WALNUT CREEK MANOR et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S015131
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 29, 1991.
54 Cal. 3d 245
COUNSEL
Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson, William H. Staples and Marsha L. Stephenson for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attorneys General, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Marian M. Johnston and M. Anne Jennings, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
PANELLI, J.—Pursuant to
We conclude that while
I. FACTS
This case arises from a complaint for housing discrimination filed with the Fair Employment and Housing Department (the department) by Robert Cannon, an unmarried Black man, alleging that Walnut Creek Manor (Manor) had discriminated against him by refusing to rent him a one-bedroom apartment. Following an investigation, the department issued an accusation charging Manor, owner Marilyn Boswell, and rental manager Edith Indridson with violating
Manor is a 418-unit apartment complex. In November 1979, when Cannon first applied for a one-bedroom apartment, Manor was consistently full and had a waiting list. Cannon was told the waiting period was one to one and a half years and that he should check back every six months to see where he stood on the waiting list. For the ensuing two and one-half years Cannon called back approximately twice a year to determine his position on the waiting list.
In August 1981, more than one and a half years after Cannon first applied, Edith Indridson assumed the position of rental manager. At that time she believed Cannon had waited the normal time and “was thus ready to be rented to.” Nevertheless, Indridson made no attempt to offer Cannon available one-bedroom apartments, but did call other non-Black applicants who had applied after Cannon.
Following her first meeting with Cannon in November 1981, Indridson marked his name with the code designation Manor used for undesirable tenants, but after the department commenced its investigation in June of 1982, she altered the code rating to desirable. In April 1982 Cannon was first on the waiting list, but when he visited the rental office on April 5, Indridson refused to tell him where he stood. After this encounter, Indridson wrote owner Marilyn Boswell for advice on how to treat Cannon. In response, Boswell sent Indridson a copy of an October 9, 1980, opinion letter written by her attorney after a race discrimination complaint was filed against Phoenix Manor, a housing development Boswell owned in Arizona. The
In May 1982, while checking the availability of mobilehomes for rent at a Contra Costa County mobilehome park, Cannon met a non-Black man who told Cannon he had applied to Manor a few months before and had moved in the same month. The next day Cannon called Manor and again asked where he stood on the waiting list. Indridson refused to tell him. On the following Wednesday, Indridson‘s day off, Cannon called Manor without identifying himself and asked how long the waiting list was. He was told the list was one year long and was encouraged to apply. Cannon thereupon filed his complaint with the department.
From November 1981 until June 28, 1982, the date of Cannon‘s complaint, Indridson rented 18 apartments to later, non-Black applicants. Eleven of these were rented between March and June; of these, three were rented to married couples. From June 1982 to July 1983, Indridson rented another 24 one-bedroom apartments to later, non-Black applicants.
The ALJ found Cannon‘s claim of racial discrimination meritorious and awarded Cannon $1,500 in unspecified compensatory damages and $650 in punitive damages assessed against rental manager Edith Indridson. The commission did not adopt the ALJ‘s proposed decision; rather, after considering additional written argument, the commission found that Cannon had been discriminated against on the basis of marital status as well as race. The commission awarded Cannon special damages for the cost of his rent and utilities in excess of what he would have paid at Manor, $162.50 in attorney fees, and $50,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. In addition, the commission awarded Cannon $40,635 in punitive damages (calculated at $1,000 for each of 35 apartment rentals made to others while his application was pending and within the 120-day jurisdictional time period [
On petition for writ of administrative mandamus (
The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeal interpreted the statute as authorizing the commission to award unlimited compensatory damages for housing discrimination. The court held, however, that while the commission‘s award of special damages was valid, the award of general compensatory damages for emotional distress constituted an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power by a nonjudicial body in violation of the judicial powers clause of the California Constitution (
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‘s ruling that the statute limits the punitive damages award against Manor, Boswell and Indridson to a total of $1,000. The Court of Appeal held that
The commission and respondents Manor, Boswell and Indridson each petitioned for review.3
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Award of Actual Damages
We turn, then, to the question whether an administrative award of general, as opposed to special, compensatory damages violates the judicial
In McHugh we considered whether a local charter amendment authorizing administrative adjudication of excess rent claims and imposition of treble damages was unconstitutional as in violation of article VI, section 1. Reiterating the principle that “[a]gencies not vested by the Constitution with judicial powers may not exercise such powers” (49 Cal.3d at p. 356), we there articulated the following standard: “An administrative agency may constitutionally hold hearings, determine facts, apply the law to those facts, and order relief—including certain types of monetary relief—so long as (i) such activities are authorized by statute or legislation and are reasonably necessary to effectuate the administrative agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes, and (ii) the ‘essential’ judicial power (i.e., the power to make enforceable, binding judgments) remains ultimately in the courts, through review of agency determinations.” (49 Cal.3d at p. 372, italics in original.) The agency, we emphasized, may exercise “only those powers that are reasonably necessary to effectuate [its] primary, legitimate regulatory purposes.” (Ibid., italics in original.)
