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Barland v. Eau Claire County
575 N.W.2d 691
Wis.
1998
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*1 Lеnz, Peterson, Gregory Thomas H. Paul J. Barland, Wahl, Benjamin Proctor, and Eric Circuit Court County, for Eau Claire Judges Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v. County, Eau Claire Defendant-Co-Appellant, AFSCME Local Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court 4, 1997. argument September No. 96-1607. Oral —Decided 13, 1998. March 691.) (Alsoreported in 575 N.W.2d *4 (in defendant-appellant there were briefs For the by Appeals) Bruce F. Ehlke and the Court of Myers, Dowling, Shneidman, Ehlke, Blumenfield, by argument Domer, Hawks and Madison and oral Bruce F. Ehlke. defendant-co-appellant

For the there were briefs (in Appeals) argument by the Court of and oral Keith R. Corporation Zehms, Counsel, Claire. Eau plaintiffs-respondents For the the cause was by attorney general, argued Rice, David C. (in Appeals) with whom on brief Court of was Doyle, attorney general. E. James (in Appeals) Amicus curiae brief Court of was by O'Neil, filed Thomas G. Cannon and Cannon & Holl- Judges man, S.C., for the Trial Milwaukee Wisconsin Association, Inc. (in Court) Supreme

Amicus curiae brief was Rosenbaum, filed Robert Horowitz and Stafford, Hansen, Rieser & Madison for the Wisconsin Counties Assocation. *5 WILCOX, 1. JON P. J. This case is not about explicitly

powers that are set forth or described our constitution, or even mentioned our statutes. "[fjrom powers Rather, it that time immemo- is about they are rial. . .have been conceded to courts because powers courts. Such have been conceded because with- dignity, they out them could neither maintain their accomplish purposes business, their nor the of transact pow- powers called inherent their existence. These are Cannon, 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 ers." State v. (1928). judiciary powers to maintain Inherent allow the separate co-equal their stаtus as a branch government.

¶2. Indeed, the inherent of the courts as the "sword and shield of the have been referred to judiciary." Stumpf, Felix F. Inherent Powers Judiciary, National Courts: Sword and Shield of College Using protect these tools to its Judicial gov- independence third constitutional as a branch judiciary against to shield ernment, the should be able intrusions into its domain of exclusive ity, author- away using cut while its sword to legislative constitutionally portions defective of a Today must determine whether circuit enactment. we exclusive, inherent constitu- have authority prevent unilateral removal of

tional bargain- by way their assistants of a collective ing agreement county government and its between they employees. do. We hold This case is the court on certification before appeals, pursuant § to Wis. Stat. 809.61 the court (1995-96).1 granted plaintiff The circuit court (the summary judgment judges' judges) motion for Stats, to Wis. will be to the 1995-96 All future references unless otherwise indicated. version of the statutes exclusive, declared that a circuit court has appoint and remove its bargaining *6 regardless provisions of a collective county agreement negotiated and its between employees Municipal Employment Relations under the (MERA), §§ Stat. 111.70-111.77. Defendants Act (the County County) Local and AFSCME Eau Claire (AFSCME) appealed from the circuit court's deci- 2223 sion and order. certification, consider a cir- 4. On we whether authority judge exclusive, inherent

cuit court has judicial appoint assistant, her and remove his or to regardless provisions bargaining of a collective judge agreement. stated, As we hold that a circuit court authority exclusive, inherent constitutional to judicial prevent the unilateral removal of his or her bargaining despite a the terms of collective agreement. a circuit court However, we do not address judge's power appoint Therefore, to that assistant.2 we granting judges' the circuit court affirm the order of summary judgment on the basis that circuit motion authority judges exclusive, have the inherent to remove their assistants.3 2 core, requires whether At its this decision us to determine judges prevent circuit court can the removal of their appoint assistants. The to an assistant after one has been consideration, secondary is a and one that is not neces removed sarily by triggered typically the facts of this case. Because we possible grounds, State v. decide cases on the narrowest see (Ct. Blalock, 688, 703, 1989), App. 150 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 514 solely judge's power encompasses this decision a circuit court remove his or her assistant. case, Following argument in this AFSCME filed a oral seeking "Supplemental file motion with this court leave to a Followup Argument." to Oral That motion is Statement

l-H County ¶ 5. Five Eau Claire circuit court declaratory judgment pursuant filed a action to Wis. requesting § Stat. 806.044 the court declare that a authority exclusive, circuit court has the appoint judicial assistants, and remove its and that such cannot be modified collective bar- gaining agreement. findings

¶ 6. The circuit court made certain upon parties' pleadings, briefs, fact based and oral arguments, including following. County is a municipаl employer meaning within the of MERA. bargaining repre- AFSCME is the exclusive collective County sentative for the Eau Claire courthouse clerical employees bargaining unit. AFSCME and the *7 ("the parties bargaining agreement were to a collective agreement") period January 1, 1994, in force for the through bargaining 31, December 1995. Collective agreements covering employees courthouse have been hereby papers denied. Briefs addition to those discussed by very accepted in Wis. Stat. 809.19 are this court under § circumstances; typically only limited such action is allowed requested briefing particular when the court has additional on a consider, Accordingly, opinion issue. we do not nor does this address, any arguments of the additional that are set forth that statement. 4 (1) declaratory judgments § Uniform act. Wis. Stat. 806.04 respective jurisdictions shall SCOPE.Courts ofrecord within their status, rights, legal have to declare and other relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.... (2) CONSTRUE, deed, Any person interested under a POWERTO ETC. contract,

will, constituting writings written contract or other a or rights, legal by a stat- whose status or other relations are affected any validity .may question ute. . have determined ofconstruction or instrument, arising under the statute.. .and obtain a declaration of rights, legal status or other relations thereunder....

