Lamay v. State, 49 A.3d 559

Plaintiff is a former Vermont state trooper who resigned in Feb 2002 and was rehired in Aug 2003.
In Oct 2004, plaintiff admitted policy violations related to a high-speed chase report and received a reprimand.
Shortly after, a second internal affairs investigation arose from a traffic stop and drug-seizure; discrepancies between her affidavits/depositions and a police videotape were found.
Plaintiff was suspended with pay during the investigation and instructed to dispose of marijuana in her desk, leading to further charges.
In July 2005, the Commissioner of Public Safety dismissed plaintiff based on the reprimand and the new charges; plaintiff then filed a FEPA and Title VII claim alleging gender-based discharge.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding no genuine issue of material fact that gender was a motivating factor; plaintiff appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff showed mixed-motive discrimination.	Plaintiff contends direct and circumstantial evidence shows gender bias.	State argues evidence is insufficient to prove gender bias as a motivating factor.	Mixed-motive not proven; no actionable gender motivation.
Whether the evidence supports gender-based motive from supervisor remarks.	Statements about being a single mother show bias.	Remarks were descriptive of childcare problems, not discriminatory motive.	Remarks do not establish discriminatory motive.
Whether the State disproved discriminatory grounds or pretext.	Disparate treatment evidence exists.	Record shows non-discriminatory explanations and no pretext.	State’s grounds not shown to be pretextual.
Whether the trial court should have considered the Human Rights Commission allegations.	Complaint to commission contains possible discriminatory claims.	Claims are inadmissible hearsay and conclusory; not enough to defeat summary judgment.	Commission allegations not considered; insufficient basis.
Whether there was evidence of similarly situated male treatment.	Male officers faced different outcomes.	Comparators not similarly situated or not known to be involved in the same proceedings.	No valid evidence of gender-based disparate treatment.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (establishes mixed-motive framework under Title VII)
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (clarifies proof of improper motives under amended Title VII)
Robertson v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 2004 VT 15, 176 Vt. 356, 848 A.2d 310 (Vt. 2004) (explains burden allocation for FEPA/Title VII mixed-motive analysis)
McIsaac v. Univ. of Vt., 2004 VT 50, 177 Vt. 16, 853 A.2d 77 (Vt. 2004) (describes initial burden shifting in mixed-motive cases)
In re McCort, 162 Vt. 481, 650 A.2d 504 (Vt. 1994) (approach to circumstantial evidence in motive cases)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (supervisor actions may be proximate cause of adverse action)
Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (gender-based stereotypes may indicate bias when similar to other cases)
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (evidence of parental duties and balance as discriminatory motive)
Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (illustrates sensitive consideration of gender-based stereotypes)
Bostock v. City of Burlington, 2011 VT 89, mem. (Vt. 2011) (consideration of late-filed evidence under summary judgment)