Kaighn v. Trump
2:16-cv-02227
E.D. Cal.Aug 11, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Gregory and Janis Kaighn sued (pre-election) seeking a declaration that Donald J. Trump is a "member of the Communist Party" (alleging membership in the "Illuminati") and therefore ineligible for the presidency under the Communist Control Act of 1954; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring him from office.
- Trump moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for lack of standing) and alternatively under Rules 12(b)(2), (3), and (6); the court addressed standing first and dismissed on that ground.
- The court noted this suit relied on the same operative facts as a related case the court had already dismissed, and that Gregory Kaighn had later been declared a vexatious litigant (but the motion was decided before that order).
- Plaintiffs framed their claim as both individual litigants and as "co-trustees on behalf of the People of the United States;" the court struck the trustee assertion from the complaint.
- Plaintiffs asserted generalized grievances (e.g., Trump is in the "Illuminati," "waging war against America") and in opposition alleged, without supporting pleadings, personal harms such as attempted murder and kidnapping by Trump; they asked for leave to amend if dismissal were granted.
- The court concluded the complaint failed Article III standing (injury-in-fact, causation, redressability), denied leave to amend as futile, granted dismissal with prejudice, and closed the case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge Trump's eligibility under the Communist Control Act | Kaighn: as U.S. citizens and "co-trustees" for the people, they have standing; later asserted individual harms (attempted murder, kidnapping) | Trump: plaintiffs lack standing; the Act is not privately enforceable and plaintiffs allege only generalized grievances | Held: No standing—plaintiffs alleged only generalized grievances, failed injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability; dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) granted |
| Whether the court may consider lack of jurisdiction sua sponte despite defendant asserting other defenses | Kaighn: argued equitable estoppel against lack-of-standing defense | Trump: raised jurisdictional defenses and other procedural grounds | Held: Court must and did address Article III jurisdiction sua sponte; equitable-estoppel argument need not be reached because jurisdiction is resolved first |
| Whether leave to amend should be granted after dismissal for lack of standing | Kaighn: requested leave to amend and proffered new allegations of personal harm | Trump: opposed amendment (argued futility and other defenses) | Held: Denied—amendment would be futile because plaintiffs failed to tie asserted harms to the claimed statutory violation and offered no plausible redress theory |
| Whether the court should dismiss on other procedural grounds (venue, personal jurisdiction, mootness) | Kaighn: opposed dismissal | Trump: alternatively argued lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to state a claim, and later mootness after election | Held: Court did not reach those alternative grounds because lack of Article III standing disposed of the case |
Key Cases Cited
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury)
- Pritikin v. Department of Energy, 254 F.3d 791 (standing: injury, causation, redressability elements explained)
- Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (credible threat of harm and standing at the pleading stage)
- Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (fairly traceable and redressability are related causation facets)
- Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (causal chain too attenuated where numerous third-party decisions intervene)
- Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (distinction between facial and factual Rule 12(b)(1) attacks)
- Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149 (Rule 15 leave-to-amend principles)
- Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051 (court may choose among threshold grounds to dismiss)