567 County See since 1972. in effect in Eau Claire 298, 2223, 190 Wis. 2d Local Eau Claire v. AFSCME 1994). (Ct. 301, 526 N.W.2d App. agreement provides

¶ that 4.02 of the 7. Section layoff, employee has the an affected in the event of a right seniority "bump" and move or his or her to invoke seniоrity by employee position with less held an into a bargaining provided unit, that the same within bumping employee "necessary qualifica-

possesses position. for that tions" County, judicial assistant In Eau Claire always posted

legal secretary5 been vacancies have agreement, pursuant filled terms of the to the through posting procedure.6 The last time that a county position in the was filled assistant years lay- July posting on 1981—14 before was off here. positions are five 9. There bargaining employees' clerical

within the courthouse positions provide assis- of those five clerical unit. Three Ms. Shanan Melland serves tance to the circuit court. bargaining agreement County collective The Eau Claire argument, "legal secretary." At oral counsel uses the term "judicial take the position as a assistant." We referred to 70.39(ll)(a) (1996) in SCR "judicial term assistant" as described "judi synonymous "legal secretary" and use the term with be throughout opinion except this in direct reference cial assistant" agreement. bargaining of this collective to the terms county stated that if no argument, At oral counsel for the *8 county person applied posted position, qualified policies position. to fill the would then use standard recruitment judge, event, appointing person, such as the would In that many applicants he or she wanted to con indicate how outside judges are involved in the sider. There is no evidence procedure posting the normal is appointment process when successful. judicial County

as the assistant to Eau Claire Circuit Judge family Cоurt Paul J. Lenz and to the court com- Although missioner/court commissioner. the three County assistants for the five Eau Claire cir- judges specific responsibilities, they will, cuit have if arises, the need assist one another their assignments. findings

¶ 10. The circuit court also made describing procedural history of this action. On County Supervisors 15, 1995, November Board of County adopted for Eau Claire Ordinance No. positions 95-96/237 which abolished certain effective January Penny Walske, 1996. Ms. a member of the bargaining position unit, courthouse clerical held a by that would be affected the new ordinance. On 30, 1995, Walske, November Ms. a more senior employee, bump posi- elected to Ms. Melland from her Judge tion as assistant Lenz. The circuit court found that Ms. Walske meets exceeds all the job qualifications required by agreement.7 County

¶ 11. The five Eau Claire circuit court judges expressed objection bumping their to the of Ms. Melland to the Board Committee on Personnel. claimed to have exclusive Walske, Specifically, found that circuit court Ms. position Register whose in the of Deeds Office had been elimi 95-96/237, possesses high nated Ordinance No. school diploma plus Degree, years an has over six secretarial Associate office, years working experience general in a with four of those legal secretary private Ms. as a for two different law offices. experience training typing, personal Walske also has software, processing bookkeeping computer use with word basic practices procedures, plus a demon and standard office ability confidentiality. strated to maintain *9 judicial appoint assistants, the their under and remove judicial authority separation and doctrines of inherent arguments, powers. Despite these the Committee on judges' arguments. rejected the Ms. Melland Personnel by County if the and AFSCME that notified both was position to her as she did not abandon report Judge of the and for work the Office Lenz might disciplined for Courts, she be insubordi- Clerk comply Further, to meant that Ms. nation. a failure County paid by the after Decem- Melland would not be 31,1995. ber judges 28, 1995, filed a 12. On December the they

complaint seeking a declaration that have authority judi- appoint remove their exclusive to and authority may assistants, not be cial and that such bargaining agreement. The a collective modified enjoining County judges requested also an order refusing pay bumping and from to from Ms. Melland 29, heard On the circuit court her. December temporary arguments parties and issued a enjoin County injunction and AFSCME from removing position Ms. Melland from her as Judge Then, 18, 1996, assistant to Lenz. on March summary judgment seeking judges filed a motion for enjoin declaratory permanent order to relief and a County bumping Ms. and AFSCME from Melland. May a declar- 1,1996, 13. On the court entered atory judgment that circuit court have authority judi- appoint their exclusive and remove cial assistants under the doctrines of inherent authority powers. separation The court held that and authority may by a collective bar- such not be modified gaining agreement negotiated between the and joint if AFSCME under MERA. Even there were appoint remove, the сircuit court con- trained, eluded that the deliberate removal of a compatible employee significantly trusted, would impair efficiency irreparably of the court and would *10 public. harm the circuit as well as the Having ¶ conclusions, 14. reached these the cir- enjoined permanently County cuit court the removing posi- AFSCME from Ms. Melland from her judicial Judge refusing Lenz, tion as assistant from pay disciplining remaining her, from her for position. County Thereafter, her the timely appealed and AFSCME from the decision and granted the order of circuit court. We the court of appeals' request for certification. ¶ 15. declaratory judgment action, this we

II. County's must decide whether the unilateral act to pursuant member, remove a staff albeit to the bargaining agreement, terms of a collective intrudes upon authority exclusive, inherent constitutional question impression the circuit court. This is a of first in the state of Wisconsin. rights A court's to declare is broad. Loy Bunderson, 400, 407,

See v. 107 Wis. 2d 320 (1982). A N.W.2d 175 circuit court has discretion to deny declaratory only grant relief, but when there is justiciable controversy. a case or See id. at 409-10. To discretionary act, sustain a must conclude that the we applied facts, circuit court examined the relevant proper a using law, and, standard of demonstrated process, rational reached a conclusion that a reasona- judge could reach. See id. at 414-15. Most ble importantly case, in this we determine whether müst applied proper the circuit court standard of law declaratory judges' request granting relief. by lеgislative govern branch of Whether an act separation doctrine ment violates infringing upon the inherent constitutional government question is a branch of independently courts. review lower law that we Holmes, 31, 41 n.7, 2d 315 N.W.2d See State v. 106 Wis. I—I that the 17. The and AFSCME contend constitutionally delegated power legislature to the bargaining agreement, County to enter into a collective constitutionally and that the circuit court is not agreement's empowered to avoid the effect of judges, "bumping" provision. hand, other on the *11 applied bumping provision contend that the is void as judges' power appoint assistants, since exclusive one. To and remove such assistants ‍‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‍is an helpful conflicting to set claims, address these it will be regarding separation general principles forth some powers. of

