JAI PRAKASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SATISH PARULEKAR, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 1-19-1819
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
September 30, 2020
Modified upon denial of rehearing December 3, 2020
2020 IL App (1st) 191819
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Fourth Division
¶ 1 Plaintiff Jai Prakash appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County that dismissed with prejudice his two-count amended complaint, which alleged claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and defamation per se against defendant Satish Parulekar.
¶ 2 On appeal, plaintiff argues that he sufficiently pled his IIED and defamation claims, he did not release those claims in a settlement agreement with the university, and he produced clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s acts were not immunized from liability.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 Plaintiff and defendant were both tenured professors of chemical еngineering at Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT). In 2008, plaintiff eliminated the position of associate chair of the chemical and biological engineering department, which at the time was occupied by defendant. Later, in 2011, defendant became the department’s acting chair, and plaintiff reported to him. Also in 2011, plaintiff appointed a research professor who worked on plaintiff’s off-site research project.
¶ 6 According to plaintiff, defendant retaliated against him for eliminating the associate chair position by severely harassing plaintiff in 2011 and 2012. This alleged harassment included defendant, as the department chair, initiating in 2012 an investigation of plaintiff’s research projects.
¶ 7 In August 2013, IIT’s dean and a past provost removed defendant from the acting department chair positiоn. On November 6, 2013, that past provost and IIT’s general counsel sent defendant emails that stated IIT, after a six-months-long investigation, found no misconduct by plaintiff.
¶ 8 Also on November 6, 2013, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with IIT to resolve several claims, including the unauthorized reduction of his salary and his proper actions concerning the appointment of the research professor. Under this agreement, plaintiff received $37,990.55 and other benefits and released IIT and its current and former employees from every
¶ 9 In February 2014, defendant made complaints to federal agencies and Argonne National Laboratory, plaintiff’s key research funding agency, raising the same allegations against plaintiff of fraud and criminal misuse of federal funds that defendant had raised in IIT’s 2012 investigation. Thereafter, Argonne National Laboratory discontinued plaintiff’s research project and federal agents conducted a comprehensive investigation, which included inspecting documents, interviewing administrators of IIT and Argonne National Laboratory, and interviewing plaintiff at his home. On February 21, 2014, IIT’s general counsel sent a litigation hold letter to IIT individuals, informing them that a federal agency was investigating plaintiff regarding his research projects. When the federal agency concluded its investigation, it found no wrongdoing by plaintiff.
¶ 10 On August 8, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging claims of IIED and defamation per se and “seek[ing] redress for a prolonged pattern of misconduct *** spanning over seven (7) years.”
¶ 11 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under
¶ 12 On March 7, 2019, the trial court granted the 2-615 portion of defendant’s motion to dismiss, reserved ruling on the 2-619 portion of the mоtion, and granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
¶ 13 Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged against defendant (count I) a claim of IIED based on defendant’s pattern of egregious misconduct each year from 2011 to 2018, which was intended to destroy plaintiff’s research, projects and career, was extreme and outrageous and intended to inflict severe emotional distress, and caused plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional, mental, physical and financial distress.
¶ 14 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s conduct before November 6, 2013 (the effective date of the settlement agreement) included making false statements and maliciously providing false information about plaintiff’s employment contracts and changing the contract language without justificаtion or notice to reduce plaintiff’s $130,000 nine-month base salary to $118,755; harassing plaintiff by questioning his 2011 appointment of the research professor and falsely stating to IIT’s dean, officials, past provosts, counsel, faculty and others that plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent conduct and criminal activity by misusing federal funds when he appointed the research professor; initiating in 2012, pursuant to defendant’s authority as the department chair, a false, selective and retaliatory investigation by IIT of plaintiff’s research projects; sending to the home dean and colleagues of the appointed research professor malevolent emails that disclosed his private and confidential family information and caused him to resign from his position as a key member of plaintiff’s research group; and in Mаy 2013 sharing with two IIT professors, who had
¶ 15 Furthermore, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s conduct after the November 2013 effective date of the settlement included knowingly making false complaints in February 2014 to federal agencies and Argonne National Laboratory that accused plaintiff of fraud and misusing federal funds when he appointed the research professor in 2011, despite defendant’s knowledge that IIT’s investigation had found no wrongdoing by plaintiff; in 2015 making false and defamatory statements about plaintiff to IIT faculty members who were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of plaintiff; in February 2016 sending to 23 individuals a letter alleging that defendant had received an anonymous threat letter and alluding to the federal investigation of plaintiff; in August 2016 sending to 28 people a letter falsely accusing “individual C,” whom the letter recipients would understand to be plaintiff, of sending the anonymous threat letter to defendant, invading defendant’s home and accessing his computers; in 2017 falsely blaming plaintiff for sending defendant a letter; and sending 26 people an email on March 4, 2018, which stated that a federal agency was investigating federal grants awarded to an individual, and including attachments to ensure the recipients would identify plaintiff as the subject of the investigation. Plaintiff asserted that defendant’s false 2014 complaints to federal agencies resulted in federal agents interviewing plaintiff at his home for over one hour in front of his family, which wаs the most embarrassing, humiliating and traumatic event plaintiff or his family ever endured, destroyed plaintiff’s mental and physical health, and caused him to have recurring nightmares and seek medical help.