Although in McHugh we reserved the question now before us—i.e., whether an administrative agency‘s award of general compensatory damages violates the judicial powers clause (49 Cal.3d at p. 375, fn. 38), we clearly set out the approach for resolving the issue. In applying the first or substantive prong of the standard, i.e., the “reasonable necessity/legitimate regulatory purpose” requirements, we first inquire whether the award is authorized by legislation, and is “reasonably necessary to accomplish the administrative agency‘s regulatory purposes.” (49 Cal.3d at p. 374.) Next, we must “closely scrutinize the agency‘s asserted regulatory purposes in order to ascertain whether the challenged remedial power is merely incidental to a proper, primary regulatory purpose, or whether it is in reality an attempt to transfer determination of traditional common law claims from the courts to a specialized agency whose primary purpose is the processing of such claims.” (Ibid.)
The commission argues that where the Legislature has clearly authorized an administrative agency to award monetary relief, we should not substitute our judgment for the legislative decision that such authority is reasonably necessary to effectuate the agency‘s regulatory purposes; rather, pursuant to due process principles, our only inquiry should be whether the remedy is procedurally fair and related to a proper legislative goal. (See, e.g., Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 398 [149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512].) Here, the commission argues, the Legislature has clearly authorized it
Whatever merit the commission‘s argument may have in the context of a due process analysis, in applying the judicial powers doctrine our role is not so limited. McHugh clearly contemplated that the mere fact of legislative authorization does not shield a challenged power from scrutiny under the reasonable necessity/legitimate regulatory purpose prong of the substantive test. This much is clear from McHugh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 378-379, where the court conceded treble damages were authorized by the city charter, yet found such damages violative of the reasonable necessity/legitimate purpose prong, in part because, in the court‘s view, there were other, less intrusive means of accomplishing the asserted regulatory goal. It is thus apparent from McHugh that our judicial powers analysis contemplates a somewhat higher level of scrutiny than rational basis.
The purposes of the housing provisions of the act are to prevent and eliminate specified discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of housing. (See
If, by contrast, the department fails to issue an accusation within 150 days after the filing of a complaint, or earlier determines none will issue, the department issues a right-to-sue letter, notifying the complainant of the right
Seeking to satisfy the substantive test, the commission argues that the award of general compensatory damages is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act to provide “effective remedies” that will eliminate discriminatory practices (see
That compensatory damages serve to deter discrimination and compensate its victim for the psychic harm flowing from discrimination is not in dispute, nor is it the issue. Under McHugh, supra, 44 Cal.3d 348, the issue, rather, is whether the award of substantial emotional distress compensatory damages is “reasonably necessary” to accomplish the commission‘s legitimate regu-
In answering this question, we find it helpful to trace the history of the fair housing provisions of the act. In 1959 the Legislature enacted three separate acts directed to the declaration and enforcement of civil rights: the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) (former
Originally the Legislature intended only employment discrimination to be handled administratively; discrimination in housing was to be handled by civil suit under the Hawkins and Unruh Civil Rights Acts. (Stearns v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1971) 6 Cal.3d 205, 214 [98 Cal.Rptr. 467, 490 P.2d 1155] (hereafter Stearns); see Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., supra, 57 Cal.2d 463.) However, because civil damages in housing violations often amounted to less than $1,000 (Stearns, supra), defendants by means of various procedural maneuvers could force the cost of litigation above the plaintiff‘s expected recovery. To remedy this, the Legislature in 1963 replaced the Hawkins Act with the Rumford Fair Housing Act (former
Although the Rumford Fair Housing Act retained language authorizing the award of “damages,” it transformed the statutory minimum recoverable in judicial proceedings under the Hawkins Act (see fn. 6, ante) into a statutory maximum in administrative proceedings. Thus, the Rumford Act initially empowered the commission‘s predecessor, the Fair Employment Practice Commission (FEPC), if it determined that specified make-whole remedies were not available, to award damages in an amount not to exceed $500. (Stats. 1963, ch. 1853, § 2, pp. 3828-3829.)8 In 1975 the maximum damage award was increased to $1,000. (Stats. 1975, ch. 280, § 1, p. 701.) In 1977 the Rumford Act was amended to specify that the damages payable to the injured party were “actual and punitive” damages and for the first time to describe the FEPC‘s authority to award damages in housing cases as cumulative, rather than alternative. (Stats. 1977, ch. 1187, § 10, p. 3893; Stats. 1977, ch. 1188, § 13.1, pp. 3905-3906 [describing the FEPC‘s authority as “including, but not limited to,” the actions specified].) (See Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1394 & fn. 17.) At the same time, the Legislature extended to victims of housing discrimination the right to bring a civil suit under the act on receipt from the department of a right-to-sue letter. (Stats. 1977, ch. 1188, § 5.1, p. 3902; see
In 1980 the Legislature combined the employment and housing antidiscrimination statutory schemes to form the present act, with enforcement of both sections of the act vested in the commission. (Stats. 1980, ch. 992, § 4, pp. 3140-3142; see Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1394.) In 1981
As this history illustrates, from 1963, when the FEPC was first empowered to handle housing discrimination complaints, until 1982, when the amendment removing the cap on actual damages became effective, the agency‘s primary remedial focus was on cease and desist orders and affirmative equitable or corrective “make-whole” relief that would provide a
The statutory focus on corrective measures was consistent with the legislative purpose to provide a streamlined procedure to prevent and eliminate housing discrimination. As explained in Stearns, supra: “In providing an administrative remedy for housing discrimination the Legislature undertook to make sure that individual actions did not become burdened with procedural technicalities. [¶] To achieve this end the FEPC established procedures that are as simple and uncomplicated as possible. Complaints are drafted by laymen; the commission informally attempts to eliminate discriminatory practices before instituting formal accusations; the commission, on a finding of discrimination, may fashion remedies both to correct unique cases of such practice as well as to curb its general incidence.” (6 Cal.3d at p. 214.)