A. powers, separation ¶ of while 18. "The doctrine of explicitly constitution, forth in the is not set Wisconsin among governmental powers implicit in the of division judicial, legislative and executive branches." State County, 192 Friedrich v. Circuit Court Dane ex rel. (1995) (citation omitted). 1, 13, Wis. 2d 531 N.W.2d 32 separate three "The constitution creates Wisconsin government, no branch coordinate branches of arrogate other, to itself to the no branch to subordinate except provided by as is the con- control over the other

572 stitution, and no to exercise the branch Holmes, to another." 106 committed constitution 42. Wis. 2d at attempting powers of 19. to delineate government, tripartite "strict, need not seek a

our we complete, absolute, of functions scientific division government. sepa- the three of The between branches principle shared, ration of doctrine states the of completely separated powers. rather than The doctrine sharing government separate branches envisions (citations omitted). powers." "In certain Id. at 43 these power,' government may one areas of'shared branch only on to an extent exercise conferred another unduly substantially that does not interfere burden power." In re the other branch's exercise of its with Grady, Complaint Against 762, 775, 348 118 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 559 majority governmental powers lie authority, "great of shared

within these borderlands" Appointment 592, 597, Revisor, Wis. In re (1910), possible prac- it is "neither nor N.W. 670 where exclusively categorize governmental action as tical to legislative, judicial." Friedrich, 192 Wis. executive or (citation omitted). "[e]ach Nevertheless, 2d at authority into has a core zone of exclusive branch may intrude." Id. at the other branches not which *12 (citation omitted). Although and restricted finite 13-14 authority "jealously size, in zones of are to be these core by government. guarded" Id. at each branch power, employ Therefore, areas of we do not as to these interference test the undue burden or substantial "any authority by another branch because exercise of

573 Grady, government In re 118 Wis. is unconstitutional." (citation omitted) original).8 (emphasis at 776 2d regard areas of exclusive 21. With authority, we have stated: century, called

For more than a this court been govern- attempts by to resist other branches of upon exclusively judicial authority ment to exercise in an attempt These have included an to remove area. Janitor, a court In re 35 Wis. replace employe, (1874); facili- attempt physical 410 an to dictate the was to exercise its ties which a court functions, Room, (1912); an In re Court 148 109Wis. attempt legislate legal what constitutes the suffi- evidence, Chicago M. & St. P.R. ciency of Thoe v. Co., (1923); attempt regulate 181 456 an Wis. business, trials in the conduct of court Rules of Case, (1931); Court 204 Wis. 501 bar admission Cannon, attorneys, In re 206 Wis. 374 regulation of Cases, (1943), (1932), 244 8 Integration Bar (1946), In each of 249 Wis. 523 273 Wis. 281 recognized areas of exclu- these cases we and, therefore, free from sive to the branch by government. intrusion another branch of (holding setting and enforcement of Id. at 778 that the periods time to decide cases falls within an judicial authority). area of exclusive " 8 judiciary's '[i]f We note that a statute falls within the authority, may the court abide core zone of exclusive justice, statute if it furthers the administration of 'as a matter of comity courtesy acknowledgment rather than an as ’ however, judici power.' Compliance, is at the discretion of State, ary and cannot be mandated." Joni B. v. 202 Wis. 2d (citation omitted). (1996) n.5, N.W.2d 411 *13 legislative ¶ 22. To determine whether a enact unconstitutionally infringes judicial power, upon ment subject the court must consider first whether the mat legislation power that is ter of the falls within constitutionally granted legislature. to the See Fried does, If rich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14. it the court must then inquire subject legislation matter of the whether judiciary's grant of also falls within the constitutional power. See id. at 14-15.

B. legisla- 23. We examine first the extent of employment in the ture's constitutional provides staff The state constitution members. legislature may upon "[t]he confer the boards of supervisors of the several counties of the state such legislative powers local, char- of a and administrative they prescribe." time to time Wis. acter as Const, shall from § IV, 22. Pursuant to that constitutional art. delegated grant power, legislature certain statutory county, including powers to each other acts as are "make such contracts and to do such necessary proper the exercise of the and legal privileges granted performance legisla- charged upon § duties it." Wis. Stat. 59.01. delegated county supervisors also boards of ture has regulations employment to "establish treasury." any county person paid Stat. from the Wis. 59.22(2)(c).9 Finally, municipal employers § must bar- regarding collectively public employees gain with 59.22(2)(c) formerly designated as Wis. Wis. Stat. was § 59.15(2)(c). all sections of 1995 Wis. Act 201 renumbered Stat. § and the use the Chapter 59. The briefs of AFSCME statutory designations. 1993-94 employment.10 wages, terms of See hours and other 111.70(l)(a), 111.01(3), §§ 111.04, Stat. *14 111.70(l)(j). statutory provisions

¶ 24. set out the These County, leg- delegated broad as county regulate employment employees, islature, to including subject Moreover, staff. matter of court agreement seems to fall within the well boundaries authority: holidays, compensation, of this it covers brief, County objects to the circuit court's char its judicial employees, acterization of assistants as "confidential" 111.70(l)(i) employ because Wis. Stat. excludes confidential § (and status) protected municipal ees from the definition of a employee. Emрloyment The asserts that Wisconsin (WERC)requires employee Relations Commission that for an to confidential, to, be considered he or she must have access of, knowledge participate relating or in confidential matters to Further, confidential, for information to it labor relations. be employer's strategy position deal with the or in collective must administration, bargaining, litigation contract or other similar pertaining grievance handling matters to relations and labor bargaining representative employer, bétween the and the bargaining repre be information which is not available to the agents. County's judges sentative See 9. The or its brief at contend that the circuit court's use of this term is not meant to employees, fit the WERC of confidential definition but is com recognition judge mon sense of the fact that a circuit court entrusts his or her assistants with confidential informa judges' tion. See brief at 15-16 n.2.

We likewise do not read the circuit court's "confidential" characterization of assistants to mean that those staff have, persons example, strategy employer's for access to the bargaining grievance handling. collective circuit court parties bargaining agreement. are not to the collective Instead, we read the circuit court's use ofthe term "confidential" courts, knowledge to refer to of the substantive business of the knowledge strategies. and not to a of labor relations types pregnancy leave, and various vacation, insurance.