¶ 17 Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint under
¶ 18 In his response, plaintiff argued that (1) he did not release any claims against defendant, who was neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of plaintiff’s settlement agreement with IIT; (2) the Act did not bar plaintiff’s claims because defendant’s defamatory statements to many people with no connection to the government were not protected, defendant did nоt intend to secure favorable government action but rather acted to harass plaintiff, and plaintiff’s complaint was filed years after defendant’s complained-of conduct and thus was not retaliatory; and (3) plaintiff
¶ 19 On August 14, 2019, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21
¶ 22 This court reviews the dismissal of a complaint under
A. The Effect of the 2013 Settlement Agreement
¶ 24 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s amended complaint was subject to dismissal under
¶ 25 “A release ‘is the abandonment of a claim to the person against whom the claim exists.’ ” Borsellino v. Putnam, 2011 IL App (1st) 102242, ¶ 103. A release is governed by contract law and the language of the release should be given its plain meaning. Farmers Auto Insurance Association v. Wroblewski, 382 Ill. App. 3d 688, 696-97 (2008). “Where the terms of a contractual release are clear and explicit, a reviewing court must enforce them as written.” Id. at 697. “The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review.” In re Liquidation of Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 171613, ¶ 62. “[W]hen a motion to dismiss is based upon a release, the burden *** shifts to the plaintiff to sufficiently allege and prove that a materiаl issue of fact exists that would invalidate the release.” Janowiak v. Tiesi, 402 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1005 (2010).
¶ 27 We conclude that plaintiff released all claims against dеfendant arising out of pre-November 6, 2013 conduct. Accordingly, we review the dismissal of plaintiff’s IIED and defamation claims absent any allegations of defendant’s conduct before that date.
¶ 28 Consequently, plaintiff’s IIED claim is limited to his allegations that defendant knowingly made false complaints to federal agencies and Argonne National Laboratory in February 2014 that
¶ 29 Also as part of his IIED claim, plaintiff alleged defendant engaged in a prolonged pattern of misconduct that included making false and defamatory statements about plaintiff in 2015 to IIT faculty who were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of plaintiff; sending to 23 individuals in February 2016 a letter alleging that defendant had received an anonymous threat letter and alluding to the federal investigation of plaintiff; sending to 28 people in August 2016 a letter falsely accusing “individual C,” whom the letter recipients would understand to be plaintiff, of sending the anonymous threat letter to defendant, invading defendant’s home and accessing his computers; falsely blaming plaintiff in 2017 for sending defendant a letter; and sending 26 people an email on March 4, 2018, which stated that a federal agency was investigating federal grants awarded to an individual, and including attachments to ensure the recipients would identify plaintiff as the subject of the investigation. As a result of defendant’s prolonged pattern of misconduct, plaintiff suffered extreme emotional, mental, physical and financial distress.
¶ 30 Furthermore, plaintiff’s defamation per se claim is limited to his allegations that defendant sent an email on March 4, 2018, to numerous third parties both inside and outside of IIT; this email included a March 2, 2018 letter; defendant stated in these materials that the federal government
B. Immunity Based on the Right to Petition the Government
¶ 32 Plaintiff argues the trial court erred when it dismissed with prejudice his IIED and defamation per se claims based on immunities afforded under the Act for the protected activity of petitioning the government to obtain favorable government action.
