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Davison, Anthony Ray
405 S.W.3d 682
Tex. Crim. App.
2013
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*1 DAVISON, Ray Anthony Appellant of Texas. STATE

No. PD-1236-12. Appeals of Texas. of Criminal

Court 22, 2013.

May *2 Law, Sare, Attorney at

Clint Foster TX, Bryan, for Appellant. Tatum, District

Jefferson P. Assistant *3 Hunstville, TX, McMinn, Attorney, Lisa C. Austin, Attorney, for the State. State’s OPINION PRICE, J., for a opinion delivered the unanimous Court. review, grounds appel-

In three of appeals lant contends that the court 1) to hold that error in the failure erred administer one of admonishments 26.13 of Article the Texas Code Crimi- nal Procedure was harmful under Rule Appellate Texas Rules of 2) Procedure, his claim that his involuntary therefore rendered purposes the Due Process Clause or- Fourteenth Amendment was dinary procedural default and there- by objec- fore forfeited because not raised 3) trial, any error tion at event, was, any harmless under the governs same rule that the standard for analyses statutory for claims of Article granted under 26.13.1 We discretionary pellant’s petition for review holdings. in order to all three address judgment will affirm the appeals. AND

FACTS PROCEDURAL POSTURE appellant en- On December to the offense open plea tered an building, ordinarily burglary of a a state jail felony.2 accepting plea, Prior to as appellant the trial court admonished the TexR.App. 26.13; (c)(1). 30.02(a)(1) § & art. P. 2. Tex. Penal Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Code 44.2(b). for such imposed trial court a sentence of twen- “Guilty ty years, offense. Both a written Plea the maximum for a second de- Memorandum,” gree felony, which was admitted during point fine. At no orally, any of plea proceeding,3 proceedings the trial these did the trial court ever formally admonish the appellant “[a] informed state enhanced, jail felony possible punishment charges against the ap- has pellant exposed him days to a punish- less than 180 and no more than two ment, felon, degree a second years jail facility in a of two to state fine not twenty years in the $10,000.”4 penitentiary. to exceed But also pled felony true three enhancement The appellant raised complaints two made paragraphs, susceptible him First, direct appeal. argued that *4 punishment degree as second felon.5 trial court failed to admonish him as to the applicable range punishment, as re- 1, 2009, April