C. time, it is clear that circuit At the same authority over matters constitutiоnal courts also have legislature administration. The of staff and appointment delegated powers the circuit some appoint reporters court, such as the § Other See Stat. 751.02. of court. Wis. each branch delegated appointment include Wis. Stat. juvenile appointment § clerk of court for 48.04, of a juvenile appointment § 48.065, matters, Stat. § 851.71, commissioners, Stat. and Wis. court appoint register probate. also, Wis. See and remove a *15 32.08(2) county (power appoint § condemnation to Stat. 17.13(3) officers); (power § remove local to Wis. Stat. officers). government and AFSCME Both the point § each also authorizes that Stat. 751.02 out Wis. judge appeals justice supreme court of and secretary prescribe appoint and a and the duties of a statutory is, however, clerk. There no similar law judge appoint authority a a circuit court secretary. County and take the However, do not we only seriously that courts can contend

AFSCME authority of staff and over matters have delegation. legislative by virtue administration authority non-delegated mat- Examples over such appellate recognized in numerous ters have been authority staff in matters of Circuit court decisions.11 11 1, 7, Co., 2d See, 138 Wis. Rupert v. Home Mut. Ins. e.g., 1987) (Ct. (concluding circuit court App. 661 405 N.W.2d

577 administration emanates not from an express grant of constitutional but is an inher power, ent authority derived from the in sec. powers granted Inherent, Art. VII of the Wisconsin Constitution.12 implied, incidental are those powers which must necessarily be invoked to enable the courts to accоm their plish constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions. Friedrich, See 192 Wis. 2d at 16.13 The outer limits of that are not fully delineated in the constitution, nor in our case See State, law. E.B. v. 111 (1983). 2d 175, 181, Wis. 330 584 N.W.2d economy to control its docket to achieve of time effort); Neylan Vorwald, 85, 94, v. 124 Wis. 2d 368 N.W.2d (1985) (recognizing that court has inherent to control it). business before Const, provides: art. VII system. judicial power Court Section 2. The of this state shall be system consisting court, supreme vested in a unified court of one a appeals, court, general court of a circuit such trial courts of uniform jurisdiction legislature may law, by statewide as the create and a municipal legislature court if authorized under section 14. recognize We there are subtle differences between implied powers. inherent and Felix generally, See Stumpf, F. Inherent Powers the Courts: Sword and Shield the Judici ary, College However, National Judicial reject any we mechanical distinction drawn concepts: between the two There powers .[Ilnherent is distinction between the two terms... reasonably necessary refer to the exercise of that are for the *16 grow conduct of a court's constitutional functions and that of out jurisdiction. Implied powers

the court's are those that arise out of necessary carry authority expressly granted and are to out the and contemplated constitutionally legislatively. either or (citation omitted). Id. at 5 We have little concluding trouble powers, that most just implied powers, inherent as ultimately find provisions VII, their roots in constitutional such as art. 2.§

578 catalog need not cоmprehensively 27. We case, of this For purposes to courts. granted powers inherent of power need determine whether only we to enforce- prevent includes the power the circuit court against the bumping provision ment of to circuit court judges. assistants include those powers powers 28. Inherent and con- proper to the expedition are "essential which In re Janitor of business." ducting (1874). have also Court, 35 Wis. 410, 419 We Supreme stated: authorities, any found on the in so far as can be

The court are to the effect that constitutional subject, power protect inherent general jurisdiction has unreasonably any action that would against itself efficiency. materially impair its powers its curtail attempt to even county A has no board court, such such a and no the functions of impede upon it. could be conferred 490 Room, 148 109, 121, 134 N.W. In re Court & King Corp., 23 v. Casey in Latham Later, (1964), 225 this 311, 314, 127 N.W.2d 2dWis. further stated: judicial business before control of the general if it function. the court is to court] is essential to

[the in its power, exercisable 'Every court has inherent discretion, the Constitu- consistent within sound of causes on statutes, disposition control tion economy time and effort.' its docket with 171, Powers Am.Jur., Courts, Inherent p. sec. Courts, Suppl., p. constitutionally- asserts AFSCME ¶29. only, "need specific" are grounded *17 prerogative may not a ing be exercised at will. Accord- County, to the the circuit court's need remains replaced by qualified if filled Ms. Melland is member bargaining employee unit. This instance of sub- stitution is in contrast to the need for a new circuit position, provide court staff or the need to the circuit judges equipment with additional facilities, or services.14 Because this is need, not a case of contends that cannot invoke their inherent to avoid the terms of the col- bargaining agreement. lective disagree appellants' argu- 30. We with the recognize ments. We the distinction between this case involving and cases the need for additional facilities or reject implication staff, additional but we that a powers may only court's inherent be asserted under may such circumstances. The courts of this state call upon powers protect their inherent when needed to 14See, e.g., Dep't Admin., State ex rel. Moran v. 103 Wis. of (1981) 311, 2d (expenditure 307 N.W.2d 658 of funds for auto legal system mated research would proper be a exercise of powers); inherent Reynolds County State ex rel. v. Court Keno of (1960) (court County, 560, sha 11 Wis. 2d 105 N.W.2d 876 can order conditioning necessary); installation of air if In re Court (1912) Room, 148 Wis. (upholding judge's N.W. 490 accept space refusal to léased outside courthouse which failed to room). jury include a

The circuit court recognized below that there are several functional areas to which powers apply. Decision and at 4. of logistical Order One those areas is support, which circuit court the ordering described as personnel, additional mandating facilities, the construction of court procurement services, acquisition ‍‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‍equipment, setting or the of sala- Id. ries. For an overview commentary of cases and discussing logistical support, Stumpf, see Felix F. Inherent Powers Court, seq., 47 et Collegе National Judicial "unreasonably against actions that would themselves impair materially [their] [their] effi- curtail *18 conducting judicial ciency" expediting and their Therefore, at Room, In 148 Wis. 121. business. re Court disagree County's suggestion the cir- we with necessarily fulfilled when cuit court's "need" has been judicial "bumps" the is a who incumbent bargaining qualified unit. of the member unilaterally ¶ fact, branch when another already qualified replaces and an trained and removes employee, only the court forced not to lose court is developed by employee, but efficiencies the incumbent orienting training spend to valuable time replacement employee. positive, productive A the working overnight.

