L.G. v. M.B., 25 Cal. App. 5th 211

Background

Plaintiff (L.G.), a former nanny, sued Defendant (M.B.) for defamation, invasion of privacy/false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements M.B. made in a declaration supporting a domestic violence restraining order filed in M.B.’s ongoing marital dissolution.
M.B. filed two ex parte temporary restraining orders: one in her dissolution against Ex-Husband that also contained allegations about L.G., and one in a separate civil harassment proceeding directly against L.G.; both resulted in temporary orders but the record lacks detailed findings.
L.G. filed the present complaint alleging the statements about her (e.g., sexual relationship with Ex-Husband, extortion, misuse of funds, taking children) were false and defamatory.
M.B. moved to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16), asserting absolute litigation privilege (Civ. Code §47) or, alternately, that prior restraining-order rulings established probable cause for her statements.
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the marital-dissolution exception to the litigation privilege (the “divorce proviso,” Civ. Code §47(b)(1)) applied and that L.G. made a prima facie showing she is likely to prevail; M.B. appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed: it held the divorce proviso applies to pleadings/affidavits filed in a dissolution action (including declarations seeking restraining orders), and the temporary restraining orders did not establish probable cause for the specific allegations as a matter of law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (L.G.)	Defendant's Argument (M.B.)	Held
Whether the marital-dissolution exception to the litigation privilege (Civ. Code §47(b)(1)) covers statements in a declaration filed in a dissolution action seeking a domestic violence restraining order	The exception applies because the statements were allegations/averments in a pleading/affidavit filed in a dissolution action concerning a person who sought no affirmative relief	The exception should be read narrowly to exclude restraining-order applications; statutory purpose and policy weigh against applying the proviso here	Held: The plain text of §47(b)(1) applies; the proviso covers any pleading/affidavit filed in an action for marital dissolution or legal separation, including declarations for restraining orders.
Whether Silberg or prior case law limits the proviso to historic "corespondents" or narrow categories	L.G. relied on the plain statutory language; no controlling precedent narrowed the proviso in Silberg	M.B./Amicus argued Silberg signaled the proviso is anachronistic or limited to historical corespondents	Held: Silberg did not definitively construe the proviso; subsequent legislative amendment in 1990 indicates the proviso remains operative and broader in scope.
Whether prior temporary restraining orders establish "reasonable and probable cause" as a matter of law for statements made in court filings (so that privilege applies)	L.G. argued the record does not show judges made findings supporting the specific challenged allegations	M.B. argued issuance of temporary restraining orders (including a later temporary order in the civil harassment action) proves probable cause to believe the statements	Held: The prior temporary orders were too preliminary/unclear to show the judges made findings on the particular challenged allegations; they do not establish probable cause as a matter of law.
Whether the anti-SLAPP denial was erroneous and whether appellate fees are warranted	L.G. argued the trial court correctly found a probability of prevailing on the merits	M.B. contended statements were privileged and anti-SLAPP should have been granted; sought reversal and contested fee denial	Held: Affirmed denial of anti-SLAPP motion; appeal not frivolous so no appellate fees awarded to L.G.

Key Cases Cited

Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205 (1990) (discusses litigation privilege and the marital-dissolution exception)
Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016) (describes anti-SLAPP two-step procedure and burdens)
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal.4th 811 (2002) (interim adverse judgment rule and when prior rulings may establish probable cause)
Parrish v. Latham & Watkins, 3 Cal.5th 767 (2017) (elements of malicious prosecution and discussion of probable cause)
Day v. City of Fontana, 25 Cal.4th 268 (2001) (statutory interpretation principle: plain meaning governs)