¶ 33 The Act was created as anti-SLAPP legislation. Sandholm, 2012 IL 111433, ¶ 33. SLAPPs are lawsuits ” ‘aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so.’ ” Id. (quoting Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh, 238 Ill. 2d 620, 630 (2010)). “Plaintiffs in SLAPP suits do not intend to win but rather to chill a defendant’s speech or protest activity and discourage opposition by others through delay, expense, and distraction.” Sandholm, 2012 IL 111433, ¶ 34. “SLAPPs use the threat of money damages or the prospect of the cost of defending against the suits to silence citizen participation.” Wright Development Group, LLC, 238 Ill. 2d at 630. “The purpose of the Act is to give relief, including monetary relief, to citizens who have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their ‘act or acts’ made ‘in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government.’ ” Id. at 633 (quoting
¶ 34 Plaintiff’s lawsuit may only be dismissed due to immunity under the Act if (1) the movant’s acts were in furtherance of his rights to petition, speak, associate, or otherwise participate in government to obtain favorable government action; (2) plaintiff’s claims were solely based on, related to, or in response to the movant’s acts in furtherance of his rights of petition, speech, association, or other participation in government (this prong is satisfied if the movant demonstrates that the lawsuit is meritless and was filed in retaliation of the movant’s protected activities to deter him from further engaging in those activities); and (3) plaintiff failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that the movant’s acts were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.
¶ 35 If plaintiff’s claims genuinely sought relief for damages for the alleged IIED and defamation per se by defendant, the claims are not solely based on defendant’s rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government (see Sandholm, 2012 IL 111433, ¶ 45), and accordingly, “it is irrelevant whether the defendant[’s] actions were ‘genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result or outcome.’ ” (id. ¶ 53 (quoting
¶ 36 Addressing plaintiff’s IIED claim first, we determine whether defendant’s complained-of actions after the Novеmber 6, 2013 release were protected under the Act by considering whether his actions were in furtherance of his constitutional rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government to obtain favorable government action. Defendant’s complaints to federal agencies in February 2014 were made to government officials in an effort to obtain favorable government action by way of preventing plaintiff from allegedly misusing federal funds in the appointment of a research professor. See
¶ 37 Although defendant met his burden under the first prong of the analysis to obtain immunity under the Act for his complaints to federal agencies in 2014, he did not meet this burden for his alleged prolonged pattern of misconduct from 2015 to 2018 based on his false statements about plaintiff to people who were not members of a government agency. Furthermore, even if a movant’s activities were the kind that the Act is designed to protect, a plaintiff’s lawsuit is not necessarily deemed a SLAPP and therefore subject to dismissal under the Act. Stein, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 16.
¶ 38 Under the second prong of the analysis, defendant has the burden to shоw that plaintiff’s IIED claim was solely based on, related to, or in response to defendant’s acts in furtherance of his right to petition the government. See Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters v. Jursich, 2013 IL App (1st) 113279, ¶ 20. To satisfy this burden, defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that plaintiff’s suit was retaliatory and meritless. Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 18. To determine whether plaintiff’s IIED claim was retaliatory within the meaning of the Act, we consider (1) the proximity in time between the protected activity and the filing of the complaint, and (2) whether the damages requested are reasonably related to the facts alleged in the complaint and present a good-faith estimate of the injury sustained. See Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶ 23. Furthermore, a movant “for dismissal under the Act can show that a claim is ‘meritless’ only ‘if a movant disproves some essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.’ ” Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Association, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958, ¶ 95 (quoting Garrido, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 19).