relationship The is not established by training spent replacement on the the court time given pressing judicial member could be to other staff responsibilities. argues

¶ also that the exercise 32. AFSCME authority to those instances where inherent is limited capacity. judge Accord- acts in a a circuit judge ing an a circuit court makes AFSCME, to when appointment administrative, not decision, it exercises judicial, powers. this AFSCME for 33. The authorities cited persuasive.

proposition cases15 In none of those are not inher- the distinctions between the courts discuss did 175, Doyle, ex Drake v. 40 Wis. 15 AFSCME State rel. cites (1876) Thorne, 112 Wis. 87-88 ex rel. Ellis v. and State (1901) argument. judicial/administrative distinction for its judges could other than persons Ellis on whether focus in was power. Drake addressed whether exercise certain to certain state, empowered by statute revoke secretary of judicial act when unconstitutionally a licenses, performed revoking such licenses. powers judiciary

exit constitutional and the legislature's delegate constitutional to employment upon decisions to counties. Other cases distinguishable, which AFSCME relies are also they employment because assess whether certain deci- byjudges sufficiently "judicial" qualify sions were immunity prosecution.16 from request distinguish 34. AFSCME's that we "judicial" power between ity and "administrative" author- identify power in order to a court's inherent misses point. Contrary to AFSCME's assertion, a court's deciding are not limited to outcomes particular beyond in power cases. "Judicial extends adjudicate particular controversy encompasses regulate matters related to *19 adjudication." Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44.

¶ obligation 35. The constitutional to administer justice addressing includes court administration issues frequently employ- which arise "offthe bench." Judicial play extremely ees important can and often do an role discharge duty of a court's constitutional to justice deliver to the citizens of the state. appellate

¶ long recognized 36. Our courts have responsibility the inherent constitutional of the circuit employ courts to efficient and effective off-the-bench judicial management techniques. delivery jus- requires presiding tice much more than over cases and announcing Judges decisions. and their staff also serve as performing courtroom and calendar administrators,

16 See,e.g., (7th Krajewski, Kurowski v. Cir.), 848 F.2d 767 denied, (1988), cert. 488 U.S. 926 Rosenbarger Shipman, v. 857 (N.D. Supp. F. 1994), 1282 White, Ind. Forrester v. 484 U.S. 219 (1988), (6th 1987). Brody, and Guercio v. 814 F.2d 1115 Cir.

582 designed carry myriad to out constitution- tasks all ally responsibilities. required A circuit court power, necessarily from derived the con- has inherent protect and to control the stitution, to itself that "administra- it, business includes business before 240, Avestruz, v. 81 Wis. 2d tasks. See Jacobson tive" Young, also, 267 See Lentz 245, 260 v. N.W.2d (Ct. 1995). App. 451 457, Wis. 2d 536 195 N.W.2d support for from a 37. draw this conclusion We examples the exercise of a circuit court's number of non-adjudicative power in matters. In Steven- inherent County, 14, 19, v. 140 121 N.W. son Milwaukee (1909), example, circuit we held that a appoint bailiff, to its own notwith- standing restricting appointment to a statute example is the sheriff. Another candidates selected Reynolds County v. Court ex rel. our conclusion State County, 560, 2d Kenosha 11 Wis. N.W.2d (1960), efficiently need function the court's an to order installation of included the inherent air conditioner. have sum, are satisfied that courts we perform their

inherent constitutional subject responsibilities. result, the As a administrative judici- agreement also falls within the matter of the constitutionally-based sphere powers ary's of inherent against any "protect that would unrea- itself action materially sonably impair its its curtail efficiency," Room, at and to In re 148 Wis. Court *20 expe- are "essential exercise those which conducting proper re business,” In of dition and Janitor, 35 Wis. at 419.

rv. legislative judi- However, that both power cial branches exercise in the realm of staff and necessarily administration does not lead to the power. conclusion that the two branches share this See example, bumping Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 20. For provision agreement might legis- of the fall within the general power delegate employment lature's county might decisions to boards, but also intrude impermissibly judiciary's on the core zone of exclusive power. persuaded We are somewhat more argument judi- AFSCME's that the to remove a legislative cial assistant is shared with the branch, and judiciary, County's specific, not exclusive to the constitutionally-based power via the regulations

to establish employment persons paid county from the trea- 59.22(2)(c). sury. § See examining Wis. Stat. However, general powers legislature provides such impre- of the guidance cise in this case.

¶ 40. We reach this conclusion because in our "bumping" assessment, or removal of a power wholly is a distinct from the regulations employment." "establish establishing regulations employment, agreement certain sets guidelines working forth on conditions such as leaves of (see agreement), § absence pregnancy 6.07 of the leave (see (see 6.12), (see 7.09), § 7.10), § vacation § sick leave (see 7.05-.07) health, §§ life and dental insurance (see 7.11). compensation injury worker's § leave provisions regulate employment county These personnel, but do not control or commandeer it as bumping provision agreement does. We are satis- bumping provision fied step that the takes a down unexplored path bargaining heretofore in collective *21 doing relating so, negotiations staff, and in private judiciary's abode.17 the threshold of crosses regu- establishing The distinction between 41. making employment the ultimate and lations of employee hired is made clear once to retain an decision by Bar Association The American authorities. several in thе promulgated for courts certain standards organization. Standards Relat- See ABA area of court 1.42.5(a), Organization § ing Collective to Court (1990). Nonjudicial Bargaining These Personnel for scope "[t]he bar- of collective indicate that standards gaining concerning those matters limited to should be working compensation, conditions, related sub- public applying by jects permitted state law including Id. employees, branch." those in University study Criminal the American A done similarly Project indicates Technical Assistance Courts "[ujnions wages, strength bargain hours on employment. The courts and conditions and terms right management's administer, disci- hire, retain pline, Harry employees." Lawson, O. their and remove in the Courts al., Personnel Administration et Stumpf the Courts Powers Inherent See also ("Generally, line cases cited therein at 54-55 and litigation bargaining drawn in collective that has been designated judiciary as the not when is whether managerial representative control has retained discharging selecting, supervising, personnel."). that the unilateral Therefore, conclude we judge's assistant a circuit court

removal of synonymous judge permission is not from the without argument at oral fact, conceded counsel for the had been judicial time that a the first that this was agreement. bargaining a collective bumped under logical "establishing] reg- with, or even a of, extension employment." agree Thus, ulations of legislature while we that the *22 constitutionally-based authority reg-

has to county employment, ulate the conditions of this fact analysis does not aid in our of whether it has ever power shared the to remove assistant without judge's permission. the circuit court Therefore, we look practices to the historical and laws of this state to power determine whether the to remove a legislature is shared with the or exclusive to judiciary. the Friedrich, See 192 Wis. 2d at 20. legislative powers

