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847 F.3d 941
8th Cir.
2017
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Background

  • Plaintiff Kyle Soltesz leased and operated a food concession at the Rushmore Plaza Civic Center; the lease allowed the Civic Center to terminate with 45 days’ notice.
  • After a surveillance video showed Soltesz assaulting an employee, Civic Center General Manager Brian Maliske confronted Soltesz, issued a no-trespass warning, and escorted him out; shortly after a Board meeting, Maliske sent a letter terminating the lease immediately.
  • Soltesz was prevented from retrieving property from the concession stand while the no-trespass warning remained in effect; the Board later refused to transfer the lease and relet the space to another vendor.
  • Soltesz sued the Civic Center and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment due process; Fourth Amendment seizure) and state-law claims; the jury returned verdicts for Soltesz on all claims.
  • The Civic Center moved for JMOL arguing the district court erred by not identifying the final policymaker under state law before submitting municipal-liability questions to the jury; the district court denied JMOL and later suggested Maliske was the final policymaker.
  • The Eighth Circuit reversed and vacated the jury verdict, holding the district court must identify the final policymaker as a matter of law under state/local law before the case goes to the jury and remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the jury could find municipal liability without the court identifying the municipality's final policymaker Maliske exercised final policymaking authority over vendor leases and actions; evidence supported jury verdict Court must identify final policymaker as a matter of law; failure to do so is legal error preserved by JMOL Court held identification of final policymaker is a question of law for the judge; failing to identify it requires vacatur and remand
Whether policymaking authority was delegated to Maliske by the Board Board’s inaction and conduct imply delegation or de facto policymaking to Maliske Delegation is a legal question; de facto arguments insufficient—delegation requires legal authority free of review Court held delegation is a legal determination under state law for the judge; de facto final policymakers are not recognized
Whether the Board ratified Maliske’s actions Board’s failure to protest or stop the termination constituted ratification Ratification requires affirmative approval and knowledge; jury cannot infer policymaker identity Court explained ratification is a factual issue for the jury only after the court identifies the final policymaker; district court erred by not doing so earlier
Whether JMOL was properly denied and whether the jury verdict had legally sufficient basis Evidence at trial provided sufficient basis for verdict and for court’s post-trial finding that Maliske was final policymaker JMOL preserved the issue; the judge must decide final policymaker before jury deliberation Court reversed denial of renewed JMOL, vacated verdict, and remanded for retrial with proper legal identification of final policymaker

Key Cases Cited

  • Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (single official’s decision can be municipal policy if that official has final policymaking authority)
  • Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (identification of final policymakers is a legal question for the judge)
  • City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (courts must consult state/local law to locate policymaking authority; ratification and delegation principles)
  • Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 attaches to official policy, not respondeat superior)
  • Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 2013) (judge must identify final policymaker before jury decides causation by that policymaker’s policy)
  • Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, 810 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for JMOL and viewing evidence in light most favorable to the verdict)
  • Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2002) (vacatur and remand where municipal liability was imposed without the court identifying a final policymaker)
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Case Details

Case Name: Kyle Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza Civic Center
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 7, 2017
Citations: 847 F.3d 941; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2151; 2017 WL 490407; 15-3264
Docket Number: 15-3264
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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