¶ 40 It was defendant’s burden to “show that there are undisputed facts that demоnstrate plaintiff’s claim is meritless.” Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶ 26. Because this court reviews a motion to dismiss under the Act pursuant to
¶ 41 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s IIED claim was meritless because his actions could never rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law since much of defendant’s
¶ 42 Regarding plaintiff’s defamation per se claim, defendant argues it also was based on his proteсted right to petition the government. According to the amended complaint and disregarding allegations about defendant’s activity before the November 6, 2013 effective date of the settlement agreement, plaintiff alleged defendant sent a March 4, 2018 email to numerous nongovernmental third parties both inside and outside of IIT; this email included a March 2, 2018 letter; defendant stated in these materials that the federal government was investigating federal grants awarded to plaintiff; defendant implied in these materials, knowingly and falsely, that plaintiff was involved in embezzlement and a financial conspiracy to defraud the government; many of the third-party recipients of defendant’s March 2018 materials were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of this matter, which had concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in аny wrongdoing; the publication of defendant’s March 2018 materials prejudiced plaintiff in his profession and suggested he lacked
¶ 43 Taking all well-pled facts as true, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, and viewing the pleading in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff’s defamation claim was not meritless where defendant failed to satisfy his burden under the first and second prongs of the Act’s immunity analysis. Specifically, defendant was not acting to further his right to petition or otherwise participate in government to obtain favorable government action because he had already filed his complaints with the federal agencies in 2014 when he sent his email and attached letter in March 2018 to numerous people who were not affiliated with any government agency. Furthermore, plaintiff’s defamation claim was not solely based on defendant’s acts in furtherance of his right of petition or other participation in government because the lawsuit was filed over four years after defendant filed his complaints with the federal agencies and defendant has not offered any evidence to show that plaintiff’s defamation claim lacked merit. The well-pled allegations of the amended complaint show that IIT’s six-months-long investigation in 2012 of plaintiff’s conduct, including his use of federal funds for his research projects, concluded that he did not engage in any wrongdoing. Furthermore, there is no indication that dеfendant’s complaints to federal agencies in 2014 about plaintiff’s alleged misuse of federal funds, embezzlement and financial conspiracy to defraud the government resulted in any findings or actions against plaintiff.
¶ 44 We, therefore, conclude that plaintiff’s defamation claim does not qualify as a SLAPP and the trial court erred in dismissing this claim with prejudice under the Act.
¶ 46 Finally, defendant argues that even if dismissal of the amended complaint was improper under
¶ 47 To state a cause of action for IIED, a plaintiff must plead that (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe, and (3) the defendant knew that severe emotional distress was certain or substantially certain to result from such conduct. Miller v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 181 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956 (1989). ” ‘The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ ” McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86 (1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment j, at 77-78 (1965)). “[T]he tort does not extend to ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d, at 73 (1965)). Factors сourts may consider to determine whether a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous include the intensity and duration of the distress, defendant’s degree of power or authority over the plaintiff, defendant’s abuse of a position that gives him actual or apparent power to damage the plaintiff’s interests, whether defendant reasonably believed that his objective was legitimate, and defendant’s
¶ 48 Stripped of all allegations of conduct before November 6, 2013 concerning released claims, and accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, the count I IIED claim of the amended complaint essentially alleged that for approximately five years defendant intentionally and knowingly made false statements about plaintiff engaging in fraudulent and criminal activity by (1) making false statements to federal agencies and Argonne National Laboratory in 2014 that accused plaintiff of misusing federal funds despite defendant’s knowledge that IIT had exonerated plaintiff after conducting a thorough investigation of this same claim; (2) making false and defamatory statements about plaintiff in 2015 to IIT faculty who were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation and exoneration of plaintiff; (3) sending to 23 individuals in February 2016 a letter alleging that defendant had received an anonymous threat letter and alluding to the federal investigation of plaintiff; (4) sending to 28 people in August 2016 a letter falsely accusing “individual C,” whom the letter recipients would understand to be plaintiff, of sending the anonymous threat letter to defendant, invading defendant’s home and accessing his computers; (5) falsely blaming plaintiff in 2017 for sending defendant a letter; and (6) sending 26 people an email on March 4, 2018, which stated that a federal agency was investigating federal grants awarded to an individual, and including attachments to ensure the recipients would identify plaintiff as the subject of the investigation. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of defendant’s prolonged pattern of misconduct, plaintiff suffered extreme emotional, mental, physical and financial distress.
¶ 49 Regarding the question of the outrageousness of defendant’s conduct, defendant argues that plaintiff’s six alleged incidents that occurred from 2014 to 2018 fall far short of the type of
¶ 50 We conclude that the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts, well beyond mere insults and trivialities, to allege the outrageous conduct element of the tort. The alleged misconduct intensely attacked plaintiff’s professional integrity and career for a lengthy duration of five years. Although defendant was not the department chair at the time of the alleged misconduct, he abused his position as a tenured professor to damage plaintiff’s reputation and career by using the same false accusations defendant made in 2012 during his tenure as the department chair and broadly publishing those accusations to IIT administration and faculty members and numerous other people in the larger academic and business communities who did not know that IIT’s investigation had exonerated plaintiff. Furthermore, based on IIT’s exoneration of plaintiff, defendant did not reasonably believe his objective was legitimate. A reasonable trier of fact could easily conclude that defendant’s alleged conduct was so outrageous as to be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.
