*1 MISSIONS v. ADAMS MENNONITE OF BOARD Argued No. 82-11. March 1983 Decided June *2 Court, Marshall, Burger, J., opinion in delivered the which Stevens, J., Brennan, White, Blackmun, JJ., joined. and C. O’Connor, J., dissenting opinion, in which Powell and Rehn- filed post, p. QUIST,JJ., joined, 800.
William J. Cohen argued the cause for With appellant. Whitney Slabaugh. him on the brief was C.
Robert Miller W. the cause and filed a brief for argued appellee. delivered the of the Court. opinion Marshall
Justice by publica- This raises the whether notice appeal question of real property tion and posting provides mortgaged notice of a to sell the proceeding prop- adequate for of taxes. erty nonpayment
I—I an Alfred Jean Moore obligation $14,000, To secure pay in Mennonite Board executed a favor of mortgage appellant (MBM) Ind., that Moore Elkhart, of Missions on property from MBM. The was recorded mortgage had purchased 1, 1973. on March County Elkhart Recorder’s Office responsible Moore was agreement, Under terms knowl- for all of the taxes. Without MBM’s paying property however, property. she failed to taxes on edge, pay for the sale of real on property Indiana law annual provides for have been delinquent which taxes payments property §6-1.1-24-1 longer. seq. et months or Ind. Code county post Prior sale, auditor must notice county publish for courthouse once each week §6-1.1-24-3. three consecutive weeks. The owner of the is entitled to notice mail to certified his last §6-1.1-24-4.1 known Until Indi- 1980,however, address. provide personal ana not law did notice mail service mortgagees nonpay- that was to be sold for ment taxes.2 provided, county
After notice is treasurer public holds a auction at which real sold to *3 § highest purchaser acquires the bidder. 6-1.1-24-5. The a against certificate of sale which a constitutes lien the real §6-1.1-24-9. property paid. for the entire amount This superior against property lien is to all other liens the which existed at the time the certificate was issued. Ibid. by 2-year period redemption
The tax sale is followed a dur- ing occupant, person which the “owner, lienholder, or other property may prop- who has an interest in” the redeem the §6-1.1-25-1. erty. property To redeem the an individual pay county must the treasurer a sum sufficient to cover the purchase price property of the the tax the sale and amount special paid purchaser taxes assessments the fol- lowing plus percentage specified the an in the sale, additional §6-1.1-25-2. county statute. in turn remits the payment purchaser property to the at the sale. tax §6-1.1-25-3. mortgagee mortgaged property a no
1 Because has title to the under law, mortgagee purposes Indiana the is not considered an “owner” for §of Savings First Loan Assn. Central Indiana v. Fur & 6-1.1-24-4. nish, 596, 265, 272, App. 174 Ind. n. 367 N. E. 2d n. 14 (1982), 1980, provides §6-1.1-24-4.2 Indiana Code for notice added subject mail to mortgagee property certified of real which is tax proceedings, annually mortgagee requested sale if the has such notice agreed $10, pay fee, sending has not to exceed to cover the cost the question notice. Because the in this case occurred before events amendment, is not before us. constitutionality the of the amendment statutory during property re- the the If no one redeems county may apply purchaser period, to the au- demption the executing property. and deliv- Before to the ditor for a deed county notify ering the former auditor must deed, the the property. to redeem the he still entitled that is owner required. §6-1.1-25-6. If is notice to the No county days, audi- property not redeemed within may and deliver a deed for the execute tor then thereby acquires purchaser, “an estate §6-1.1-25-4, who simple liens and encum- absolute, free and clear all in fee ” l-25-4(d). § brances . 6-1. may obtaining purchaser initiate an ac- deed, After § property. quiet 6-1.1-25-14. The to the tion to his title previous to have an lienholders, and others who claim owner, longer property. no redeem interest conveyed by only They may tax deed defeat the title by proving, that had been sub- alia, inter not ject sold, taxes for which it was to, for, assessed prop- paid sale, before the or that the taxes had been erty properly was redeemed before the deed was executed. §6-1.1-25-16. County Elkhart initiated sell *4 property nonpayment county pro- taxes. The
Moore’s of posted the it vided notice as under statute: published an announcement of the tax sale and mailed notice by to Moore mail. informed of certified MBM was not the by pending County tax sale either Auditor or Moore. property appellee $1,167.75 was sold for Richard ap- August
Adams on MBM 8, 1977. Neither Moore nor peared steps at the sale or took thereafter to redeem the property. Following property, the sale of her Moore contin- payments make a result MBM, ued to each month to and as not sold. On MBM did realize that had been August By then 16,1979, MBMfirst learned of the tax sale. redemption period appel- run had and Moore still owed lant $8,237.19.