Until 1982, therefore, the award of damages—in a minimal and limited amount—was clearly incidental to the commission‘s primary regulatory purpose of correcting and preventing housing discrimination.9 The legislative history does not disclose the reason for the Legislature‘s amendment of the act to eliminate the ceiling on actual damages. Since the amendment, however, the dollar amounts of the damage awards have steadily risen10 and may be expected to continue to do so. The availability of unlimited damages thus risks converting the focus of the commission‘s remedial decision from one of fashioning equitable remedies directed to making the injured party whole in the context of housing, to one of compensating him or her for the psychic harm suffered. As the commission seeks to assess and evaluate the extent of the complainant‘s injury, what once was an alternative or incidental adjunct to the primary relief of securing the same or comparable housing, has assumed an independent importance
As we recognized in Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 80 [233 Cal.Rptr. 294, 729 P.2d 728, 85 A.L.R.4th 1025]: “[T]he power to award compensatory and punitive tort damages to an injured party is a judicial function.” (Accord, Curtis v. Loether, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 196 [39 L.Ed.2d at pp. 267-268]; see also Broward County v. La Rosa (Fla. 1987) 505 So.2d 422, 423-424 [where the court stated that it could not “imagine a more purely judicial function than a contested adjudicatory proceeding involving disputed facts that results in an award of unliquidated common law damages for personal injuries in the form of humiliation and embarrassment“].)
Although in McHugh, supra, 49 Cal.3d 348, we rejected a rigid rule that would hold administrative agencies incompetent under the doctrine of judicial powers to award “damages” of any kind (id. at p. 358), in upholding the administrative award of damages we repeatedly distinguished incidental, “restitutive” damages—permissible under the judicial powers clause—from the award of unlimited, nonquantifiable compensatory damages, as to which we reserved opinion. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 358, 359-360, 375 & fn. 38.) In Curtis v. Loether, supra, 415 U.S. 189, a title VIII housing discrimination case, the United States Supreme Court made a similar distinction. Referring to the plaintiff‘s complaint, the Supreme Court stated, “[T]he relief sought here—actual and punitive damages—is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law. [Fn. omitted.]” (415 U.S. at p. 196 [39 L.Ed.2d at p. 267].) Backpay, by contrast—the only monetary relief afforded under title VII for employment discrimination—“is an integral part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution.” (Id. at p. 197 [39 L.Ed.2d at p. 197] [explaining why the jury trial right applies to a title VIII, but not a title VII, civil suit]).11
By implication, therefore, restitutive damages encompass, at a minimum, quantifiable sums that one private party subject to the jurisdiction of the agency owes to another party who claims the sum was obtained, or not paid, in violation of a law or regulation the agency is empowered to enforce. To the foregoing we would add, as here, out-of-pocket expenditures incurred or economic harm suffered by one party in consequence of another party‘s violation of a law or regulation the agency is empowered to enforce. Restitutive damages, in short, are akin to special damages, i.e., they are quantifiable amounts of money due an injured private party from another party to compensate for the pecuniary loss directly resulting from the second party‘s violation of law.
General compensatory damages for emotional distress, by contrast, are not pecuniarily measurable, defy a fixed rule of quantification, and are awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. (Oleck, supra, § 46, at pp. 31-32; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, supra, § 28, at p. 56.) As the commission itself has recognized, in seeking to place a dollar value on a complainant‘s mental and emotional injuries there is little in legal authority to guide it, for the reason that “[i]t has traditionally been left to the trier of fact to assess the degree of harm suffered and to fix a monetary amount as just compensation therefor. [Citation.]” (Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Ambylou Enterprises (1982) No. 82-06, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1982-1983, CEB 3, p. 11 [employment discrimination]; see Peralta, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 56; see generally Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases (1981) 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 83 [discussing the difficulty of evaluating intangible injuries in housing discrimination cases] [hereafter Schwemm].)
