Kevin Turner v. Stephanie D. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257

Background

Father (Kevin) obtained a default chancery-court judgment in 2001 terminating Mother’s parental rights after attempting service at the former marital home and publishing notice; no motion for publication or detailed affidavit of diligent efforts appears in the record.
The divorce decree awarded Father the marital home and exclusive custody in 2000; Mother’s counsel withdrew in 2000 and notices from that counsel used a different address (friend Charlie Fosset’s), which Father did not use for service.
Mother had been largely absent from the children from 2000 due to drug relapse, regained sobriety in 2004, and learned of the termination in 2008; she filed a Rule 60.02(3) petition in 2010 to set aside the 2001 default judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The trial court and Court of Appeals set aside the termination order as void because Father failed to comply with statutory requirements and produce the requisite affidavit showing diligent efforts before resorting to publication.
Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether the termination order was void for lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) whether Rule 60.02’s “reasonable time” requirement bars late challenges to void judgments, and (3) whether courts may deny relief from a void judgment under exceptional circumstances.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Turner)	Defendant's Argument (Turner)	Held
Was the termination judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction?	Father argued constructive service by publication was valid and created prima facie jurisdiction.	Mother argued statutory prerequisites (motion for publication and detailed affidavit of diligent efforts) were not met, so service was ineffective.	Judgment is void: record lacks the statutorily required motion/affidavit and court order authorizing publication; publication alone was insufficient.
Does Rule 60.02’s “reasonable time” limit bar late attacks on void judgments?	Father argued Mother waited unreasonably (≈9 years) and must be barred by Rule 60.02.	Mother argued void judgments may be attacked at any time; Rule 60.02’s time limit should not apply to void-judgment claims.	Rule 60.02’s reasonable-time requirement does not bar attacks on void judgments; void judgments are not time-barred.
May relief from a void judgment be denied on equitable/exceptional grounds?	Father urged denial based on delay, children's settled status, and prejudice to adoptive/third-party interests.	Mother contended no such bar applies because the judgment is void ab initio.	Yes: relief may be denied under limited "exceptional circumstances" (estoppel-by-benefit). Court adopts Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 two-part test (manifestation of intent to treat judgment as valid; substantial reliance by others).
What remand proceedings are required?	Father sought deference to trial-court factual findings.	Mother sought immediate reinstatement of parental rights post-voiding.	Case remanded for a hearing so the trial court can apply § 66 to the developed record and determine whether exceptional circumstances preclude relief.

Key Cases Cited

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (establishes personal-jurisdiction foundations and limits on judgments without proper service)
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (publication notice constitutionally inadequate for known parties; notice must be reasonably calculated to inform)
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (if name and address are reasonably ascertainable, mail or other means likely to give actual notice are required)
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (distinguishes subject-matter and personal jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction protects liberty and can be waived)
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (void judgments are limited to narrow, fundamental infirmities and may be attacked despite finality)
Giles v. State ex rel. Giles, 235 S.W.2d 24 (Tenn.) (presumption of validity for judgments; voidness must appear on the face of the record)