610 F. App'x 825
11th Cir.2015Background
- Leon King, a federal prisoner represented by counsel, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion; the district court dismissed it as time-barred under AEDPA.
- King appealed; the Eleventh Circuit granted a COA limited to whether his § 2255 motion was timely under § 2255(f)(3) based on Alleyne and Descamps being retroactive.
- § 2255(f)(3) tolls the one-year AEDPA limitations period from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if [the right] has been newly recognized ... and made retroactively applicable.”
- Alleyne held that any fact that increases a statutory mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, overruling Harris.
- Descamps clarified that for indivisible statutes courts cannot use the modified categorical approach and must apply the categorical approach when assessing ACCA predicate offenses.
- The Eleventh Circuit concluded neither Alleyne nor Descamps made newly recognized rights retroactively applicable on collateral review; thus King’s § 2255 motion was untimely under § 2255(f)(3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alleyne is retroactive for § 2255(f)(3) | King: Alleyne announces a new rule (including reasonable-doubt component) that should be retroactive | Government: Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review; it applies Apprendi principles | Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review; § 2255(f)(3) not triggered |
| Whether Descamps is a new rule for § 2255(f)(3) | King: Descamps changed ACCA predicate analysis and should trigger § 2255(f)(3) | Government: Descamps applied and clarified existing precedent; it did not announce a new substantive rule | Descamps is not a new rule for § 2255(f)(3); does not trigger tolling |
| Whether a decision that is "new" is retroactively applicable | King: (implicit) if new, should be retroactive under § 2255(f)(3) | Government: New rules apply retroactively only if substantive or fit a Teague exception (watershed procedural rule) | Court applies Teague/Schriro framework: new procedural rules rarely retroactive; substantive rules are |
| Whether King’s § 2255 was timely under § 2255(f)(3) | King: Timeliness based on Alleyne/Descamps being newly recognized and retroactive | Government: Neither case qualifies to restart the AEDPA clock | Motion untimely; § 2255(f)(3) not satisfied; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (mandatory-minimum facts are elements requiring jury finding)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach unavailable for indivisible statutes)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishes substantive rules from new procedural rules for retroactivity)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by a jury)
- Jeanty v. Warden, FCI–Miami, 757 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2014) (Alleyne not retroactive on collateral review)
- Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (any court may decide retroactivity for § 2255(f)(3) purposes)
- McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (Apprendi rule not retroactive on collateral review)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (narrowing definition of "violent felony")
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (narrow construction of "violent felony" under ACCA)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permitted limited materials to determine the basis of a prior conviction)
- Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman–Medium, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (discusses substantive-rule retroactivity)
- Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (describes the watershed procedural rule standard)
- Drury v. United States, 507 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for § 2255 statute-of-limitations determinations)