The same, we believe, holds true for the administrative adjudication of nonquantifiable emotional distress damages in housing discrimination cases. As shown, the purpose of the act was to provide a streamlined and economic procedure for preventing and redressing discrimination in housing as an alternative to the more cumbersome and costly procedure of a civil suit. The availability of alternate civil remedies underscores that the primary regulatory purpose of the act is to prevent discrimination in housing before it happens and, when it does occur, to offer a streamlined and economical administrative procedure to make its victim whole in the context of the housing (cf. Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387). The award of unlimited general compensatory damages is neither necessary to this purpose nor merely incidental thereto; its effect, rather, is to shift the remedial focus of the administrative hearing from affirmative actions designed to redress the particular instance of unlawful housing discrimination and prevent its recurrence, to compensating the injured party not just for the tangible detriment to his or her housing situation, but for the intangible and nonquantifiable injury to his or her psyche suffered as a result of the respondent‘s unlawful acts, in the manner of a traditional private tort action in a court of law. (Cf. Peralta, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 49; see also Schwemm, supra, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. at pp. 89-90 [federal housing discrimination claims sound in tort and damage awards should be governed by compensation principles applicable to tort law].) As we stated in Peralta, supra, “[t]his effect, we believe, is beyond the scope of the Legislature‘s intended purpose in enacting the FEHA to prevent and eliminate discrimination . . . .” (52 Cal.3d at p. 49.)
The commission, however, argues that a distinction exists between the performance of a judicial function, on the one hand, and the exercise of judicial power, on the other, and that the state Constitution does not preclude the vesting of “court-like” functions in an administrative agency, so long as
In support of its argument, the commission cites numerous out-of-state cases that hold the administrative award of unlimited nonquantifiable damages is permissible when, as here, due process procedural rights have been protected, prohibited conduct has been well defined by the governing statute, and judicial review is available. (E.g., Kentucky Com‘n on Human Rights v. Fraser, supra, 625 S.W.2d 852; Plasti-Line, Inc. v. Human Rights Com‘n (Tenn. 1988) 746 S.W.2d 691.) In many of the cited cases, however, the administrative award of unlimited damages for emotional distress type injuries was not at issue. (See, e.g., Percy Kent Bag Co. v. Missouri Com‘n, (Mo. 1982) 632 S.W.2d 480, 483-485 [backpay]; General Drivers & Helpers U. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd. (1963) 21 Wis.2d 242 [124 N.W.2d 123] [vacation pay]; cf. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency (1973) 62 N.J. 399 [301 A.2d 754, 761, 61 A.L.R.3d 927] [“minor or incidental” awards, here $750].) In McHugh, moreover, we expressly rejected the proposition that “an administrative agency may exercise all manner of ‘judicial-like’ power on the simple condition that judicial review of the administrative decision remains available.” (49 Cal.3d at p. 364.) Although we recognized that sister states’ decisions have occasionally accorded little consideration to the “substantive limitations” principle discussed above (id. at p. 371), we adhered to the guiding principles of substantive as well as procedural limitations on the remedial power of administrative agencies (id. at p. 374).
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the commission‘s award of unlimited general compensatory damages for emotional distress was in violation of the judicial powers clause.12
Although the Court of Appeal construed the statute as authorizing the award of unlimited compensatory damages, and held that the $50,000 compensatory damages award in this case was unconstitutional, it did not invalidate the damages provision of the statute in its entirety; rather, the court determined that the general damages award for emotional distress must be stricken, leaving in effect the special damages award for out-of-pocket loss. Respondents argue that in so doing the Court of Appeal in effect rewrote the statute, which it is not empowered to do (citing Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 520 [217 Cal.Rptr. 225, 703 P.2d 1119]). We disagree. Although the statutory phrase “actual damages” is indivisible, it embodies a dual concept: that of nonquantifiable compensatory damages and that of pecuniarily measurable out-of-pocket expenditures; together these two types of damages make up “actual damages” (See Oleck, supra, § 12, at pp. 22-23.) The statute thus is one where a single section contains language susceptible of applications, part of which—i.e., the award of general compensatory damages—is invalid. (See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1986) § 44.18, p. 533.) In such a case, “the statute should be upheld if, after deletion of the invalid [application], a workable statute remains.” (Ibid.) This type of severability, Sutherland explains, is permissible in jurisdictions which permit limitation of an entire act to its valid applications. “If a court will limit an entire act to its valid applications, a fortiori it will limit a small part of the statute to its valid applications. [Fn. omitted.]” (Id. at p. 534.)
A severability clause, although not conclusive, ““normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the enactment . . . . The final determination depends on whether ‘the remainder . . . is complete in itself and would have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute’ [citation] . . . .““” (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1982) 32 Cal.3d 180, 190 [185 Cal.Rptr. 260, 649 P.2d 902].) These criteria are clearly met in the instant case: the valid application of the damages provision is complete in itself, and the Legislature, we have no doubt, would have authorized the commission to award only restitutive damages had it foreseen the invalidity of the provision for the award of unlimited compensatory damages.
