Kramer v. Wasatch County Sheriff's Office, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3468

Kramer sued Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department for Title VII and §1983 sexual harassment; district court granted summary judgment on §1983 and on Title VII issues later reversed for trial.
Kramer endured long-running harassment by Sergeant Benson, including explicit requests, a doctored doctor’s note demanding foot rubs, and coercive, escalating abuses culminating in rape in Benson’s home.
Kramer reported jail harassment to the Sheriff in 2006; the Sheriff’s remedial action was defensive and largely ineffective, culminating in a staff meeting reenacting harassment.
Kramer was later assigned as a courthouse bailiff under Benson, who supervised her, evaluated her, and had power to affect her employment status; Benson’s harassment intensified and extended to coercive retaliation.
Kramer reported alleged misconduct during a money investigation; the Sheriff’s internal investigation focused on her personal life rather than harassment; POST suspended her certification for an affair; the Sheriff urged her resignation.
Kramer ultimately alleged that the County’s response and policy failures allowed Benson’s harassment; the district court held Benson not a supervisor for Title VII purposes and that the County was not liable; on appeal the Title VII supervisor issue and Faragher/Ellerth defense were reconsidered.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Benson was a Title VII supervisor for vicarious liability	Kramer contends Benson acted as her supervisor and thus the County is liable.	County argues Benson lacked actual authority to fire or decisively affect employment; supervisor status uncertain.	Genuine issues of material fact on supervisor status; remand for trial.
Whether the County can invoke Faragher/Ellerth defense if Benson is a supervisor	Even with supervisor status, County failed to show reasonable prevention and prompt correction and reasonable employee response.	County can avoid liability if it proves it exercised reasonable care and plaintiff unreasonably failed to utilize remedies.	Faragher/Ellerth defense not established as a matter of law; genuine issues remain.
Whether the harassment constituted a tangible employment action	Rape and some actions (e.g., demotion, leave decisions) should be viewed as tangible actions.	Rape and pass-through actions were not official acts of the enterprise; not tangible employment actions.	No tangible employment action found.
Whether the County is liable under §1983 and on qualified immunity grounds	County violated equal protection by tolerating sexual harassment; Supervisor’s actions justify liability.	Sheriff entitled to qualified immunity; no policy or custom shown; no deliberate indifference proven.	Sheriff entitled to qualified immunity; County not liable under §1983.

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court, 1998) (established Faragher/Ellerth framework for supervisor liability)
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (Supreme Court, 2013) (defined supervisor as one empowered to take tangible employment actions or who can influence them)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (Supreme Court, 2011) (affirmed liability for biased subordinate even when final decisionmaker is unbiased)
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998) (apparent authority analysis for supervisor status)
Suders v. Dickin s, 542 U.S. 129 (Supreme Court, 2004) (conduct of harassment and employer’s duty to prevent; permissible defense framework)
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (Supreme Court, 1986) (hostile work environment concept requires unwelcome conduct)
Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court, 1998) (tangible employment action and Faragher defense framework)
Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussed tangible employment action and assault context)
Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Comm., Inc., 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995) (constructive notice and pervasive harassment considerations)