¶ regu- 43. The to control and county personnel significant history late have in the state of Wisconsin. 1945, Since Wisconsin counties ability regula- have had the to establish "rules and 59.15(2)(c) county employment. § tions" of Wis. Stat. (1945) provided: county

The board. .may provide, . fix change or salary compensation or any.. .employe.. .and also establish the employes number of in any depart- ment or may office. . .and establish rules and regulations employment any or all persons paid from the county treasury.. . . provided 44. date, Prior to that statute that the any change

board could "at time fix or the number of deputies, may appointed clerks and assistants that be by any county change officer, and fix or the annual 694(4)(b) salary appointee." of each § such Wis. Stat. (1915) added). (emphasis phrase "county The officer" "any was defined and clarified in 1929 to include elec- salary compensation paid tive whose is officer part county treasury. whole or in out of the ..." See 1929 Wis. Laws Ch. 362. This definition would have county judges prior included both and circuit to the they typically reorganization since were treasury.18 county part, paid, out least in at analysis By engaging in the historical employed that there is no Freidrich, it clear becomes power legislature has ever held the that the evidence unilaterally assistant without remove a contrary, history authority. judge's To the rely upon and AFSCME which statutes suggests only historically legislature had that the and salaries of set the number the limited regu- secondary powers along assistants, other with employment. to remove such assistants late judge appeared alone, so to rest in the hands of employment, regulate again, legislature could once altogether.19 employment decision not control the but *23 analysis that we is similar to 46. This employed Senate, ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin in State (1990), this 99, 770 where 155 2d 454 N.W.2d Wis. imposing legislative that a enactment court concluded attorneys continuing legal requirement on education a guardians appointment prior litem ad their as to practice regulation upon improperly a of the intruded 18 removal, it of is silent on the issue Although this statute the and "if the court or power appointment, of does address the they latter, that alone can exercise possess the it follows justices Court, Supreme 410, 417 the In re Janitor the former." simultaneously pro agreement recognize that the We status, also employment but public judicial a assistant's tects Therefore, we ref susceptible bumping. to employee makes the only it insofar as employment decision" "control over the erence retaining particular a judge's personal choice relates to the assistant; suggest do not we as his or her individual terminate the assistant judge may subsequently circuit court a entirely. public employment from exclusively province of law that is within the judiciary. See id. at 98. As a result of intrusion, this we held that the statute was void as an unconstitutional separation violation of the doctrine. id. See judi- ¶ 47. In Fiedler, we first concluded that the ciary qualifications attorneys is concerned with regulate in the exercise of its inherent to the bar. Fiedler, See 155 Wis. 2d at 101. We also noted that the legislature may prescribe qualifications minimum persons desiring practice to admitted be to in the law general power protect state as an incident to its to public. See id. at 102. "Once admitted, however, it does legislature judiciary not follow that the shares with the authority qualifications to establish minimum specific areas of Id. law." Having "[t]his

¶48. determined that court has past legislature adopt never authorized the to legislation attempting rules or enact establish competency practice particular threshold level of in a attorney area," we concluded that "once an has been legislative determined to met have requirements practice threshold and is admitted to subject judiciary's law, he or she is to the inherent and regulate practice exclusive of law." Fiedler, 155 Wis. 2d at 103. way,

¶ 49. In the same we conclude that to remove a assistant falls not within an powers, area of shared but within an area that histori- cally belonged exclusively judiciary. to the *24 legislature employee has set limits on hours and wages, compensation levels, set and has even estab- posting procedure appointment judicial lished a positions,20 county employee assistant but once a 20 again, Once presence posting procedures the in the Eаu County system Claire is purposes opinion. irrelevant for of this

588 position appointed assistant, the to the been enjoyed legislature the has, now, until never judge's permission. without the remove that assistant contrary, history that assist- illustrates To the judiciary's traditionally subject to the been ants have appointed.21 once exclusive left an action that lies 50. Because we are with judiciary's sphere wholly of exclusive the within bumping provision power,22 is that we conclude vacancy only when a occurs in the position posted A is judge's power a to remove position, and does not affect vacancy. no express no We her assistant when there is his or constitutionality posting procedures opinion on the County. by the previously been utilized have 21 recently that we analysis no different from This is Administration, 216 Wis. Flynn Department v. employed in 544-52, concluding that 520, 245 After 2d 576 N.W.2d fell within both subject 1993 Wis. Act 9253 § matter of constitutionally-granted judiciary's legislature's 546-52, concluded that authority, 216 Wis. 2d at we zones of judiciary's not be within subject matter of the statute could the circum authority. Id at 551. Under exclusive core zone of legislature that the had Flynn, it was clear presented stances allocating consistently appropriations in the area of acted as to legislative in nature power so government resources —a exclusive any judiciary's question that eliminate might be involved. 22 expressed have noting that other authorities It is worth See, power. removal nature of the court's opinions on the similar Winnebago County Courthouse Winnebago County v. e.g., n.4, 540 733, 741, 204 Ass'n, N.W.2d 196 Wis. 2d Employees (decision (Ct. 1995) infringе upon the App. "does not staff'; "The her appoint or remove his or power of a court to staff is not from his or her right to remove members court's WERC, County v. bargaining."); Kewaunee subject to collective (Ct. 1987) (”[A]ny 347, 358, App. 415 N.W.2d 839 2d union and agreement between the in collective labor provision *25 unconstitutional, and therefore void and unenforceable judicial applies itas assistants. We also note that agreement provides binding § 2.02 final and alleged arbitration the event of an breach of the "bumping" provision. any attempt result, As a provision enforce the would transfer the removal deci County sion to an arbitrator. See Iowa v. Iowa Employees, Courthouse Social Servs. Local / (1992). 614, 621, 2d N.W.2d 499 Because this directly judge's conflicts with a circuit exclusive, inherent assistant, to remove a we also bumping provision subject hold that is not arbitration.