We therefore hold that
B. The Award of Punitive Damages
The commission, one commissioner dissenting, awarded Cannon $40,635 in punitive damages, or the statutory maximum of $1,000 for each discrim-
We turn, then, to the statutory language. The statute declares the “practice of discrimination because of race, color,” and other specified grounds to be against public policy (
Although the statute lists unlawful practices, nowhere does it define “practice.” The term, however, is unambiguous. As both lay and legal dictionaries state, the term “practice” means a course of conduct, i.e., “to do or perform often, customarily, or habitually; to make a practice of” (Webster‘s New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 1937, col. 3); “[r]epeated or customary action; habitual performance; a succession of acts of similar kind; custom; usage” (Black‘s Law Dict., supra, at p. 1172, col. 1). Given this plain meaning of the term, we conclude that in refusing to rent to Cannon on the basis of race, respondents committed a single “unlawful practice” within the meaning of the statute.
Asserting the remedial section of the act was patterned after federal law, the commission maintains we should adopt the federal definition of “discriminatory housing practice” to mean “an act” that is unlawful under the federal law. (
California law is the same. Our conclusion that respondents are liable for only one punitive damages award does not mean that a single “act” of discrimination is not a violation of the act or cannot support an accusation and finding of an “unlawful practice.” The case law is to the contrary. (See Stearns, supra, 6 Cal.3d 205, 212-213; Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 232; see also
Thus, in the instant case, Indridson‘s refusal to rent to Cannon because of his race constituted one violation of the act or one “unlawful practice.” (
Our adherence to the plain meaning of the statute is consistent with the other tenets of statutory construction previously recited. As discussed in part II.A. of this opinion (ante, at pp. 259-262), the history of the housing provisions of the act discloses a legislative intent to provide an inexpensive, streamlined remedy, providing conciliation and corrective, make-whole relief, as an alternative to the more cumbersome and expensive procedures of a civil suit. Pursuant to the statutory scheme, the department from the very outset seeks cooperative resolution of the complaint. (See
Unlike the primarily equitable and corrective remedies authorized by
“The general rule is that ‘[w]here the enabling statute is essentially remedial, and does not carry a penal program declaring certain practices to be crimes or provide penalties or fines in vindication of public rights, an agency does not have discretion to devise punitive measures such as the prescription of penalties or fines.’ ” (Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1388.) Here, although the enabling statute authorizes the award of limited punitive damages, the statute is essentially remedial. To construe it, as the commission urges, as permitting unlimited multiple cumulative awards of punitive damages, would be to alter fundamentally the nature of the administrative remedy. “Uniformly, we have looked with disfavor on ever-mounting penalties and have narrowly construed the statutes which either require or permit them.” (Hale v. Morgan, supra, 22 Cal.3d 388, 401.)
Finally, a statute is to be construed whenever possible so as to preserve its constitutionality. (Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387 and cases cited.) Under the commission‘s view, a question would arise whether the administrative award of substantial punitive damages by a nonconstitutional agency, as here, would violate the judicial powers clause. Although in McHugh, supra, 49 Cal.3d 348, we expressly noted we were not considering the constitutional propriety of “relatively minor ‘punitive damages’ under statutory schemes that expressly authorize such damages, and set a cap on such awards,” citing
The commission urges that cumulative punitive damages effectuate the purpose of the law by serving to deter repeated acts of discrimination. We do not dispute the deterrent effect of punitive damages. (See Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1389.) In light, however, of the considerations discussed above, this is insufficient basis to construe the statute as authorizing such awards.
In People v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283 [107 Cal.Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d 1400, 55 A.L.R.3d 191], this court reached a similar conclusion in construing consumer protection legislation prohibiting false and misleading advertising (
We are not unmindful of the substantial deleterious effects of housing discrimination, not only on the individual victim, but on society at large. Without in any way diminishing the gravity of such discrimination or minimizing the particularly egregious violations of law that occurred in this case, we nevertheless believe that here, as in People v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 283, it would be unreasonable to assume that the Legislature, in an essentially remedial statute, intended to authorize the commission to impose substantial multiple, cumulative punitive damage awards for a single course of discriminatory conduct against one complainant.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed in part and affirmed in part. That part of the Court of Appeal judgment relating to punitive damages is reversed. That part of the Court of Appeal judgment relating to emotional distress compensatory damages is modified with directions to order the superior court to modify its writ to strike the award of compensatory damages for emotional distress14 and, as modified, is affirmed.
Lucas, C. J., Mosk, J., Arabian, J., and Baxter, J., concurred.
KENNARD, J.—I dissent.
Through the Fair Employment and Housing Act1 (FEHA or the Act), this state has made a firm commitment to eradicate housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry. (
The majority holds that administrative awards of compensatory damages for emotional suffering violate our state Constitution‘s judicial powers clause, and that the Act itself limits administrative awards of punitive damages to $1,000 from each violator of the Act for multiple acts of discrimination of the same type against a single victim. These holdings, as I shall explain, are neither compelled by our state Constitution nor faithful to the language or purpose of the Act. Worse yet, they will so impair the Act‘s administrative enforcement as to prevent achievement of its paramount goal.
The significance of these holdings can best be appreciated in the context of the facts of this case. In 1979, Robert Cannon, a 55-year-old African-American, applied to rent an apartment at Walnut Creek Manor, a 418-unit apartment complex for persons 55 years and older, in part because he had friends who lived there. Because of his race, Cannon remained on the waiting list for two and one-half years.