In November
Adams filed a suit
state court seek-
ing
property.
opposition
quiet
title to the
to Adams’
summary judgment,
motion for
MBM contended that it had
constitutionally adequate
pending
not received
notice of the
opportunity
tax sale and of the
to redeem the
fol-
lowing
upheld
tax sale. The trial court
Indiana tax
against
challenge. The
sale statute
this constitutional
Indi-
Appeals
ana Court of
affirmed.
II In Mullane v. Trust Co., Central Hanover Bank & (1950), recognized prior this Court to an liberty, action which will life, affect an interest protected by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth provide reasonably a State must “notice calcu- Amendment, apprise par- lated, circumstances, under all the interested pendency opportu- ties nity of the action and afford them an present objections.” “elementary Invoking their requirement process,” and fundamental ibid., due published Court held that an to settle ac- action counts of a common trust fund not sufficient to inform was beneficiaries of the trust whose names and addresses were explained by publication known. The Court that notice was provide not calculated to actual notice pending proceeding inadequate and was to inform therefore those who could be notified more effective means such as personal service or mailed notice: brings
“Chance alone resi- to the attention of even a local type dent an in the back advertisement small inserted pages newspaper, if and he makes his home outside *5 newspaper’s the area of the normal circulation odds large in- that the information never him are will reach deed. of actual notice further reduced chance is when, here, as notice does not even name 796 attract, and does it is to attention supposed whose
those call it to attention. who might not inform acquaintances of on the basis sufficiency equivalence In its weighing more this as notice, regard we are unable actual Id., at 315.3 than a feint.”
3 premises underlying in Mullane rejected one The decision judicial concerning requirements of notice in previous Court’s decisions vary rights depending process on whether ac proceedings: that due S.,U. personam. in rem in at 312. v. 339 See tions are or Shaffer Heitner, Traditionally, 186, when a court 206 state S. upon authority person, per over the jurisdiction its its defendant’s based essential for the court to bind individuals who sonal service was considered g., Brown, e. Hamilton v. See, jurisdiction. to its 161 did not submit (1890); Pennoyer Griggs, (1896); Arndt v. 134 U. S. (“[D]ue (1878) Neff, 714, 726, process v. law would re 95 U. S. appearance personal person or before the defendant quire service could be rendered”). Pawloski, Hess In v. ally judgment 274 U. S. bound (1927), recognized by regis first time the Court that service service, mail, personal may satisfy place requirements tered in process. due Constructive notice was never deemed sufficient to bind an personam. in an action in individual quasi in in rem in rem contrast, jurisdiction in which power territory, gen- on the over its see
was based court’s within Heitner, supra, erally 196-205, v. constructive notice to nonres- Shaffer traditionally satisfy the requirements idents was understood of due process. questions In order to settle of title to its within terri- an in rem action tory, generally required proceed by a state court was since the court could not otherwise bind nonresidents. At one time con- only notifying structive service means nonresidents was considered the “[pjrocess since it was believed that from the tribunals of one cannot State Pennoyer Neff, Ballard v. run into another State.” v. at 727. See Hunter, result, As acquired the nonresident duty way “to represented take measures that in some he shall be when Id., requisition.” get If he “fail[ed] his called into ordinary publications usually required which have been cases, Ibid. such it his [was] misfortune.”
