virginia’s obstruction statute in this context? | Graham: Virginia law limits obstruction to intentional acts that thwart or prevent an arrest, not mere noncooperation or making an arrest more difficult. | Officers: a continuum exists from passive noncooperation to active obstruction; the magistrate could resolve close calls. | Held: Court reiterates Virginia decisions drawing a limiting construction: mere difficulty or noncooperation is not obstruction; the facts here are outside the statute. |
| Remedy on appeal — should plaintiff get summary judgment? | Graham: having shown a clearly established violation, she seeks summary judgment and remand only for damages. | Officers: disputed facts remain and district court must first apply correct legal standard. | Held: Remanded to district court to consider Graham’s summary judgment motion in the first instance under correct standards; not resolved on appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012) (a magistrate-issued warrant does not automatically confer qualified immunity when no reasonably competent officer would have sought the warrant)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (officer not immune when request for warrant is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer would have made it)
- Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2012) (qualified-immunity framework and emphasis on objective reasonableness)
- Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2003) (Virginia obstruction statute construed narrowly; mere failure to cooperate or making an arrest more difficult is not obstruction)
- McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 2013) (reiterating probable-cause/qualified-immunity standards for arrests)
- City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (First Amendment protects peaceful verbal criticism of police and such speech cannot be criminalized under a general obstruction statute)