Kleehammer v. Monroe County, 583 F. App'x 18

Kleehammer, proceeding pro se, appealed district court orders related to her employment discrimination claims against Monroe County and others.
District court dismissed part of her claims in September 2010 and later granted summary judgment for defendants on remaining claims in November 2012.
The district court also sanctioned counsel on March 20, 2013.
Kleehammer filed a notice of appeal on April 29, 2013, attempting to appeal the November 2012 order and the March 2013 sanction, but the notice did not specify the September 2010 order.
The Second Circuit held jurisdiction was limited to the November 2012 summary judgment order and dismissed the rest.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the appeal is reviewable of the November 2012 order	Kleehammer contends the district court erred in summary judgment on retaliation claims.	Defendants argue the notice of appeal did not designate the September 2010 order and thus limits review to the November 2012 order.	Yes, the appeal is limited to the November 2012 order.
Whether Kleehammer stated a Title VII/NYSHRL retaliation claim	Kleehammer asserts retaliation for reporting incidents by denying Z-time and ordering return to work.	Defendants maintain no genuine dispute on nonretaliatory reasons and no pretext.	The claims fail; no pretext shown and no causal link established.
Whether the Rule 11 sanction against counsel created a justiciable dispute for appeal	Kleehammer sought review of sanctions against counsel as part of her appeal.	Sanctions against attorney, not plaintiff, cannot be appealed by plaintiff.	No, sanctions charged to counsel are not subject to plaintiff’s appeal.

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (U.S. 2007) (jurisdictional requirements for filing a notice of appeal)
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (S. Ct. 2012) (Rule 3(c)(1) jurisdictional designations)
New Phone Co. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2007) (interpretation of notices of appeal when intent is clear)
M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell, 712 F.3d 666 (2d Cir. 2013) (timeliness of amended notices of appeal)
DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1988) (appeal by attorney must be in his own name)
Goins v. Bridgeport Hosp., 555 F. App’x 70 (2d Cir. 2014) (pre-Nassar context for retaliation standard not required here)
Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir. 1996) (three-step burden-shifting standard for retaliation claims)
Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005) (three-step framework for Title VII retaliation claims)
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (elements of protected activity, knowledge, adverse action, and causation)
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (S. Ct. 2013) (but-for causation standard for retaliation in Title VII cases)
Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1990) (pre-Nassar standard for retaliation causation)
New Phone Co. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2007) (jurisdictional interpretation of notices of appeal)