Larson v. City & County of San Francisco
192 Cal. App. 4th 1263
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Proposition M amended San Francisco's Rent Ordinance to expand 'decrease in housing services' to include more than a dozen harassment-related acts by landlords or their agents, allowing Rent Board rent reductions without specified amounts or criteria.
- Proposition M added a mandatory cost and attorney fees provision awarding tenants reasonable fees in defending unlawful detainer actions when they prevail, under specified conditions.
- Pre‑enactment, housing services were defined to include repairs, maintenance, utilities, and other tenant benefits; Proposition M added quiet enjoyment harassment as part of the services concept.
- The trial court upheld the decrease‑in‑services provisions (37.10B(a)(1)-(3)) but struck the prefatory phrase 'with ulterior motive or without honest intent' and invalidated the attorney fees provision.
- Appellants (various tenants' and housing groups) challenged the expansion as a violation of the Judicial Powers Clause and First Amendment rights, and the City cross‑appealed on the attorney fees provision; the appellate review is de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 37.10B(a)(4)-(15) unlawfully vest judicial power in the Rent Board? | Larson argues the board would adjudicate nonquantifiable damages, effectively displacing courts. | City contends these provisions serve regulatory purposes and are within Board authority. | Yes for (a)(4)-(15): facially invalid due to improper judicial power delegation. |
| Is 37.10B(a)(5) a permissible content‑neutral restriction on speech? | Larson contends it targets protected speech; no, it is content‑neutral on harassment‑related conduct. | City contends it bans fraud; regulates manner, not content. | Yes: narrowly tailored content‑neutral regulation; upheld. |
| Are 37.10B(a)(6) and (a)(7) valid under commercial speech doctrine and Central Hudson? | Larson argues these restrict protected speech and are overbroad or vague. | City argues they regulate commercial‑speech aspects of offers to vacate under intermediate scrutiny. | No: (a)(6) and especially (a)(7) fail Central Hudson and are unenforceable. |
| Is the attorney fees provision 37.10B(c)(6) valid under the state unlawful detainer framework? | Larson asserts municipalities cannot create a state law fee regime for unlawful detainers. | City contends fee provision is lawful under local police power to regulate housing. | No: invalid; City has no authority to mandate attorney fees in state unlawful detainer actions. |
Key Cases Cited
- McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal.3d 120 (1989) (limits agency adjudication of damages; preserves courts' essential power)
- Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., 54 Cal.3d 245 (1991) (limits administrative awards of general damages; distinguishes restitutive vs. tort damages)
- Ocean Park Associates v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 114 Cal.App.4th 1050 (2004) (rent reductions for construction/habitat impacts may be within board power if damages are restitutive)
- San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 27 Cal.4th 643 (2002) (facial challenges require showing the ordinance invalid in the great majority of cases)
- Baba v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal.App.4th 504 (2004) (speech restrictions in rent control context can be invalid if overly suppressive of protected speech)
- Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (commercial speech framework; Central Hudson test)
- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (test for regulation of commercial speech)