V. Having ¶ 51. reached the conclusion that bumping provision agreement impermissibly of the upon judiciary's intrudes core zone of exclusive authority, important it is to set forth the foundation upon exclusive, which the to remove Early history one's rests. in the this state we considered the invocation of inherent abrupt employee after the removal of a court county hampers operation court in its or interferes void."); with its constitutional functions would be ABA Stan- Relating Organization, dards to Court Non-Judicial Personnel 1.42(b)(iii) ("Confidential System, Court employees include § persons secretaries law clerks and other whose duties require personal them to work on a and confidential basis with individual appointment officers. . . .their may pleasure tenure be at the person they for whom work.") (1990) ("Confidential added), (emphasis per- cmt. at 99 sonnel, including secretaries and law clerks. . .should be selected and retained at the choice of the individual for whom functions.") added). they perform their confidential (emphasis Janitor, In re 35 Wis. 410 another officer. See branch superintendent ‍‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‍public prop- There, the state *26 justices, erty notice to the an served, without cause or serving janitor upon person of removal the as order superintendent appointed supreme court. The then the supreme person, to the another someone unknown janitor. justices, See at court to serve as the new id. 410-11. super- Up

¶ of the 52. until the unilateral action always supreme janitor intendent, the had been justices, "by and under their direc- removed the approval." Id. at 411. tion and with their consent and opinion Moreover, demonstrated that the the court's very working justices developed positive rela- had a they tionship janitor, depended on with the and that necessary perform many See id. at him to functions. Citing rea- customs, these the Janitor court 412-16. . that "no should be ordered. .without soned removal justices." approbation Id. 416. the advice and of the at reasoning, Following the court first 53. this statutory superintendent's support the considered pro- power janitor. statutes to remove a One of those superintendent authorized "to vided that the was capitol employ and such workmen and about necessary keep public grounds may the same in as be prоper Janitor, In re 35 Wis. a state of cleanliness...." concluding that the statute did not at 419-20. After superintendent powers give asserted, id. at see the division of 420-21, the court considered government: the three branches of between legislative power judicial a and not executive or As nature, lodged in co-ordinate branch in its and one separated independent and its government of the branches, it seems to of action from the other sphere constitution, protection be under and power therefore a which cannot be taken from the court, given legisla- to either the executive or departments.... tive

Id. 419. From this the court concluded reasoning, at to remove a court assistant was exclu- power to the and declared the judiciary, superintendent's sive order of void. See id. at 421.23 removal sum, the Janitor court held that to remove a court assistant was exclusive to the custom, based in on and in judiciary part part on the nature of the between the relationship justices their In the janitor. way, same we conclude that exclusive, of a circuit court judge *27 his her judicial remove from his- springs custom, torical as well as the unique relationship judges between and their immediate assistants. 23 engage note that the did We Janitor court not a mod ern-day separation powers analysis to reach this conclusion. However, only highlight age this is relevant of the deci Although proclamation sion. it is not the most recent of law that seen, In this court has re Janitor is still considered one of this exclusive, preeminent involving pow state's сases inherent judiciary, routinely ers of the and has been cited and discussed See, involving powers. e.g., in our decisions State exrel. 1, 16-17 County, Friedrich v. Circuit Court Dane 192Wis. 2d for n.7, (1995); 531 N.W.2d 32 State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 100-101 n.1, (1990); 155 Wis. 2d 454 770 N.W.2d 762, 778, Complaint Against Grady, re 2d 118 Wis. 348 N.W.2d (1984); Admin., Dep't 559 State ex rel. Moran v. 103 Wis. 2d 311, 316, (1981); Reynolds 307 N.W.2d 658 State ex rel. v. 560, 575-76, County, Court Kenosha 11 Wis. 2d 105 (1960); Case, 8, 46, Integration 11 N.W.2d Bar Wis. (1943); County, N.W.2d 604 Stevenson v. Milwaukee 140 Wis. 14, 18, 121 N.W. 654 support stated, find no 55. As we historical legislative proposition

the possessed that branch has ever to remove assistants with- judge's permission. contrary, out the To the Janitor strongly supports the conclusion that circuit court protect have exclusive their assistants by government. from removal another branch of At the unique relationship time, same we conclude that a judge exists between a and his or her assistant. Judges share their and confidences their labors with rely upon experience assistants, their assistants' managing increasingly complex caseload, an highly entrust sensitive matters to their assistants' good judgment. As the Janitor court observed: "This every principle pervading of trust and confidence department public private, life, of active both recognizes upon law also and acts and will enforce and protect." 35 at 415. integral played by judicial

¶ 56. The role staff in justice reflected in the overall administration of is also 70.39(ll)(a) (1996),24 Supreme Court Rule Wisconsin "[e]ach circuit court which recommends branch of should staffed one full-time assistant." be explains The Comment to the Rule the basis for that recommendation: system increasing

The trial court faces ever increasing complexity. caseloads and cases of ever *28 judge today charge aggressively The must take and manage judge his or her caseload. To do so the needs judicial position a full-time assistant. This staff will her permit judge each to devote more of his or 24 70, Chapter SCR entitled "Rules of Judicial Administra tion," governs court administration at the state and local levels. Note, Judicial Council Committee's judicial presiding over primary efforts to task — judging and lawsuits. position judicial assistant should be perform

the state service. It will for the court the following .;. assist with calendar man- type. work: .; scheduling conferences; assist agement. . hold . .maintain acquisitions;. with file and record library; judge's receptionist answering law act as telephone, handling processing visitors and mail;. by required . .such other work as the court. See, 758.19(h), Stats., sec. "The director of state description qualifica- a courts shall establish .a ..." tions and duties of.. assistant. experience expertise support Judicial long-standing position of the Wisconsin Judicial position Conference that this staff is vital to a well- functioning now court. Where assistants part staffing, of the court caseloads are exist as much more current and the oldest cases are dis- posed priority with consideration. right