Rarely imposed corresponding duty parties was a on interested who re- sided within the State and whose identities were ascertainable. rem, actions provided personal generally Even such individuals were g., Griggs, supra, e. Arndt See, service. the iden- at 326-327. Where
797 subsequent unwaveringly cases, In this Court has adhered principle City in to the announced Mullane. v. Walker of (1956), example, Hutchinson, 352 U. 112 for S. the Court proceedings published held that notice of condemnation in a newspaper inadequate informing local anwas means of a city landowner whose name was known to the and was on the Similarly, City, officialrecords. New Schroeder v. York (1962), publication 371 U. 208 S. the Court concluded that newspaper posted inadequate apprise a notices were owner of condemnation when his name readily and address were ascertainable from both deed rec recently, Lindsey, ords and tax rolls. Most in Greene v. (1982), posting 456 444 U. S. we held that a summons on the apartment inadequate pro of door a tenant's was an of means viding entry forcible and detainer actions. See also Light, Memphis &Gas Water Div. v. Craft, 1, U. S. (1978); Jacquelin, 13-15 Eisen v. Carlisle 156, & 417 U. S. (1974); England, 174-175 Bank Marin v. 99, S. (1966); Covey Somers, v. Town 146-147 (1956); City New York York, v. New Co., N. H. & H. R. tity of interested residents could not be ascertained after a dili gent however, inquiry, in property their interests could be affected in rem See Ham proceeding long provided. as as constructive notice was Brown, Zeiss, supra, ilton v. American Land Co. v. 275; at 219 U. S. 61-62, 65-66 Beginning contrary this recognized, Court has to the ear- cases, in rem judgment lier line of that “an adverse directly affects the divesting rights owner him of his in the before Heitner, court.” In rejecting 206. the traditional Shaffer justification distinguishing between residents and nonresidents and be- personam actions, tween in rem and the Court has not left all interested vagaries claimants indirect required notice. Our cases have provide parties State make efforts to actual all notice to interested com- parable in in personam previously only to the efforts that were infra, page. actions. See *7 analysis by in Mullane. To is controlled This case mortgagee possesses begin a substantial a with, by significantly tax sale. Under a affected that is interest mortgagee acquires on the owner’s a lien law, a Indiana mortgag- conveyed together may with the be which by repay obligation personal secured the debt or’s (1982). §32-8-11-7 mortgagee’s mortgage. A Ind. Code priority subsequent generally security has over interest purchase- attaching property, and a or liens claims virtually precedence money mortgage all other takes over including those which antedate the execution claims or liens § immediately mortgage. 32-8-11-4. The tax sale security drastically value of this interest diminishes the and by purchaser priority granting a over the tax-sale lien with Ultimately, the tax sale of all other creditors. complete mortgagee’s ofthe interest, in the nullification result purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other since the redemption period. encumbrances at the conclusion of the mortgagee clearly legally protected property has a Since a reasonably ap- interest, he is entitled to notice calculated to prise pending Sampson, him a tax sale. Cf. v. of Wiswall mortgagee How. When the is identified mortgage publicly by recorded, that is constructive notice publication supplemented must be notice mailed to the mortgagee’s by personal address, last known available reasonably service. But unless the is not identifi- satisfy alone able, constructive notice does not mandate Mullane,4 of case, mortgage on County In this file with the Recorder identified mortgagee only corpora as “MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS tion, Wayne County, of in the State of Ohio.” We assume that the mort
gagee’s diligent could address have been ascertained efforts. Co., See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust S., 339 U. Simply Missions, Wayne mailing County, a letter to “Mennonite Board Ohio,” likely notice, quite provided given would have actual “the well- postal employés making proper delivery known skill of officials and Ordean, defectively Grannis of letters addressed.” however, suggest, governmental body not that a We do by publication posting, Neither notice nor no- mailed property owner, tice to the are means “such as one desirous actually informing [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt accomplish it.” Mullane, at 315. Because they designed primarily prospective purchasers are to attract publication posting unlikely sale, tax are to reach although they property, who, those have an interest in the do special keep not make efforts to abreast such notices. City supra, City Hutchinson, Walker v. at New York 116; supra, York, v. New N. H. H. Co., 296; & R. at 315. Notice to the owner, who is not *8 privity steps with his creditor and who has failed to take necessary preserve to his own interest, also can- expected mortgagee. not be to lead to actual notice to City, Nelson v. Cf. New York county’s use of these less reliable forms of notice inexpensive is not reasonable as “an where, here, and effi- cient mechanism such as mail service is available.” Greene Lindsey, supra, v. at 455. required though