On some four months after quired by 26.13(a)(1), Article since “the accepting appellant’s plea, guilty the the punishment attached of- punishment trial court the hear- conducted fense” was for a degree felony second ing. community The supervision officer rather jail Second, than a felony.7 state pre-sentence who the prepared investiga- argued that the failure to admonish him that, report taking tion testified into ac- with respect the applicable range of count paragraphs, the enhancement the punishment not simply did violate the stat- appellant subject punishment for “a ute, but also served to his guilty render degree felony.” second She not speci- did plea for involuntary purposes of the Due fy punishment a range of for that level of Process Clause the Fourteenth Amend- Later, however, offense. just before the ment to the United States Constitution. parties their closing arguments made the punishment hearing, the court The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected the provisions remarked that enhancement both contentions.8 the Regarding appel- “punishable by made the case two to twen- lant’s first argument, the ty.” 1) He did not mention a fine or other- held that: the trial court in failing erred arguments, wise elaborate.6 After closing appellant admonish the prior accept- 26.13(d) 3. See (per- tencing hearing, although Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. judgment the also mitting long pled so written admonishments as reflects that he true to the enhancement they by signed are the defendant and his paragraphs. appellant Because the was ulti- attorney). felon, mately punished degree as a second complaint appeal and there was 12.35(a) § & (b). 4. Tex. Penal Code appellant validly plead true to the paragraphs, accept enhancement we will § (formerly, and Tex. Penal Code purposes discretionary that he review did. appellant as of the date committed his offense, 12.42(a)(2), § see Acts 82nd hearing, 6. At the 4th December trial court 2104-05, Leg., p. §§ & Sept. ch. eff. did admonish the that he would be 1, 2011). indictment contains three "En- $10,000 susceptible to a maximum fine—the Paragraphs” previous alleging hancement se- felony jail fine available either a state or a convictions, quential burglary and in the degree felony. second Penal Tex. Code "Guilty Plea Memorandum” 12.33(b) 12.35(b). §§ & "agree[d] and confessed] that all acts and allegations pleading in said true are and cor- 26.13(a)(1). place any § 7. Tex. Penal Code rect.” We cannot find other appellant actually pled in which counts, during (Tex.App.- true to the enhancement either 8. Davison v. 377 S.W.3d 897 2012). plea proceeding during or later the sen- Eastland voluntary be required by must be but must know- plea only Article ing guilty his 2) 26.13(a); statutory admon- because ing, intelligent acts done with sufficient waiver-only nature of a ishment is of the relevant awareness circumstances for the right, this could asserted likely consequences.”12 and A criminal 3) the error was appeal; first time on enters a has defendant who 44.2(b), the standard harmless under Rule by relinquished his Sixth definition Having errors.9 for non-constitutional jury by Amendment to trial and appellant’s statutory rejected thus him, well against confront witnesses claim, appeals declined to the court of privilege against as his Fifth Amendment his constitutional claim reach the merits of self-incrimination.13 “For this waiver to be First, that, it held unlike for two reasons. Clause, Due it valid under the Process claim, statutory consti- relinquishment ‘an or must be intentional procedural tutional claim was right privi- a known abandonment of his failure to default was forfeited ”14 in- lege.’ A criminal defendant who is during proceed- raise it at some point plead guilty duced to in a state court court; second, it ings in the trial held precise ignorance total nature any if properly preserved, even con- charge stitutional error was harmless —also utiliz- *5 proce- carries has suffered a violation of in Rule ing the standard contained process.15 dural due Such a defendant 44.2(b).10 reaching In this last conclusion proper analysis, to respect the incomplete understanding such an has the two of this construed plea his cannot charge that stand to for the past opinions Court’s stand intelligent guilt. an admission of With- proposition applies that Rule even adequate notice of out the nature of jury to claims that a admonish- particular him, charge against he in proof that indispensable to ment is the establishment charge, plea fact can- understood constitutionally voluntary of a and intelli- voluntary in ... not be this sense.16 granted the gent guilty plea.11 appel- discretionary petition lant’s review constitutionally For his be holdings. evaluate each of these then, valid, defendant must have and gravity actual awareness of nature THE LEGAL BACKDROP charges against him and of the Due Process rights privileges short, necessarily full relinquishes “a requires Federal due —in what understanding plea of constitutional connotes “[wfeivers 459, Id. at 900-01. States, McCarthy v. United 394 U.S. 466, 1166, (1969). 22 418 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Id. at 901. Zerbst, (quoting Id. Johnson v. 304 U.S. State, (citing Aguirre-Mata v. 992 464, 458, 1019, 82 1461 58 S.Ct. L.Ed. (hereinafter, (Tex.Crim.App.1999) S.W.2d 495 I"), and (1938)). State, Aguirre-Mata v. "Aguirre-Mata (herein (Tex.Crim.App.2003) 125 S.W.3d 473 after, II")). "Aguirre-Mata 329, O'Grady, v. 312 Smith U.S. 61 S.Ct. 572, (1941). 85 L.Ed. 859 States, 742, 748, Brady v. United 397 U.S. 1463, (1970); 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 747 Men Morgan, n. Henderson v. 426 U.S. 645 (Tex.Crim. 344 dez (1976). 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 108 App.2004). consequence.” court; its the trial the record also must be respect silent with to whether he was oth Supreme What United States provided, of, erwise or nevertheless aware opinion Boykin Court’s 1969 v. Alabama requisite information process jurispru contributed this due to render his requirement dence “was the rec guilty plea voluntary and intelligent. affirmatively ord must disclose that a de pleaded

