SC20257
Conn.Oct 27, 2020Background
- Karagozian worked as a licensed optician manager for USV Optical in a JCPenney store and performed duties the plaintiff characterizes as optometric assistant work (scheduling, patient prep, adjustments, glaucoma tests, ocular ultrasound, contact‑lens modifications).
- About three months after hire he repeatedly asked to be excused from those duties, claiming they violated public policy and relied on a Board declaratory ruling, a Walmart cease‑and‑desist consent order, and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31‑130(i).
- USV refused his requests; Karagozian resigned and sued for constructive discharge in violation of public policy.
- The trial court granted USV’s motion to strike the complaint, relying on Brittell to require proof that the employer intended to force the employee to resign; the Appellate Court affirmed.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether Brittell requires proof that the employer intended to force the employee to quit and affirmed the lower courts’ judgment on the alternative ground that the complaint failed to allege intolerable working conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper intent standard under Brittell for constructive discharge | Karagozian: intent should focus only on creation of the condition; no requirement to prove employer intended to force resignation | USV: Brittell requires showing employer intended to force the employee to quit | Court: Brittell requires showing employer intended to create the intolerable atmosphere (subjective) and an objective showing that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign; no separate requirement that employer intended to force resignation |
| Whether complaint alleged intolerable working conditions | Karagozian: being required to perform allegedly unlawful optometric‑assistant duties made conditions intolerable | USV: duties were within hired responsibilities and plaintiff did not allege conditions so severe a reasonable person would be compelled to resign | Held: complaint failed to allege objective element; conditions alleged were not so difficult/unpleasant to compel a reasonable person to quit |
| Reliance on Board declaratory ruling and Walmart consent order | Karagozian: those documents show the duties violated public policy and created intolerable conditions | USV: the ruling and order are not binding on the parties and do not create a private right applicable to Karagozian/USV | Held: declaratory ruling bound only participants in that hearing and addressed optometrists (not opticians); the Walmart consent order did not bind USV or show intolerable conditions |
| Applicability of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31‑130(i) (staffing permit) | Karagozian: statute supports public‑policy violation because staffing permit was required | USV: complaint contains no allegation that an optometrist charged USV for hiring staff; statute therefore inapplicable | Held: § 31‑130(i) was inapplicable on the pleadings because plaintiff did not allege facts triggering the statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148 (Conn. 1998) (articulates Connecticut constructive‑discharge standard: employer intentionally creates intolerable atmosphere that forces employee to quit)
- Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1996) (federal formulation of constructive discharge standard relied on in Brittell)
- Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769 (U.S. 2016) (Supreme Court: no requirement that plaintiff prove employer intended the employee to quit when claim is constructive discharge)
- Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (U.S. 2004) (discusses treating constructive resignation as an actual firing in extreme cases)
- Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting Second Circuit does not insist on proof of specific intent in constructive discharge cases)
- Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471 (Conn. 1980) (an employee should not be forced to choose between criminal exposure and continued employment)