In 1982, Cannon met a non-African-American who, after only a few months on the waiting list, had rented an apartment at Walnut Creek Manor. Cannon then realized that his race was the reason no apartment had been offered him, and filed a FEHA complaint. Investigation uncovered that Walnut Creek Manor had rented 35 apartments to non-African-Americans who applied after Cannon.
At the administrative hearing, Cannon testified that as the result of Walnut Creek Manor‘s refusal to rent to him, he had suffered humiliation and embarrassment. The Commission awarded Cannon $50,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress and $35,000 in punitive damages ($1,000 for each of the 35 violations of the Act) plus an adjustment for inflation. The majority eliminates the award for emotional distress and reduces the punitive damage award to slightly more than $1,000. I disagree with this result.
The first part of this dissenting opinion shows that the judicial powers clause of the state Constitution does not prevent the Commission from awarding damages for emotional distress. The second part explains that the Legislature has authorized the Commission to award punitive damages up to
I. THE JUDICIAL POWERS CLAUSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE COMMISSION FROM AWARDING DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
FEHA, like the federal Fair Housing Act (
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that a system that relies on private enforcement, yet bars administrative tribunals from compensating housing discrimination victims for their emotional distress, cannot eliminate housing discrimination. Such a system is doomed to fail. For these reasons, administrative awards of compensatory damages for pain and suffering are
A. FEHA Authorizes the Commission to Award Emotional Distress Damages to the Victims of Housing Discrimination
Segregated housing patterns, which frequently confine minority groups to substandard housing, persist in many areas in California and throughout the nation. (See Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Federal Fair Housing Act (1988) 6 Yale L. & Pol‘y Rev. 375, 384 [hereafter Private Enforcement and Fair Housing].) Although low income undoubtedly prevents many minority group members from obtaining better housing, this case vividly demonstrates that discrimination on racial and other grounds continues to prevent individuals from obtaining housing they can well afford, a situation that Congress has recognized to be one of our most serious social problems. As one commentator has written, “The involuntary ghetto is inimical to the American dream.” (Kaplan, Discrimination in California Housing: The Need for Additional Legislation (1962) 50 Cal.L.Rev. 635, 643 [hereafter Discrimination in California Housing].) And, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a landlord who discriminates against a rental applicant injures not just the applicant, but the whole community. (Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. (1972) 409 U.S. 205, 211 [34 L.Ed.2d 415, 420, 93 S.Ct. 364].)
FEHA declares that “the practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry in housing accommodations is . . . against public policy.” (
A person who has suffered housing discrimination can seek redress by filing a verified complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (Department). (
If the Department issues an accusation and the Commission concludes after a hearing that the Act has been violated, the Commission must issue “an order requiring [the] respondent to cease and desist” the discriminatory practice. (
B. Congress Has Recognized the Necessity of Effective Administrative Remedies for Housing Discrimination
An administrative tribunal‘s ability to compensate discrimination victims with meaningful damage awards is crucial to eliminating discrimination in housing. This is demonstrated by the history of FEHA‘s federal counterpart, the Fair Housing Act, and by the congressional findings supporting recent amendments of that legislation.
The federal Fair Housing Act is similar in both purpose and content to FEHA.3 Like FEHA, the federal law depends on private enforcement to achieve its policy goals. (See Private Enforcement and Fair Housing, supra, 6 Yale L. & Pol‘y Rev. 375, 378.) The United States Supreme Court has observed that “complaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the [Fair Housing] Act.” (Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., supra, 409 U.S. 205, 209 [34 L.Ed.2d 415, 419].) When the victims of housing discrimination enforce the fair housing laws, they “act not only on their own behalf but also ‘as private attorneys general in
Private enforcement of the federal Fair Housing Act has been frustrated, however, by the difficulty of pursuing court actions. As one commentator notes: “[T]he prospect of hiring a lawyer and filing a lawsuit is not appealing to many people, and this problem is especially acute in the housing field. The very fact that an individual or a family is in the market for new housing often means that their lives are in a state of flux,” which frequently makes bringing a civil lawsuit “a practical impossibility.” (Private Enforcement and Fair Housing, supra, 6 Yale L. & Pol‘y Rev. at p. 380.) Other commentators agree that allowing victims of housing discrimination to bring court actions cannot alone eradicate discriminatory housing practices. (Discrimination in California Housing, supra, 50 Cal.L.Rev. 635, 642, fn. 42 [“Given the expenses emanating from a lengthy trial, the doubt as to the outcome, immediate need for housing, and the difficulty in calculating damages, many victims of [housing] discrimination may not (or cannot) initiate court action.“].)
Compared to a court action, an administrative proceeding is simple to initiate. There are no complex procedural requirements that would require the complainant to seek out and retain private counsel. And administrative proceedings usually produce decisions and remedies more quickly than judicial proceedings.
For administrative proceedings to be truly effective, however, they must offer meaningful compensation to the claimant. The federal experience shows that the single most important component of an effective fair housing program is the administrative agency‘s enforcement authority. If that authority is weak, the statutory scheme will not succeed.