fendant who guilty entered Article 26.13 plea understandingly voluntarily.”18 Thus, “when of a con criminal 26.13(a)(1) Article mandates by guilty plea viction obtained contains “[p]rior to accepting plea of guilty or evidence that a defendant knew of the plea contendere, of nolo the court shall rights he was putatively waiving, the con admonish the defendant of ... viction must be reversed.”19 We have not of punishment attached to the offense[.]”22 occasion, however, ed on more than one Although the is obviously statute intended “that Boykin specifically out set entry facilitate the in adequately ‘spread what on must record’ pleas contendere,23 guilty formed or nolo Moreover, comply with [its] mandate.”20 any claim that court failed to “Boykin clearly pro did not hold that due follow the mandate of the is sepa statute requires equivalent cess of the Article rate from the plea claim that the guilty 26.13(a) or an admonishments admonish accepted in violation of process.24 due ment on the So punishment.”21 26.13(a) Because Article “puts duty on long affirmatively as the record otherwise the trial court to sponte,” act sua we held discloses that the defendant’s Bessey v. State that it a right “creates informed, adequately due process is only.”25 Therefore, is waivable For prevail satisfied. *6 of may breach the statute be raised for the claim, therefore, his constitutional it not is on enough appeal.26 the first time But that record is with this does not unrevealing respect to whether he was admonished a mean that violation of the statute is not Alabama, 238, 244, Boykin II, v. 17. U.S. Aguirre-Mata supra, 395 89 at 475-76. See 1709, (1969); State, 706, 23 Aguirre- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 274 also VanNortrick v. 227 S.W.3d II, supra, ("The pass (Tex.Crim.App.2007) Mata at observed in 708 Article 26.13 ing Aguirre-Mata "literally ... II that admonishments are not consti- satis themselves tutionally language quote Boykin required.”). fies” the we from pleading above to admonish a defendant charged of "the factual 26.13(a)(1). elements of the 22. Tex Code Crim. art. Proc. rights” crime” and the "various constitutional waived, necessarily that are "without State, 653, [also] v. 980 S.W.2d 656 Carranza admonishing range punish [him] on the of I, (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Aguirre-Mata supra, Id. 499; at 475 II, 476; ment[J” n. 4. Aguirre-Mata supra, at at Van Nortrick, supra, at 708. 4, Brady, supra, at 747 90 n. S.Ct. 1463. State, 914, 24. Anderson v. 182 S.W.3d 918 Benitez, Gardner, 398; 74, (Tex.Crim.App.2006); United States v. 542 supra, U.S. n. at 84 10, State, 633, (Tex. (2004). 124 S.Ct. Burnett v. 159 L.Ed.2d 157 88 S.W.3d 637 State, Fakeye Crim.App.2002); See also Gardner v. 227 S.W.3d 164 S.W.3d 399 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing (Tex.Crim.App.2007). for this Benitez proposition). (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Gardner, supra, (quoting Aguirre- at 399 II, 475). supra, Mata at Indeed, made when mention was surprise” for harm.27 “claim analysis an that his of solely punishment hearing the predicated at such a claim because violation, paragraphs for true the enhancements statutory standard upon a degree “a him for second pertains punishable to claims made determining harm that range twenty” “two to felony” with a of applies of non-constitutional —Rule 44.2(b).28 actually had been aware pro harm under this indicates he assaying In range punishment to the of four vision, applicable court must look reviewing plea. determine whether months earlier when he entered his as a whole to particular nothing of amounts to aware Such conclusion defendant was more, contends, he have rule of proce- should he than a information notwithstanding default, object him to requiring been dural admonished — prior to lack he raise a the trial court level before admonishment — accepted his time that the trial court appeal, Article 26.13 on con- violation of completely silent plea.29 A record that is trary holding manifest this Court’s a defendant respect with whether rhetorical Bessey.33 there is some While punishment, actually aware arguments, in the final anal- force these notwithstanding judicial lack of admon they court ysis misperceive ishment, that he supports the inference holding. peals’s purposes in fact aware not so Although opinion is not as clear as we its 44.2(b) analysis.30 the Rule wish, do not the court of might believe to hold the failure to appeals meant ANALYSIS timely admonish Analysis

