Kevin Spencer v. United States
2013 WL 4106367
11th Cir.2013Background
- Spencer was sentenced in 2007 as a career offender based on two predicate felonies, including a Florida third-degree felony child abuse conviction in 2004.
- Spencer argued at sentencing and on appeal that the Florida conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause.
- Begay v. United States (2008) narrowed the crime-of-violence definition, prompting Spencer to file a timely §2255 motion after Begay’s retroactive recognition.
- The district court denied relief; this court previously affirmed the career-offender designation in Spencer I based on the record then.
- An intervening retroactive Supreme Court/ circuit-law development (Begay and Sykes) prompted reconsideration of whether the Florida conviction qualifies as a crime of violence.
- The court vacates the district court’s denial, remands for resentencing without treating the Florida conviction as a crime of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2255 allows relief when a later retroactive Supreme Court decision changes controlling law | Spencer | Spencer is entitled to §2255 relief due to retroactive change in law | Yes; §2255 can be used where a retroactive change affects career-offender status |
| Whether Spencer’s Florida third-degree felony child abuse is a crime of violence under the residual clause after Begay and Sykes | Spencer’s conduct fits Begay’s residual-clause framework | The Florida statute can involve mental injury; not a qualifying crime of violence under Begay/Sykes | No; after Begay and Sykes, the conviction does not categorically or by the modified approach qualify as a crime of violence |
| Whether Spencer I precludes relief under Rozier and finality considerations | There was an intervening change allowing collateral review | Rozier limits §2255 relief absent intervening change | Relief warranted; retroactive change and preserved challenge permit resentencing without the Florida conviction as a crime of violence |
| Scope and limits of the remand remedy for erroneous career-offender designation | Remand to resentence without the flawed predicate | Remand with resentence excluding the Florida conviction as a crime of violence |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (narrowed crime-of-violence to crimes akin in kind and risk to enumerated offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (U.S. 2005) (recognizes collateral review when a state conviction is vacated affecting federal sentence)
- Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011) (allowed §2255 review when predicate convictions were vacated post-sentencing)
- Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1974) (§2255 covers changes in law after conviction; other formal errors may be non-justiciable)
- Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681 (11th Cir. 2012) (limits collateral review absent intervening change in controlling law)
- Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2012) (discusses residual vs. modified categorical approaches post-Begay/Sykes)
- Owens v. United States, 672 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 2012) (addresses Begay/Sykes interplay on Florida-like offenses)
- Harris v. United States, 608 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2010) (discusses crime-of-violence risk framework for Florida offenses)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (Supreme Court 2011) (narrows Begay’s applicability to strict-liability-like offenses)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (Supreme Court 2013) (reaffirmed guidelines’ role in sentencing and finality considerations)