Judith Moore-Pennoyer v. State of Tennessee, 515 S.W.3d 271

Background

Judith Moore-Pennoyer worked as a circuit court secretarial assistant in Knox County from 1990; she served exclusively for Judge Harold Wimberly for 18 years.
Judge Wimberly lost re-election to William T. Ailor in August 2014; Wimberly’s term ended August 31, 2014, and Moore-Pennoyer was given a separation notice indicating employment ended the last business day of his term (August 29, 2014).
After the election but before taking office, Ailor told Moore-Pennoyer he had selected a different secretarial assistant; she sued the State and Ailor alleging, among other claims, tortious interference with her employment relationship against Ailor individually.
The State moved to dismiss on multiple grounds; the trial court dismissed the State but allowed Moore-Pennoyer’s individual-capacity claim to proceed, leading to interlocutory appeals; the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on whether Ailor was a state officer pre-oath.
The Tennessee Supreme Court accepted review to decide, in its supervisory capacity, whether a trial judge’s secretarial assistant is an at-will employee and whether that employment terminates when the judge’s service ends.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a trial judge’s secretarial assistant is an at-will employee	Moore-Pennoyer argued she had an implied annual or continuing employment (budgeted, salaried, annual position)	Ailor (and State) argued the assistant is subject to ordinary at-will employment and judges have staffing authority	Held: Secretarial assistants are at-will employees; judge has authority to select/supervise/remove assistant
Whether assistant’s employment automatically terminates when the judge’s service ends	Moore-Pennoyer contended budgeted/annual position created entitlement to continue	Defendants argued no entitlement; incoming judge may hire whomever; position does not bind successor	Held: Employment ends when the judge’s service ends; incoming judge has no obligation to retain predecessor’s assistant
Whether Ailor tortiously interfered with employment by advising she would not be retained	Moore-Pennoyer claimed Ailor intended to and did interfere with her employment relationship	Ailor argued there was no existing employment relationship to interfere with after Judge Wimberly’s term ended	Held: No tortious interference as employment ended by operation of law and she remained employed through last business day
Whether Ailor was a state officer/employee pre-oath for statutory waiver purposes (scope question below)	Moore-Pennoyer argued Ailor was not an officer/employee before taking oath and thus statutory waiver did not apply	Ailor argued his pre-term staffing decisions were within state-employee/officer scope for waiver	Held: Court resolved broader employment-status issues and ruled dismissal appropriate because of at-will status and automatic termination; interlocutory waiver question was not necessary to the final ruling

Key Cases Cited

Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850 (Tenn. 2010) (motion-to-dismiss standards; accept factual allegations)
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011) (de novo review of legal conclusions on pleadings)
Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002) (elements of tortious interference claim)
Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976) (Supreme Court as supreme judicial tribunal)
In re Bell, 344 S.W.3d 304 (Tenn. 2011) (Court’s supervisory authority over Judicial Department)
Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., 470 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2015) (recognition of employment-at-will doctrine)
Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96 (Tenn. 2015) (policy reasons supporting employer freedom under at-will doctrine)
State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473 (Tenn. 2001) (Court’s rulemaking and supervisory powers)
Belmont v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1974) (Court authority over attorney licensing and judicial administration)
Barland v. Eau Claire Cnty., 575 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1998) (describing unique relationship between judge and judicial assistant)