Rule Harm was harmless correct simply because he later learned correct not take does issue range, he had been so aware at though looking plea. time Nor do we he entered his viola- record to determine whether entire meant to im- believe the court tion statute was admonishment . forfeiture, holding pose rule of reason, good since harmless —and with object point at some hold- has been this Court’s consistent plea prevents he his guilty after entered ing.31 argues But complaining appeal him from the lack appeals failed to the entire record examine *7 he “at time he with reveal that of admonishment the entered a view what time, contrary, at the the court of plea.”34 knew “at the the time On relevant claim guilty plea.”32 appeals appellant’s he the entertained the entered merits, error, Moreover, proceeded appeals’s he the court of on the found faults analysis. The or to the Rule harm “protest” conclusion that his failure State, 638; VanNortrick, (Tex. Burnett, supra, supra, at v. 30. Cain 710-11; Fakeye, supra, at 717 & n. 4. Crim.App.1997). at 658; I, Carranza, supra, 31. See note ante. Aguirre-Mata at 637-38; 499; Burnett, supra, supra, at at 918; VanNortrick, VanNortrick, Anderson, supra, supra, Appellant's (citing Brief at at 712). supra, at at 708. Burnett, 638; Anderson, Bessey, supra, supra, supra, at at 919; VanNortrick, 709; supra, Fakeye, at su VanNortrick, supra, pra, at 716. exhibit at the appellant’s jury charge, [t]he alarm which detailed the phase a circumstance rel- punishment range punishment, was of was read aloud in appeals’s analy- evant to the court of open court. Defense counsel did not guilty plea, sis. At the time he entered his object the charge. There no on- was notice of the appellant the had received protest the-record reaction or from in the indict- paragraphs enhancement read, pellant charge when the when ment, acknowledged he had explicitly jury the punish- returned its verdict on “Guilty in Plea Memorandum” that he the ment, appellant’s sentencing. or at Nor them they had read and that were “true did defense attempt develop counsel fact, with together and correct.” This the support record to a motion for new trial nonchalance, appellant’s later led the court on grounds the the plea was not appeals of to infer even at the time voluntary.37 knowing and must entry plea, only These not were circumstances have been aware that enhancement that led to infer us that Burnett was actu- purpose, paragraphs subjecting served a ally range aware of the punishment punishment him to a than greater range when he guilty plea despite entered his charge burglary that for the naked admonishment, absence of but cer- building, formally about which he had been tainly regarded them as relevant. While Otherwise, it admonished. would rea- the inference of actual is less awareness expect express sonable him to some compelling facts more limited or “surprise” “protest” when mention was case, available, this it is nonetheless during hearing made of a punishment not err did to follow significantly greater grade offense and our concluding lead in that the appellant’s mention, to—not by substantial not were affected when actually twenty assessed trial faulty court’s admonishment.38 year sentence. Boykin and Procedural Default reasoning similar employed

We our own opinion Burnett focus first reason the court of ing comparable gave part upon rejecting least constitu- — at — post-entry-of-the-plea circumstances.35 tional claim is that did There, appellant pled guilty preserve objection before a it with a trial motion jury then proceeded proposition to assess his for new trial.39 For the punishment, required, never such preservation he was admonished the court of puni appeals our opinion cited Mendez v. jury agree shment.36 After the appellant, was sworn and State.40 We how- ever, guilty plea, jury support Burnett entered his that Mendez simply does not Then, punishment-phase proposition.41 agree heard evidence. this also that it *8 Burnett, supra, 35. at 640-41. 41.The in a trial issue whether Mendez obligation, sponte, court sua to with- has an Id. at 640. 36. guilty plea draw a defendant’s when evidence subsequently arises is with "that inconsistent Id. at 640-41. guilt.” at 336. We held that the trial Id. obligation, court no such that the has and Tex.R.App. 44.2(b). P. plea defendant must seek to withdraw his may predicated upon the before error be Davison, supra, at 901. Id. at This court’s do so. holding predicated large (Tex.Crim.App.2004). 40. 138 334 in on S.W.3d measure as at the trial court level a to hold that a claim of awareness be anomalous would predicate complaining to de- on In- subject procedural appeal. is to Boykin error stead, fault, considering Boykin that we have we the rule of to especially regard be held, that a claim based in a already Bessey, systemic requirement, the nature of of the Article duty the absence of one a on the trial court to make upon imposing admonishments, which are meant to knowing 26.13 record and demonstrate guilty pleas voluntariness of voluntary facilitate the quality guilty plea.43 a The constitutionally re- are themselves entry but not system will not tolerate the simply subject forfeiture. is not to quired, plea a on the basis of a record guilty any that the defendant devoid indication operates a rule of Boykin like de possessed understanding “a full of what appellate record dis fault: Unless plea connotes and of its conse- guilty a defendant entered closes that 44 Therefore, pure Boykin quence.” “voluntarily understanding^,]” plea to that say, claim—that is claim reviewing presume that he did court must absolutely unrevealing is with re- not, accordingly.42 For a review rule spect guilty plea to whether a was entered an ing require appel court nevertheless to not intelligently ordinary to —is at the trial preserve Boykin lant to error principles procedural default.45 The this court level would turn that appeals erred extent head, reversing rule of default on its opinion may its read to conclude other- all, an appellate After court presumption. wise.46 from an unre- required presume that is vealing record that accused Boykin and Harmless Error an informed adequately enter reasonably him to court expect display cannot The second reason the rejected object appellant’s to his lack of constitu- the wherewithal Boykin, process prohibit supra, at the fact due does not 89 S.Ct. 1709. that plead- innocent defendant from nevertheless long ing guilty voluntarily as he does so Marin, 280; Mendez, supra, supra, at at —so intelligently. While we Id. at 344. men- expressed Boykin passing, tioned opinion preserve whether an must say every appellate is 46. This not to claim Boykin in the he error trial court before Boykin purported actually predicat- is appeal. assert court totally ed a record that is with silent page authority cited 339 of as for the Mendez respect the informed nature of proposition served, Boykin pre- error must be trigger appellate plea, so default. nothing juncture we find at that Indeed, analysis from Far it. as our opinion it. supports our merits of the due claim demonstrates, 16-19, post, fails see at he Boykin, supra, at 89 S.Ct. 1709. Boykin pure make out a case for error in this case, and must therefore lose on the merits. (Tex. 43. Marin v. S.W.2d (if most) Boykin Many claims of error will Supreme Crim.App.1993). The Court ob similarly prove just to be without "[wjhat Boykin served in stake for merit — of, jurisdiction many e.g., claims a lack of facing imprisonment an accused death or de (the convicting quintessential sys- mands the utmost solicitude of courts Marin, 279) requirement, supra, at temic see capable canvassing are the matter ultimately Appellate lack will merit. courts accused make a full under sure has must nevertheless entertain the merits of standing such of what the connotes and its *9 claims, frivolous, 243-44, consequence.” 89 however rather than declare 395 U.S. S.Ct. procedurally 1709. them to defaulted.