Personal service or mailed is notice even sophisticated disposal creditors have means at their to paid discover whether taxes have not been and proceedings likely whether tax-sale are therefore to be initi place, mortgage ated. In the first a need not involve a com plex among knowledgeable parties, commercial transaction may sophisticated and it well be the least creditor whose security by impor interest is threatened a tax sale. More tantly, party’s ability steps safeguard a to take to its inter obligation. ests does not relieve of its State constitutional particularly provide It is true that extensive efforts to notice may party’s often be when the State is aware of a inexperience incompetence. g., Memphis Light, or See, e. Covey Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 13-15; v. Town of supra. Somers, But it does not follow that the State required to extraordinary undertake identity efforts to discover the whereabouts of identity a public whose is not in the record. relatively of forgo administrative burden modest even particularly parties res are providing who notice mail City H. R. York, N. H. & v. New New York Cf. ourceful.5 as cer mail or other means Notice S., at 297. Co., pre is a minimum constitutional ensure actual tain to adversely proceeding affect lib which will a condition to erty any party, whether unlettered of interests practice, if address its name and in commercial or well versed mortgagee’s Furthermore, ascertainable. are payment knowledge delinquency is not in the of taxes of pending. equivalent is The latter that a tax sale to notice constitutionally [county] was the information which “was obliged obligation give personally appellant ... —an discharged.” single mailing have letter would which the City, New York Schroeder provided the manner of notice
We therefore conclude requirements appellant Due Proc- did not meet Accordingly, Amendment.6 ess Clause the Fourteenth Appeals judgment reversed, Indiana Court is for further not incon- the cause remanded opinion. sistent
It is so ordered. *9 O’Connor, Justice Justice Powell whom Rehnquist join, dissenting. Justice Today, departs significantly prior the Court from its deci- any proceed- holds that the sions and before State conducts ing legally protected property the that will affect of interests
5Indeed, mortgagee may ultimately notice mail to the relieve the county mortgagee of more if substantial administrative burden the ar ranges payment of delinquent prior taxes to the tax sale. 6 appeal presents whether, This question County also before the Au ditor executes and delivers a purchaser, mortgagee deed to tax-sale constitutionally right is entitled to of property. notice its to redeem the Griffin, 220, Cf. v. 327 U. S. 229 Because we conclude that Griffin give the failure to adequate deprived notice of the proceeding tax-sale appellant law, process of due question. we need not reach this
any party, provide party by the State must notice to that long means party’s certain to ensure actual notice as as the identity “reasonably and location are ascertainable.” Ante, Applying unjustified principle this novel and to the present case, the Court decides that the involved by publication posting deserved more than notice provided. approach that were I dissent because the Court’s general is unwarranted both aas rule and as the rule of this case.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 (1950), “[a]n U. S. 306, the Court established that ele mentary requirement process and fundamental of due proceeding finality which is to be accorded is notice reason ably apprise calculated, all circumstances, under inter parties pendency ested of the action and afford them an opportunity present objections.” emphasized their We constitutionally adequate prac when “the peculiarities ticalities and of the case . . . are City met,” at 314-315. id., See also v. Walker Hutchin (1956); City, son, 352 U. S. Schroeder v. New York (1962); Lindsey, Greene key 444, 449-450 focus is the “reasonableness” of the means chosen the State. 339 U. S., at particular 315. Whether a method of notice is reasonable de pends on outcome the balance the “interest of between sought protected “the State” and individual interest to be by Id., course, Fourteenth Amendment.” at 314. Of responsibility prescribe “[i]t is not our the form of service adopt.” [State] Greene, that the should n. 9. primary responsibility It is the of the State to strike this bal upset process only ance, and we will when the State *10 in an manner. strikes balance irrational adamantly on, From Mullane the Court has refused to achieving commit “itself to formula a balance between determining particular proceeding or these interests a may be utilized or what test it must when constructive notice recognized Indeed, we have “the S., meet.” 339 U. setting up rigid impossibility of formula as to the kind of vary given; required will with cir that must be notice notice (empha Walker, at 115 conditions.” cumstances and added). always approach in these cases has reflected sis Our very process general principle “[t]he nature due the negates any concept that universally procedures ap of inflexible imaginable plicable every to situation.” & Restau Cafeteria McElroy, 367 U. See rant Workers v. Eldridge, 424 also Mathews v.
