Keith v. Davis, Director TDCJ-CID, 4:15-cv-00086

In November 2013 Deanna Lynn Keith pleaded guilty in Hood County, Texas, to evading arrest under a plea agreement, admitted two enhancement paragraphs, and received 17 years’ imprisonment and a $3,000 fine; she waived direct appeal.
She filed a state habeas application signed October 1, 2014, which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on April 1, 2015.
Keith filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (filed January 30, 2015) raising claims that her enhanced sentence was illegal/excessive, trial counsel was ineffective, and prosecutorial misconduct occurred.
Respondent raised the one-year AEDPA limitations defense in a supplemental answer after the court ordered briefing on timeliness; the court concluded parties had fair notice to address limitations.
The district court calculated the AEDPA limitations period from December 5, 2013 (expiration of time to file direct appeal) to December 5, 2014, tolled by the state habeas filing for 50 days, yielding a federal filing deadline of January 24, 2015.
Because Keith’s federal petition was filed January 30, 2015, the court held it untimely and dismissed the petition; a certificate of appealability was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Keith’s § 2254 petition was timely under AEDPA § 2244(d)(1)(A)	Petition was filed within equitable or statutory tolling; state filings and events justify later filing	Statutory limitations period expired Jan 24, 2015; petition filed Jan 30, 2015 is untimely	Petition untimely; dismissed under § 2244(d)
Whether statutory tolling applied to extend filing deadline	State habeas filed Oct 1, 2014 tolled AEDPA period through denial	Tolling applied only for the period the state application was pending; computed deadline Jan 24, 2015	Statutory tolling applied as computed; did not save the Jan 30 filing
Whether equitable tolling excuses late filing	Extraordinary circumstances (lost mailed writ, lockdowns, limited supplies) and diligence justify equitable tolling	Proffered circumstances are common to prisoners and not extraordinary; attempted bypass of state remedies undermines tolling	Equitable tolling denied—no extraordinary circumstances or actual innocence shown
Whether court could raise limitations sua sponte after respondent’s initial answer	Court lacked authority to raise limitation defense sua sponte	Court may raise the defense if it gives fair notice and opportunity to be heard	Court properly raised timeliness after giving parties notice/opportunity (Day v. McDonough)

Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (courts may raise AEDPA timeliness sua sponte after fair notice and opportunity to respond)
Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1998) (a pro se inmate’s filing is deemed filed on the date placed in the prison mail system)
Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1998) (finality and calculation of AEDPA limitations period after plea)
Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2000) (state habeas application tolls AEDPA limitations while pending)
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (actual innocence may overcome AEDPA timeliness bars)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling requires diligence and extraordinary circumstances)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (statutory tolling does not apply to applications dismissed as unexhausted)
Larry v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2004) (attempts to bypass state exhaustion by filing federal habeas do not justify equitable tolling)
Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000) (prisoner ignorance, pro se status, and limited law access are generally insufficient for equitable tolling)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (federal filings do not toll state habeas limitations)
Moore v. Cain, 298 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2002) (federal habeas petitions do not toll AEDPA limitations for state collateral review)