As originally enacted, the federal Fair Housing Act offered no effective administrative redress of private claims because the powers of HUD, the administrative agency charged with enforcing the federal law, were limited to “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” (Former
Congress acknowledged the validity of these criticisms in 1988. It found that discrimination and segregation in housing remained pervasive 20 years after the federal law was enacted, noting HUD‘s estimate that 2 million instances of housing discrimination occur each year. (House Rep. of the Judiciary Com. (hereafter House Report), 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. 2176.) Based on this experience, Congress determined that the principal defect in the existing law, which prevented it from achieving the goal of eradicating discrimination in housing, was the absence of an effective administrative enforcement mechanism (ibid.), and that an administrative proceeding should be the primary method by which persons aggrieved by discriminatory housing practices obtain redress (id. at p. 2200). For the express purpose of providing effective administrative remedies, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. (
These amendments added aggressive administrative enforcement capabilities to the fair housing provisions of the federal act. They provide for agency enforcement of private claims before an administrative law judge, who is empowered, upon a finding of housing discrimination, to award appropriate relief including compensatory damages,4 injunctive relief, other equitable relief, and civil penalties of a maximum of $10,000 for a first violation and up to $50,000 for two or more violations within a seven-year period. (
C. California Law Has Also Acknowledged That Effective Administrative Remedies Are Essential to Eliminate Housing Discrimination
The history of California fair housing laws is also instructive. Before 1963, California fair housing laws were criticized for failing to provide any administrative remedy. (Discrimination in California Housing, supra, 50 Cal.L.Rev. 635, 642-643.) In that year, and long before the federal government recognized that eliminating housing discrimination hinged on effective administrative enforcement, the California Legislature provided such enforcement. The Rumford Fair Housing Act (former Health & Saf. Code, § 35700 et seq., enacted by Stats. 1963, ch. 1853, §§ 2-4, pp. 3823-3830) authorized the Commission to award damages as an alternative to equitable relief. Subsequent amendments expanded the Commission‘s authority to award damages by permitting cumulative awards of damages and equitable remedies and by raising the monetary limit on damage awards. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 260.)
The Legislature combined the then-separate housing and employment antidiscrimination provisions into FEHA in 1980. From the outset, FEHA has authorized administrative awards of equitable relief and damages. (
This case illustrates the practical advantages of administrative enforcement. The claimant, Robert Cannon, met with an attorney one time for less than two hours at a cost of $300. It appears Cannon then filed his own FEHA claim, and thereafter has not been represented by counsel either before the Commission or in court. Instead, the Department, after satisfying itself of the validity of Cannon‘s claim, has prosecuted the action in its own name.
The effectiveness of the administrative remedy will be destroyed, however, if the Commission is deprived of authority to award compensation for nonmonetary injuries. This is because in most housing cases, the “out-of-pocket damages are de minimis.” (Private Enforcement and Fair Housing, supra, 6 Yale L. & Pol‘y Rev. 375, 380.) Even though administrative proceedings are less burdensome to claimants than prosecuting a court case, they do involve a significant investment of time and effort. Unless the
D. The Judicial Powers Clause Does Not Deprive the Commission of Its Statutory Authority to Compensate Victims of Housing Discrimination for Their Emotional Distress
The majority concludes that administrative awards of general compensatory damages for pain and suffering are not “reasonably necessary” to effectuate FEHA‘s primary purpose and thus violate the judicial powers clause of the state Constitution. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 265.) The analysis offered in support of this conclusion is fundamentally flawed.
In McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 348, 372-374 [261 Cal.Rptr. 318, 777 P.2d 91], we interpreted our state Constitution‘s judicial powers clause (
The substantive limitation, as we explained in McHugh, prohibits administrative agencies from exercising “judicial-like” powers only when those powers are not “reasonably necessary to effectuate the agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes.” (McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., supra, 49 Cal.3d 348, 372, italics omitted.) Thus, so long as administrative awards of damages to compensate individual victims for pain and suffering resulting from discrimination made unlawful by FEHA are “reasonably necessary” to achieve FEHA‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purpose, such awards do not violate the judicial powers clause.
FEHA‘s primary and legitimate purpose is the elimination of discriminatory housing practices. As I have shown, FEHA, like its federal counterpart, relies on private enforcement to achieve its policy goal. FEHA includes
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the majority misapprehends FEHA‘s purpose. It characterizes that purpose as providing “a streamlined and economic procedure for preventing and redressing discrimination in housing as an alternative to the more cumbersome and costly procedure of civil suit.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 264.) Certainly, it is important that FEHA‘s administrative procedure be both “streamlined and economic.” But to say, as the majority does, that this is FEHA‘s primary goal is to mistake its means for its end. An administrative proceeding may be streamlined and economic, and yet be completely ineffective in eliminating discriminatory housing practices. Indeed, this will be the practical effect of the majority‘s holding.