A Although princi- purports apply Court these settled ples today squarely case, its decision at odds with approach developed. balancing The Court that we have legally protected prop- party whenever a has a now holds that erty “[n]otice mail or other means as certain interest, precondition ensure notice is a minimum constitutional actual adversely liberty proceeding to a which will affect the party’s] [the if are interests ... name and address knowing 800. Without Ante, ascertainable.” at and individual interests at stake future what state will be ostensibly ap- espouses general principle cases, Court any legally protected property plicable interest whenever rejection adversely This is a flat be affected. adequately evalu- no “formula” can be devised that view that constitutionality procedure of a created a State ates Despite provide the fact in a of cases. certain class accepted notice satisfied that Mullane itself that constructive process circumstances,1 in certain dictates due Co., Bank Trust In Mullane Central Hanover & regarded “[p]ersonal held service has not in all circumstances been we residents, often been indispensable process and it has more as due to unnecessary held as to nonresidents.”
803 citing Court, Mullane, now holds that constructive notice can legally protected property never suffice whenever there is a interest at stake. seeking justify
In to this broad rule, the Court holds that although party’s inability safeguard may its interests re- imposing greater sult notice burdens on the State, the fact party may safeguard that a be able “to more its interests does obligation.” not relieve the State of its constitutional Ante, Apart ignoring totality from the fact it that is the sufficiency circumstances that determines the of notice, the neglects obliga- Court also to consider that the constitutional imposed upon by tion par- the State itself be defined ty’s ability protect recently its interest. As as last Term, process inquiry Court held that focus of the due has always procedure particular been effect of a notice on “a added). (emphasis class of Greene, cases.” at 451 fashioning sophisticated a broad rule for “the least creditor,” ignores principle ante, at Court the well-settled that “procedural process shaped due rules are the risk of error truthfinding process applied general- in the inherent ity as to the exceptions.” Eldridge, rare cases, not the Mathews v. supra, at see also v. 344; Yamasaki, Califano particular generally If the members of a class possess ability safeguard their interests, then this fact “totality must taken be into account when we consider the required by circumstances,” Indeed, as Mullane. the crite- “ possibility rion Mullane of con- established ‘is not injury just ceivable but the and reasonable character of the requirements, having subject to the reference which (quoting statute deals.’” 339 U. at 315 American Land (1911)). Zeiss, Co. suggests really
The Court also its broad rule has been 796-797, law ever since Mullane. n. 3. ante, See The Court reasons that before characteriza- personam tion as rem was relevant *12 determining given constitutionally whether the notice was “power sufficient,2and that once Mullane held that the of the depended longer to resort to constructive service” no State upon personam pro- antithesis” of in rem and in “historic ceedings, 339 at constructive notice S., 312-313, U. became proceedings. insufficient as to all language plain ex-