691 already claim was that had con- ute punishment.”51 tional to the conviction or that the improper statutory cluded admon- The court of appeals erred to avoid the ishment was harmless under the standard merits of the appellant’s process due claim 44.2(b).47 Rule of of It construed several simply because it already had found his our cases to for the that proposition stand statutorily based claim be to harmless un- this same harm determining standard 44.2(b). der Any Rule constitutional error governs Boykin-based claims as In well.48 the record reveal gov- must be this, the court appeals of was also mistak- 44.2(a). by erned Rule en.

We have taken care in our case law to Boykin Error upon appellate differentiate claims based a The court appeals did not de statutory violation admonishment opinion termine its whether Boykin requirement appel- of Article 26.13 from actually case, error occurred in this pre- late claims due a based —that termiting analysis with its faulty involuntary inade- because any conclusions that such error was for cases, In quately informed.49 none of our and, event, in any feited harmless under including expressly two cited 44.2(b).52 Rule Ordinarily, we would re of appeals,50 have we ever that a held mand a cause to the lower appellate harm non-constitutional standard court when our rejection its basis for apply plea should to a that a guilty claim disposition gives rise another “issue was so as to ill-informed render it involun- raised [that was] tary [now nec becomes] under the Due Process Nor Clause. we, essary final disposition ap could consistent Texas Rule 53 peal!,]” 44.2(a), which the court of Appellate man- Procedure addressed, already has not dates so “the since in our long appellate discretionary court, as a capacity criminal review case reveals constitutional we error error review “decisions” of the courts app harmless review, exceptions But must reverse a there are to this eals.54 judgment of conviction or un- practice, and when the proper resolution beyond clear, less court determines remaining reason- issue is we will able doubt that did not contrib- dispose sometimes the case Davison, either, supra, at 901. holding harm there instead that a failing claim that the trial court erred in required by admonish Article 26.13 does not, more, without make aout constitutional claim, much less call for See notes 23 & ante. analysis. at 474. S.W.3d I, Aguirre-Mata 50. See note ante. In Tex.R.App. 44.2(a). P. apply declined constitutional harm expressly "Appellant standard because Davison, supra, at 901. appeal claim direct that the trial court's pun him admonish of the P. 47.1. Tex.R.App. ishment caused to be obtained violation of the Due Process Clause State, applicable Fifth E.g., Amendment made v. 323 S.W.3d Benavidez through States the Fourteenth (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Amendment.” 183 & n. 20 Zuliani v. State, reading 992 S.W.2d at And a (Tex.Crim.App.2011); careful S.W.3d Aguirre-Mata pur II reveals we did not Fuller 589 n. 30 (Tex. port App.2012). evaluate a constitutional claim for Crim. *10 economy.55 part identified as of its regard We judicial name of case, analysis), a for the reasons to from the rec this such Rule as may ord as a whole it be inferred follow. guilty plea was although appellant’s “Guilty Plea Memoran In the not in open, negotiated, plead not he did dum,” he appellant signed, which the ignorance applicable range pun respect to each of the admonished Thus, the case ishment. record this particular mentioned Boykin’s appellate pre to engage fails a Boykin pleading guilty defendant process due was violated sumption that necessarily by jury, waives—trial confron because the entered unintelli appellant tation, self-in privilege against gent Nor does the record guilty plea. Thus, the is not crimination. record alto inference, affirmatively deriving refute respect whether the gether silent with to to appellant’s protest from the failure consequences appellant understood greater punishment range when II, plea. Aguirre-Mata In have “[w]e his during punishment pro was mentioned ... Supreme holding found no Court case actually him at ceedings imposed court’s admonish sentencing, that he must have been aware guilty-pleading range defendant on the susceptibility greater of his to that punishment guilty plea invali renders of the time he his range entered that a assuming d.”56 But even silent —even inac guilty plea despite the trial court’s respect record with — curate admonishment. awareness of the trigger Boykin’s appel alone sufficient short, rea- essentially In the same late in this presumption, the record case is that the court of found that sons not totally respect appel “silent” with any constitutional violation was harmless knowledge applicable range lant’s (albeit wrong Rule under the subsection of plea.57 he his punishment when entered 44.2), and therefore declined reach proceeding At Boykin, “[s]o claim, we now merits his due showfed], far the judge record conclude that the has failed [Boykin] asked questions concerning no due process establish merits of his plea, [Boykin] his address claim.60 Moreover, court.”58 “the record [was] wholly light silent on” [and threw] CONCLUSION may strategy whether some trial have reasons, played Boykin’s a role plead foregoing although decision For (and Here, guilty.59 reject aspects contrast as the certain of the court of E.g., allege prove facts Johnston v. that he be able to 224 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). beyond appellate revealed in the rec- what is that are sufficient to establish to our ord n. 7. 125 S.W.3d at 475 he was unaware of the satisfaction that in fact punishment at accurate the time Boykin, supra, at 89 S.Ct. 1709. in this cause. entered S.Ct. merely today appellate hold that the trigger Boykin presumption does Id. at S.Ct. pro- violation of due otherwise demonstrate a cess. holding today would Our not foreclose the obtaining post-con- from relief in corpus proceeding habeas in the viction event *11 have, fact, ultimately affirm its reasoning, we been peak’s forfeited. We are now closely judgment. examining the of use those two terms an effort to up clear whatever JOHNSON, J., concurring filed a by confusion has been caused our inexacti- opinion. tude. JOHNSON, J., concurring filed a I believe is long past time for opinion. stop using phrase this Court to “harm- error occasion, analysis.” less Examined using logically, fall