The majority need not guess at the legislative purpose underlying FEHA; it need only recognize what the Legislature itself has expressed to be FEHA‘s stated purpose: “to provide effective remedies which will eliminate such discriminatory [housing] practices.” (
The majority concedes that “compensatory damages serve to deter discrimination” (maj. opn., ante, p. 258), but then concludes that deterring discrimination is not relevant to the issue in this case (ibid.). The majority misses the point. Whether compensatory damages serve in any significant way to further FEHA‘s underlying purpose is precisely the issue; because they do, administrative awards of such damages do not violate the judicial powers clause.
II. FEHA AUTHORIZES THE COMMISSION TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES UP TO THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM FOR EACH ACT OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
The other issue presented by this case is the scope of the Commission‘s authority to award punitive damages. FEHA authorizes the Commission to order the payment “of punitive damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars,” plus an adjustment for inflation, upon a finding that “a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice” as defined by the Act. (
The controlling issue in interpreting the language of any statute is the intent of the Legislature. (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 993 [239 Cal.Rptr. 886, 741 P.2d 1127]; Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach (1983) 34 Cal.3d 829, 831 [196 Cal.Rptr. 38, 670 P.2d 1121].) To determine that intent, we look first to the words of the statute, construing them in context, while harmonizing “both internally and with each other, to the extent possible” those statutes or statutory sections that pertain to the same subject matter. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].)
Viewed in isolation, the language of
The term “unlawful practice” appears in two sections of FEHA in addition to
In interpreting any statute, “[t]he object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented are prime considerations in determining legislative intent.” (People v. Jeffers, supra, 43 Cal.3d 984, 997, citing Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 669 [150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564].) A court should arrive at an interpretation that promotes the general purpose and policy of the law, not one that defeats it. (Harry Carian Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 209, 223 [216 Cal.Rptr. 688, 703 P.2d 27], quoting People v. Centr-O-Mart (1950) 34 Cal.2d 702, 704 [214 P.2d 378].) FEHA itself states that its provisions “shall be construed liberally” to effectuate its purposes. (
In the housing field, as I have noted, FEHA‘s purpose is “to provide effective remedies which will eliminate such discriminatory [housing] practices.” (
The majority limits a landlord‘s potential punitive damage exposure to $1,000 per victim, no matter how many discriminatory acts the landlord commits, so long as the discriminatory acts are of the same type. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 270.) This statutory construction means that a landlord who once discriminates against an applicant has little reason not to continue to do so. Here, for example, the Commission found that the landlord had discriminated against Cannon 35 times by renting to more recent applicants, yet the majority limits the Commission to a single $1,000 award of punitive damages, just as if there had been but a single act of discrimination. This $1,000 award is little punishment for a landlord who has committed as many violations of FEHA as occurred here. As the majority interprets it,
The prior version of
In this case, the Commission has interpreted
The majority is of the view that its construction of
In McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 378-379, this court relied on the judicial powers clause to strike down a portion of the Santa Monica rent control ordinance that authorized administrative awards of treble damages. We identified
Here, the majority approves multiple punitive damage awards against one landlord, provided each award is payable to a different victim or based on a different form of discrimination. In so doing, the majority necessarily concedes that multiple punitive damage awards made under these circumstances are “relatively minor” and in an amount “capped” by statute, and thus not violative of the judicial powers clause as explicated in McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., supra, 49 Cal.3d 348. Yet if multiple punitive damage awards to different victims or to the same victim based on different forms of discrimination are constitutional because they are relatively minor and capped by statute, then under the majority‘s own logic multiple punitive damage awards to the same victim based on multiple acts of the same type of discrimination should be no less offensive to the judicial powers clause. The majority fails to cover this gap in its constitutional reasoning.
In my view, the Commission correctly interpreted
III. CONCLUSION
The persistence of discriminatory housing practices and the history of state and federal efforts to combat them demonstrate that past remedial measures have not been sufficient and that vigorous administrative enforcement, with meaningful compensatory and punitive damage awards, offers the best available means to ensure a free and nondiscriminatory housing market.
The refusal to provide housing on grounds made unlawful by FEHA is invidious not simply because the applicant is denied housing, but also
Broussard, J., concurred.
Notes
The Commission made these findings in support of its award for emotional distress: “[Cannon] felt comfortable with the social and financial level he had achieved. [He] felt confident of his ability to rent an apartment because it was within his financial means and self-perceived social class. He referred to himself as someone who did not try for things ‘out of his league’ financially or socially because he ‘hated to be rejected.’ It never occurred to Cannon that he would not get an apartment in the Manor if he were patient and waited his turn. [¶] Being denied housing at the Manor had a profound effect on Cannon‘s self-esteem and caused him considerable pain, humiliation and embarrassment. The rejection affected his friendships with other residents at Walnut Creek Manor. . . . The rejection also affected Cannon‘s ability to look for other housing, discouraging him and making him worry that he would be rejected again.” Cannon expressed feelings of “pain and bewilderment” at his rejection, “he thought about it at night,” and felt “frustrated . . . by the realization that his record as a good tenant and a person who got along with all kinds of people was irrelevant to [getting accepted by Walnut Creek Manor].”
For an extensive discussion of the interrelationship between the Unruh Civil Rights Act (
