Kenyon v. Board of Education for Township High School District 113
1:24-cv-09878
N.D. Ill.Apr 14, 2025Background
- Plaintiff, Britnee Kenyon, a Jewish high school theater director, posted a story from her private Instagram related to the Israel-Gaza conflict.
- Defendant Michelle Hammer Bernstein publicized the post in local Facebook groups, denouncing Kenyon and soliciting complaints to the school board.
- The school board, through officials Krieger and Struck, initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kenyon, culminating in a written reprimand involving both the Instagram post and other personal social media content.
- Kenyon alleges procedural violations in the disciplinary process and claims the reprimand harmed her reputation, career prospects, and emotional well-being.
- The complaint included federal and state law claims against the Board of Education, Krieger, Struck, and Bernstein, including breach of the collective bargaining agreement, defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and tortious interference.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the claims on grounds including failure to state a claim, various immunities, and, as to Bernstein, Illinois Citizen Participation Act and First Amendment protections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction over CBA breach | Federal court has jurisdiction; IELRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction over all claims/parties | IELRB has exclusive jurisdiction; exhaustion of remedies required | Dismissed; only IELRB can interpret the CBA for this claim |
| Absolute Immunity (Struck) | Struck acted outside scope of duties issuing public statement | Struck’s statement was within official duties as Board spokesperson | Not enough evidence to apply immunity at motion to dismiss |
| Tort Immunity Act (Krieger/Struck) | Application premature; discretionary acts not shown | Actions were policy/discretionary, protected under Tort Immunity Act | Immunity denied at this stage; further factual development needed |
| Defamation Per Se (Struck) | Statement implied Plaintiff was antisemitic and harmed her professionally | Statement did not identify Plaintiff; was opinion, not actionable | Dismissed without prejudice—Plaintiff not clearly identified |
| False Light (Struck) | Sufficient as defamation claim; should survive if defamation survives | No identification, lacks extrinsic facts/special damages | Dismissed without prejudice—same as defamation |
| IIED (Struck) | Struck abused authority with public statement causing emotional distress | Statement did not name Plaintiff or explicitly defame | Dismissed without prejudice—no identification |
| IIED (Krieger) | Krieger’s handling of sexual assault disclosure was extreme/outrageous | Merely workplace discipline, not extreme conduct | Claim can proceed—allegations sufficient at this stage |
| Indemnification | Still viable if other claims survive | Immune if employees not liable | Not dismissed—claims against Krieger proceed |
| ICPA Immunity (Bernstein) | Suit not a SLAPP suit, seeks redress for personal harm | Speech/petitioning activities against government employee protected | No immunity; claim proceeds |
| Defamation Per Se (Bernstein) | Bernstein’s statements were explicit, damaging, and not mere opinion | Statements about public figure, opinion, protected speech | Claim can proceed—Plaintiff not a public figure |
| False Light (Bernstein) | Bernstein acted with reckless disregard for truth | No malice/falsity; same issues as defamation | Claim can proceed |
| Tortious Interference (Bernstein) | Bernstein knew of CBA and induced breach | No sufficient knowledge or intentional inducement alleged | Dismissed without prejudice—insufficiently pled |
Key Cases Cited
- Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (official capacity suits are claims against the entity itself)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard for plausibility on a motion to dismiss)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263 (IIED standard for what constitutes outrageous conduct)
- Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill.2d 399 (requirements for pleading special damages in defamation)
- Knox Coll. v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407 (Pleading requirements; paraphrasing legal conclusions without facts is insufficient)
- Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill.App.3d 727 (Defamation per se requires identification or extrinsic facts if individual not named)
- Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819 (ICPA immunity requirements and SLAPP definition)