On courts into incor “harmless error” is a incorrect conclusion reached terminology, rect termi by analytic cannot, process then in the case there- nology becomes imbedded bedevil, fore, Thereafter, analysis. it law. continues And, confuse, problem and mislead. if the When the courts of appeals consider a court, superior arises in a use the incor error, claim harmful step first is terminology rect forced lower analytic process that this Court has example, For courts. the United States prescribed, they determine whether there Supreme Court has declared certain they was error. If determine that are persons classes “not of the err, If, analysis ends. how- “actually are penalty,” death i.e. innocent ever, they err, find that the trial court did or penalty,” age the death reason they step analyt- move to the second disability, apparently mental when what it ic process and consider what error kind of persons is that means those classes of are (TRAP 44.2(a)) it is: constitutional or stat- ineligible imposition penal of the death (TRAP 44.2(b)). utory Based on reso- See, ty. e.g., Virginia, Atkins v. 536 U.S. lution question, courts of 318, 321, 304, 2242, 122 S.Ct. 153 L.Ed.2d peals then step move third (the (2002) forbids capital Constitution process and analytic consider whether the mentally retarded offend claim harmful error meets the require- ers, mentally categorically excluding Then, ments the applicable standard. execution); Roper retarded from v. Sim then, only error can be said that an mons, 578, 125 543 U.S. S.Ct. was harmful or harmless. (2005) (the 161 L.Ed.2d Constitution for process operates correctly deter- imposition penalty bids of the death mine the of a of harmful merits claim age who under of eigh offenders were It might appropriately error. be called committed); teen when their crimes were analysis analysis error because 333, 340, Sawyer Whitley, 505 U.S. 347- that is what it “harmless happens. To call (1992) 2514, 120 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 269 however, analysis,” to both inaccu- is (discussing petitioner claim rately process describe what the does and “actually penalty,” innocent of the death process make vulnerable assertions focusing on the elements which render emphasis that the is to find eligible penalty); defendant the death many possible errors as harmless. 386, 393-94, 124 Haley, Dretke v. 541 U.S. (2004) (dis S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d 659

cussing claim of “actual innocence” of the

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Case Details

Case Name: Davison, Anthony Ray
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: May 22, 2013
Citation: 405 S.W.3d 682
Docket Number: PD-1236-12
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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