Kenneth Craig Vickers v. State, 467 S.W.3d 90

Early morning confrontation at an apartment: Vickers entered after knocking, brandished a firearm, put it to Jesse Ballentine’s head, and later left with co-defendant Sewell and a minor, Jamie; all were arrested shortly thereafter.
Indictment charged burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping; Vickers pleaded open guilty and elected the judge to determine punishment.
At punishment hearing Vickers admitted drug use and remorse; testimony and a presentence report were admitted; the court found Vickers used or exhibited a deadly weapon and sentenced him to 50 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal Vickers raised two issues: (1) his guilty plea was involuntary because the written and oral admonishments did not sufficiently warn of a possible deadly-weapon finding; (2) the trial judge was biased and relied on information outside the record when imposing punishment.
The court affirmed, holding the indictment and plea placed Vickers on notice of a potential deadly-weapon finding and finding no clear evidence of judicial bias affecting the punishment decision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Vickers’ guilty plea was knowing and voluntary because he lacked notice of a potential deadly-weapon finding	Vickers: written and oral admonishments did not inform him he was pleading to an offense that could carry a deadly-weapon finding, rendering the plea involuntary	State: indictment alleged aggravated-assault theory among others; pleading guilty to that charge put Vickers on notice the State could seek a deadly-weapon finding	Court: Affirmed; because plea covered aggravated-assault theory (which necessarily notifies of deadly-weapon issue), Blount governs and notice was adequate
Whether the trial judge relied on extraneous information or showed bias in imposing punishment	Vickers: judge’s remarks about co-defendant Sewell and prior familiarity showed reliance on non-record information and partiality	State: judge’s remarks were based on courtroom observations and prior proceedings (not extrajudicial), and aggravating factors cited were supported by the trial evidence	Court: No clear evidence of bias; remarks did not show disqualification and the sentence was based on admitted evidence; point overruled

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary)
Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. Crim. App.) (review of plea voluntariness)
Blount v. State, 257 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. Crim. App.) (allegation of aggravated assault gives notice a deadly-weapon finding may be sought)
Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App.) (notice requirement for deadly-weapon finding discussion)
Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Crim. App.) (early decision establishing defendant must receive notice of intent to seek deadly-weapon finding)
Crumpton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. Crim. App.) (development of deadly-weapon notice jurisprudence)
Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Houston) (judge’s prior knowledge from earlier proceedings is not necessarily extrajudicial bias)
Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App.) (appellate review for clear evidence of judicial bias)