¶ 51 Additionally, plaintiff pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that he suffered severe emotional, mental, physical and financial distress as a result of defendant’s conduct. According to the amended complaint, in every year from 2014 to 2018, defendant knowingly used false
¶ 52 Regarding whether defendant acted intentionally or with the knowledge that severe emotional distress was certain or substantially certain to result, the allegations support this element of the tort. Defendant knew that IIT’s six-months-long investigation in 2012 had exonerated plaintiff of any wrongdoing regarding defendant’s claims that plaintiff had engaged in fraud and the criminal misuse of federal funds. Nevertheless, defendant, in addition to filing complaints with federal agencies in 2014 regarding these same claims, continued making these false claims to IIT faculty, Argonne National Laboratory and numerous other people for several years. Furthermore, defendant knew that his false claims had adversely affected plaintiff’s work and resulted in federal agents conducting a comprehensive review оf plaintiff’s projects, which included interviews with plaintiff and faculty and administration at IIT and Argonne National Laboratory. Moreover, defendant continued publishing his false allegations to numerous people inside and outside of IIT. Such allegations sufficiently demonstrate that defendant intended or at least knew with reasonable certainty that his conduct would damage plaintiff’s reputation, research, and career and cause him to suffer severe emotional distress.
¶ 53 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s IIED claim does not rise to the level of intensity or duration that no reasonable person could be expected to endure because Illinois courts have found conduct far more egregious than that alleged by plaintiff here to be non-actionable. To support this
¶ 54 Plaintiff’s specific pleading of defendant’s many acts toward him, as detailed above, indicates, at this pleading stage of the proceedings, extreme and outrageous conduct going beyond mere indignities, annoyances or trivialities, as well as severe emotional distress suffered by plaintiff and an intentional or reckless state of mind on the part of defendant. Accepting the allegations in count I as true, we conclude that plaintiff’s amended complaint adequately states a cause of action for IIED.
¶ 55 To state a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, (2) the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and (3) the publication caused damages. Kainrath v. Grider, 2018 IL App (1st) 172770, ¶ 32. Relevant to this case, words that impute a person has committed a crime or lacks integrity in performing his employment duties and words that prejudice him in his profession are considered defamation per se (Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶ 41), i.e., so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to his reputation may be presumed (Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 390 (1995)). “A complaint for defamation
¶ 56 Stripped of all allegations of conduct before November 6, 2013 concerning released claims, and accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, count II of the complaint essentially alleges that defendant sent an email on March 4, 2018 to numerous third parties both inside and outside of IIT; this email included a March 2, 2018 letter; defendant stated in these materials that the federal government was investigating federal grants awarded to plaintiff; defendant implied in these materials, knowingly and falsely, that plaintiff was involved in embezzlement and a financial conspiracy to defraud the government; many of the third-party recipients of defendant’s March 2018 materials were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of this matter, which had concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in any wrong doing; the publication of defendant’s March 2018 materials prejudiced plaintiff in his profession and suggested he lacked integrity in the performance or discharge of his employment duties; and this publication caused plaintiff to suffer emotionally and financially.
¶ 57 Many of these allegations set forth only a summary of the types of statements that defendant allegedly made instead of a precise and particular account of defendant’s alleged statements. This lack of specificity prevents the court from determining as a question of law if the alleged statement is defamatory and prevents defendant from properly formulating a response. See Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 492. However, the record before us does not indicate that plaintiff would not be able to allege these facts with the requisite specificity to state a cause of action sufficient to survive a 2-615 motion to dismiss. RBS Citizens, N.A. v. RTG-Oak Lawn, 407 Ill. App. 3d 183, 192 (2011). Furthermore, allowing plaintiff leave to amend his defamation claim a second time
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 59 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court that dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s IIED and defamation claims based on immunity afforded under the Act for the protected activity of petitioning the government. We also reject defendant’s assertion that
¶ 60 Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN
Cite as: Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-L-8559; the Hon. Moira S. Johnson, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: Robert T. Kuehl, of Kuehl Law, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: William T. Eveland and Elizabeth A. Thompson, of Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.