Kazar v. Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania
679 F. App'x 156
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Kazar, a tenure-track assistant professor at Slippery Rock University (SRU), accepted a position that required a Ph.D. but had not yet completed her degree when hired.
- SRU converted her to a non‑tenure instructor when she delayed her dissertation and repeatedly missed projected completion dates; she defended in July 2010 but had substantial revisions outstanding into 2011.
- In early 2011 the Department Evaluation Committee and department chair recommended non‑renewal based on the unfinished Ph.D. and teaching concerns; SRU did not renew her tenure‑track contract for 2011–12.
- Kazar is a lesbian who completed Safe Zone LGBT training in October 2010 and placed a pink triangle sticker on her office door. She alleged retaliatory non‑renewal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Amendment) and an equal protection violation against individual defendants, and gender discrimination under Title IX against SRU.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the § 1983 claims and dismissed the Title IX claim for failure to exhaust Title VII procedures; the Third Circuit affirms as to the § 1983/equal protection and affirms the Title IX dismissal on the ground that plaintiff failed to show pretext.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment retaliation: did Safe Zone participation cause non‑renewal? | Kazar: Safe Zone training and visible LGBT support were protected speech and a substantial factor in SRU’s non‑renewal. | Individual defendants: non‑renewal resulted from Kazar’s failure to timely complete the Ph.D. and documented teaching concerns; no causal link to Safe Zone activity. | Court: No causal link. Temporal gap, no antagonistic pattern, and record supports non‑renewal for Ph.D. delay. Summary judgment for defendants. |
| Equal protection: was Kazar treated differently as a member of a protected class? | Kazar: She was discriminated against based on sex/sexual orientation relative to coworkers. | Defendants: No similarly situated comparators; others hired had doctorates or were evaluated under different standards. | Court: Kazar failed to identify similarly situated individuals; equal protection claim fails. |
| Title IX employment discrimination: may Kazar bring Title IX claim and did she show pretext? | Kazar: Title IX claim for gender‑based employment discrimination (district court had dismissed on exhaustion grounds). | SRU: Employment discrimination claims proceed under Title VII and require exhaustion; alternatively, SRU proffered legitimate non‑discriminatory reason (Ph.D. requirement). | Court: Even assuming Title IX applies, Kazar failed to show SRU’s stated reason (untimely Ph.D.) was pretextual. Title IX claim fails. |
| Burden‑shifting and proof standard for discrimination claims | Kazar: (implicit) McDonnell Douglas framework supports inference of discrimination. | SRU: articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; plaintiff must show pretext. | Court: Applied McDonnell Douglas; SRU met its burden and plaintiff failed to prove pretext. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.) (summary judgment standard review)
- Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009) (First Amendment public‑employee retaliation standard)
- Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (summary judgment/genuine dispute standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (Sup. Ct.) (standard for genuine issue of material fact)
- Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (Sup. Ct.) (temporal proximity limits for inferring retaliation)
- Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (timing and causation in retaliation)
- Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (similarly situated standard for equal protection)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct.) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (pretext and ultimate burden on plaintiff)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (distinction between Title IX and Title VII regimes)
- Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (private right of action under Title IX)
- Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (Title VII not exclusive of other remedies)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (Title IX remedial framework and notice requirement)
- Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (statutory remedial scheme may imply exclusivity)