The of Mullane is clear that the Court reject per pressly se insuffi- constructive notice as refused id., in Moreover, See at 312-314. the Court errs cient. only justification thinking is for constructive notice that the proceedings. types ante, at the distinction between See justification n. 3. The for constructive 796-797, historical in under notice was that those with an interest were obligation keeping in in- an to act themselves proceedings property. See, that affected that formed g., 276, e. 268 North Laramie Land Co. v. U. S. Hoffman, (1925); Hunter, 241, 283 Ballard v. 204 U. S. 262 As expressly in Part II of this Mullane ac- dissent, discussed reject, vitality knowledged, of the and did not continued protect owners had some burden to notion property. their See 339 U. S.,
B receiving The Court also holds that condition approach its is name and of the under new that the address “reasonably applying party In must this be ascertainable.” mortgagee requirement case, to the the Court holds “reasonably diligent that the must exercise efforts” State determining mortgagee, ante, n. 798, 4, of the at address
2 asserting simply The is incorrect that before con Court to in rem rarely structive notice was deemed sufficient even as involved, ante, See, 796-797, n. 3. when residents of the were at State Note, Toolan, g., Longyear e. 414, also 209 See U.S. Proceedings, 84 Constitutionality by of Notice in Tax Sale Publication (“This (1975) notice] [permitting L. constructive Yale J. 1507 rule involving property proceedings, . in rem whether was . . extended to all residents”). or owned nonresidents suggests that the is State to make some effort identity “to discover the and whereabouts of a identity public whose not in Ante, record.” at Again, departs prior n. 4. the Court from our cases. all analysis, of the cases relied on the Court in its State actually identity incapacity party either knew seeking identity “very easily notice, or that was ascertain Schroeder, able.” at 212-213. S.,U. See also Mullane, Covey S., 318; at v. Town Somers, (1956); Walker, 116; Eisen v. Carlisle & (1974).3 Jacquelin, 156, 175 417 U. S. Under Court’s de *13 today, go pro cision it is not clear how far the in State must viding for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and ad party. despite Indeed, dress an affected the fact that the mortgage appellant’s recorded failed to include the address, ante, 4, see at n. its 798-799, Court concludes that where “reasonably Ante, abouts identifiable.” were at 798. This uncertainty particularly light becomes ominous in the of the duty identity fact that the and location, ascertain and notify by or means, mail other similar exists whenever legally protected implicated. interest is
h-1 HH effectively rejects progeny Once the Court Mullane and its by accepting per against ap- se rule notice, constructive it plies its rule and holds that the in this case must personal or it has a le- receive service mailed notice because gally protected mortgage stake, interest at because the publicly If was recorded. See at 798. the Court had ante, 3 identity In parties Court contrasted those whose whereabouts are known or “at hand” with those “whose interests or where diligence abouts could not with due be 339 U. ascertained.” Mullane, in language light 317. This must be read in the of the facts of actually identity which the were and location of certain beneficiaries in Mullane addition, expressly rejected the view known. Court ordinary in that diligence” required search was “under standards of Id.. case. balancing prior engaged in
observed its decisions and opposite required it Múlleme, would have reached result.
