Karen Lambert v. Andrew Saul, 980 F.3d 1266

Karen Lambert had been found disabled in 2005 due to rheumatoid arthritis and received benefits; the SSA concluded in a continuing disability review that her disability ended on January 1, 2015.
Lambert testified at an ALJ hearing that she continues to suffer debilitating pain, limited mobility, and daily-activity restrictions; she submitted treating records and records of surgeries and injections.
State-agency medical consultants concluded Lambert could perform substantial work (including extended walking/standing); the ALJ gave those consultant opinions little weight.
The ALJ found Lambert unable to perform past relevant work but capable of modified light work, and he rejected Lambert’s symptom testimony as not entirely consistent with the record.
Appeals Council denied review; district court affirmed the ALJ; Lambert appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit held (1) there is no presumption of continuing disability because the SSA’s post-1984 interpretive rule is reasonable and entitled to Chevron/Brand X deference, but (2) the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Lambert’s testimony and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a prior finding of disability creates a presumption that disability continues in a continuing-disability review	Lambert: prior 2005 disability creates a presumption of continuing disability that the SSA must overcome	SSA/Saul: the 1984 Reform Act and SSA implementing rules/preamble foreclose any presumption; ALJ acted correctly without applying one	No presumption; SSA’s interpretation that determinations must be neutral is reasonable and gets Chevron/Brand X deference, displacing prior judge-made presumption (Patti/Bellamy)
Whether the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons to reject Lambert’s symptom testimony	Lambert: ALJ failed to identify which testimony was discredited and did not explain evidence undermining it	Saul: ALJ explained inconsistencies between her reports, treatment, and medical evidence	ALJ erred—must identify specific testimony disbelieved and give specific, clear, convincing reasons; error not harmless; remand required

Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982) (announced a presumption of continuing disability)
Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985) (applied presumption in benefit-termination context)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency statutory interpretation deferential framework)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (prior judicial construction yields to reasonable agency interpretation unless statute unambiguous)
Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard for reviewing ALJ credibility determinations)
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ must identify specific testimony discredited and explain which evidence undermines it)
Warren v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting post-1984 statutory/regulatory framework on presumption question)