Laura Rivero Levey v. Ken Detzner, Secretary of State, State of, 146 So. 3d 1224

Laura Rivero Levey timely filed qualifying papers and tendered a check from her campaign account for the Florida House District 113 filing fee during the June 16–20, 2014 qualifying period.
The Secretary of State initially certified Levey as a qualified candidate.
Bank processing placed a hold on Levey’s account; her check was ultimately returned to the state after the qualifying deadline.
Levey attempted to cure by tendering a cashier’s check and a bank letter taking responsibility, but the Secretary refused because qualifying had closed.
Levey sued for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking placement on the November 2014 ballot; the trial court granted summary judgment to the state, and a divided appellate panel affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Levey remained a qualified candidate despite the bank returning her qualifying check after qualifying closed	Levey: she timely delivered a properly executed campaign-account check and was certified; the bank’s error and post-deadline return should not disqualify her	State: statute disqualifies any candidate whose check is returned unless the fee is paid by cashier’s check before the end of qualifying	Held: Statute is unambiguous—returned check must be cured by cashier’s check by the end of qualifying; failure to do so disqualifies the candidate; affirmance for the state
Whether courts may excuse noncompliance or allow post-deadline cure based on fairness / substantial compliance	Levey: courts should construe election statutes to avoid disenfranchising voters and allow substantial compliance or post-deadline rectification when candidate is blameless	State: courts must enforce plain statutory text; judicial relief cannot rewrite clear legislative command	Held: Court applied plain-language rule and declined to extend relief; any change is for Legislature, not judiciary

Greene v. Clemens, 98 So.3d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (statutory interpretation principle: legislative intent from plain language)
Bingham v. Manson, 363 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (courts must follow unambiguous statute language)
Hill v. Davis, 70 So.3d 572 (Fla. 2011) (courts cannot extend or modify clear statutory terms)
State v. Chubbuck, 141 So.3d 1163 (Fla. 2014) (limitations on judicial rewriting of statutes)
State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1972) (election statutes construed to avoid technical disqualifications when possible)
Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So.2d 972 (Fla. 1977) (public’s right to select officers; avoid unnecessary disqualifications)
Browning v. Young, 993 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (substantial compliance doctrine applied to candidate qualification)