It cannot that the has a vital interest in be doubted State of its tax revenues in collection whatever reasonable authorizing proceedings “In manner that it chooses: upon payment pur- of the taxes sold to a enforce lands sovereign in sale, chaser at tax the State is exercise of its carry power to raise revenue essential to on the affairs of proc- . . state and the due administration laws. . ‘The require kind of ess of taxation does not the same notice as taking law, in a suit at even power private property under the of eminent domain.’” (1904) Leigh (quoting Gap Bell’s Green, 193 U. S. (1890)). Pennsylvania, Co. v. The R. its vital re- State has decided to accommodate spect through interest payments the sale of real on which delinquent period of taxes have been for a certain time.4 equally strong avoiding has an interest State imposed by requirement it exercise
burden that must identity efforts to ascertain the and location “reasonable” any *14 legally protected party In the a interest. instant with mailing Rather, is not limited to notice. case, that burden must the records and ascertain State have someone check delinquent taxpayer respect whether there is a to each mortgage paid mortgagee, perhaps off, whether the has been dependable address. and whether there is weigh Against these vital interests of the we must State, possessed by relevant this case, the interest class—in “may ultimately it re suggests requires The Court that the notice that if county of a more administrative burden the mort lieve the substantial arranges delinquent prior the tax sale.” gagee payment taxes Ante, neglects n. the fact that the State is better 6. Court this judge of it to settle tax debts than is Court. how wants its mortgagees.5 Contrary approach today, to the Court’s this simply interest not be evaluated reference to the fact frequently that we have found constructive notice to be inad equate since Mullane. Rather, such interest “must be judged light practical application in the of its to the affairs of they ordinarily men as are conducted.” North Laramie Co., Land long ago part
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “it is the prudence any common for all those who have interest [property], guard by persons that interest who are in a protect Mary, situation to it.” The 126, 144 9 Cranch rejected principle, We have never and, indeed, we held may indulge” assumption “[a] in Mullane that state that a property “usually arranges owner means to learn of di upon possessory proprietary rights.” rect attack his S.,U. at 316. When we have found constructive to be always inadequate, it has been where an owner of purposes, protect for all is, unable to his interest because practical way there is no for him to learn of state action that case, threatens to affect his interest. In each completely unexpected by adverse action was one that was owner, owner would become aware of the action only by reading the fortuitous occasion of “an advertisement type pages newspaper [that in small inserted the back of a may] supposed not even it is name those whose attention acquaintances might attract, and does not inform who call it to attention.” at 315. In case, each expect the individuals had no reason to that their being interests were affected. mortgagees
This is not the case as far are as tax sales and unexpected concerned. an Unlike condemnation or account- *15 say espoused This is not to the rule all conceivable must cover proc mortgagees flexibility in all conceivable circumstances. The of due atypical class of ess is sufficient accommodate those members of the mortgagees.
ing, regularity the assessment taxes occurs with predictability, in this and the state action case cannot reason- ably unexpected in be characterized as sense. Unlike parties in cases, our other the Mennonite Board had regular upon event, focus, the assessment of which taxes, protect approximately in Further, its effort to its interest. outstanding mortgage in is 95% debt the United States by private federally supported held institutional lenders and agencies. Dept, of Commerce, Census, Bureau p. 511 1982-1983, Abstract of the United States: Statistical (103ded.).6 highly unlikely, likely signifi- if all, It is that a mortgagees consequences cant number of are unaware of mortgagors pay that ensue their fail to taxes assessed when mortgaged property. Indeed, case, on the the Board pay required that Moore all itself taxes. safeguarded
There is no doubt that the Board could have county The its interest with a minimum amount of effort. commence on second auctions Monday statute §6-1.1-24-2(5) year. of each Ind. Code county required post county The auditor is at least three weeks before the date of sale. courthouse 6-1.1-24-3(a). § required publish is The auditor also no newspapers tice two different once each week for three 6-1.1-22-4(b). §§6-1.1-24-3(a), weeks before the sale. protection supplemented Board have offered could suggested by State the additional measures pro court The Board could have that Moore below: copies paid assessments, vide it with tax or could have re- mortgage complex The Court that “a need not involve a commer holds Ante, This among knowledgeable parties . . cial transaction . .” true; however, if certainly change fact that even is that does not fairly voluntarily it professional moneylender, entered into a Board not “The sophisticated with Moore. As the court below observed: transaction expected risk of its busi be to assume the citizens’ State cannot 686, 690, E. n. 9 ness ventures.” 427 N. 2d *16 deposit moneys quired that Moore the tax in an escrow ac- public or could have itself checked the count, records to paid. determine whether the tax assessment had been N. E. 2d n. 9 party failing protect
When unreasonable its inter- despite ability process require est so, its to do due does not party that the State save the from own lack its of care. The required by clearly weighs balance Mullane in favor of find- ing requirements that the Indiana statutes satisfied the process. Accordingly, I due dissent.