Kevin R. Hough v. Shawn P. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030

Background

On Feb. 22–23, 2006, Shawn McKiernan, driving a vehicle owned by Rita Bower (insured by Quincy), taunted and flashed high beams at Kevin Hough and another man while circling them; McKiernan later exited the car and punched Hough, who hit his head and suffered a subdural hematoma.
McKiernan had been driving with Bower’s permission through a chain of permissive use (Bower → Krista Archer → McKiernan); Quincy insured Bower’s vehicle and was substituted as defendant after Bower’s death.
Hough sued McKiernan (assault/battery) and Bower/Quincy under the owner-liability statute, G.L. 1956 § 31-33-6, seeking to impute vicarious liability to the owner/insurer for the permissive driver’s intentional act.
At the close of plaintiff’s case, Quincy moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50; the trial justice granted the motion and entered judgment for Quincy.
The Supreme Court reviewed whether § 31-33-6 applies where the permissive driver’s intentional act occurred after exiting the vehicle and at some distance from it, and whether Hough had shown the required causal connection between the vehicle’s use and his injuries.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 31-33-6 (owner-liability) applies to McKiernan’s intentional battery that occurred after he exited the insured vehicle	Hough: the vehicle’s use (drive-bys, flashing lights, transporting/egging-on passengers, enabling stalking and escape) had sufficient nexus to the assault to impute liability to the owner/insurer	Quincy: the assault was an independent act removed from operation/use of the vehicle; no causal connection to make § 31-33-6 applicable	Court: § 31-33-6 requires a causal relationship between the vehicle’s use and the injury; Hough failed to show such a connection, so owner-liability did not apply
Whether owner’s insurer (Quincy) could avoid liability by proving the permissive driver had furnished proof of financial responsibility	Hough: Quincy failed to prove McKiernan satisfied statutory proof-of-financial-responsibility requirements	Quincy: McKiernan was independently insured (Allstate), so the exemption applied	Court: did not decide this issue because it affirmed judgment for Quincy on the separate ground that § 31-33-6 did not apply absent the required nexus
Whether the term “accident” in § 31-33-6 includes intentional acts and thus could cover this battery	Hough: prior cases interpret “accident” broadly to include intentional acts, so statute should cover the battery here	Quincy: even if “accident” can include intentional acts, the statute still requires the vehicle to be causally related to the injury	Court: “accident” can include intentional acts, but liability under § 31-33-6 is limited to injuries causally related to the vehicle’s operation or use; no causal link here
Whether uninsured-motorist (UM) jurisprudence’s “some nexus” standard controls application of § 31-33-6	Hough: analogizes to UM cases (Olivier, Tavarez, Skaling) that apply a minimal nexus test, arguing similar breadth should apply here	Quincy: UM cases interpret contract language broadly and are not controlling for statutory owner-liability scope	Court: UM cases are distinguishable; § 31-33-6 is statutory and requires a causal relationship to the vehicle’s operation/use—the UM “some nexus” standard cannot be imported wholesale

Key Cases Cited

Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198 (R.I. 1999) (statute construed to protect victims; “accident” may encompass intentional acts)
Olivier v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990) (UM coverage: minimal nexus between vehicle and injury)
Tavarez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 778 (R.I. 2000) (death arose out of use of vehicle as platform/chase—broad UM nexus)
Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997 (R.I. 2002) (reiterating minimal evidentiary nexus required under UM/UIM provisions)
Kernan v. Webb, 148 A. 186 (R.I. 1929) (prestatutory common-law agency rule; historical backdrop for § 31-33-6)