The citizens of this state have a to com- directly judge's during each municate with office day get immediate answers normal work hours questions requests to their and service on their judge, waiting without for return calls from the reporters, or court clerk who at the time of the .Also, working call are in the courtroom. . . protected parte must be from ex communications by knowledge- having telephone their calls screened able staff.25 October, the director of state courts issued a

description which of the duties mirrors description in the position contained above Comment. That description qualifications, also contains a list of desired includ ability confidentiality, ing high an to maintain a level of integrity, ability clearly, discretion and an to communicate con- *29 unique relationship ¶ 57. Evidence of this can be statutory in mentioned, found as well. As each law justice appeals judge in and court of the state of Wis- "may appoint prescribe consin and the duties a secretary justice judge and a law clerk to assist the performance in the or her his duties." Wis. Stat. unique § 751.02. This statute also the reveals and con- relationship judge fidential that is inherent to a and Although legislature his or her assistant. the has cho- provide equivalent statutory authority sen not to ato judge, why circuit court we see no reason the relation- ship any is different at the circuit court level. protecting relationship

¶ 58. The reasons for this arguably stronger they are at the circuit court than are appellate at the level. Circuit court handle jury trials, numerous court and have dockets that are equally appellate if not more crowded than at the parties those level, and more have contact with the and the public general. strip- in circumstances, Under these ping judge prior a of his or her assistant without approval impair could the func- court's constitutional appellate tion than it more would at the level. County, Iowa 2d this court nearly present

faced a situation identical to the case. county argued judge's had that the circuit court statutory authority appoint register probate to a in county could be harmonized with a board's to working pursuant establish conditions to Wis. Stat. 59.15(2)(c), 59.22(2)(c), precursor §§ § to Wis. Stat. 111.70(l)(a). county Thus, and argued, See id. at 621. provision agreement requiring

a labor judge vacancy register post probate to in position prior appointment could coexist with the cisely ability tactfully, judgment and an exercise diplomacy. judge granting a circuit court

statute appoint register probate. See id. at 618. *30 bargain- ¶ The court held that the collective judge's supersede ing agreement the not could authority register probate. statutory appoint in See to a agree- provisions the Therefore, the within id. at 621. statutory regulate judge's purported to the ment which authority See id. void and unenforceable. were statutory authority appoint judge's a essence, the register probate in was held to be exclusive. again, relationship

¶ nature of the 61. Once the judge and his or her assistant does between a statutory change simply there is no not because appoint at circuit court an assistant the County, it in Iowa we find level. Given our decision appointment that the and removal difficult to conclude "jealously register probate power more of a guarded" by in is a to be judiciary power than the to remove the judges Friedrich, 192 themselves. See assistants to the Wis. 2d at 14.

VI. customary practices ¶62. in our Based on the judge uniquе relationship state, and the between bumping assistant, the his or her provision we conclude the circuit court cannot be harmonized with power judge's exclusive, to remove a judiciary provision the assistant. Because the obstructs thereby separa- sphere, the in violates its exclusive implied by powers principles constitution, our it tion of subject unenforceable, and not to arbitration. void, is proper applied stan- 63. The circuit court the conclusion law, dard of and reached a sustainable doing grant declaratory Therefore, so. relief for proper. was

By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 0dissenting). GESKE, 64. JANINE P. J. I dis- majority opinion important

sent. The errs two respects. majority mistakenly First, the concludes that power bump employee, despite a circuit court bargaining agreement, terms of a collective is an exclu- sive circuit court and not a shared legislative majority pur- Second, with the ports branch. impact rule, to state a narrow but true of this rule will be hard to contain. *31 upon

¶ 65. Based the Wisconsin Constitution interpreting and our constitutional case law shared powers, I would conclude that a circuit court shares power legislative with the branch the realm of court employment. realistically staff This conclusion artificially staff, all circuit embraces distinguish court and does not and between assistants other court employees. majority fully engaged Had the in a shared powers analysis, it would concluded that a have circuit prevent court has inherent constitutional being unilaterally a сourt staff member from removed replaced, despite bargain- the terms of collective ing agreement, replacement if such removal and unduly substantially burdens or interferes with the ability court's to conduct its constitutional functions responsibilities. the did this case circuit court factually powers the not undertake intensive shared analysis replacing to determine whether Ms. Melland qualified bargaining with another member of the unit unduly substantially would burden or interfere with I County.1 conclude that court of Eau Claire the circuit standard of law and wrong the circuit court applied so, the relevant facts. failed to examine doing by describ- majority begins analysis The its is no of the courts. There the inherent ing powers court over staff power employment that circuit dispute constitution, by conferred not an express power is of the courts. This from the inherent power but derives the nature of inherent described previously government: each branch of powers possessed accomplish its any agency may human In order that necessary possess power. The it is that it purposes, to direct and control his executive must have must superintendent works business. accomplish to direct his men. In order to have created, they are courts purposes for which immemorial, time possess powers. also From must been conceded to courts powers certain have powers have been they are courts. Such because they could neither without them conceded because business, nor dignity, maintain their transact their their existence. These aсcomplish purposes powers. powers are called Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 State v. N.W. are those par- Inherent powers its get branch governmental requires ticular even to consider whether the 1 The circuit court failed legislature's constitu employment decision here was within *32 grant authority presumably because tional equal an that Eau Claire is not branch concluded judiciary. The court concluded alter government with the state authority appoint natively county joint had to that even if the irrep remove, bumping provision of the would enforcement public, and such enforcement arably the courts and the harm judges. inherent would also diminish the job constitutional In case, done. this the circuit court clearly has inherent to assure that it has staff get job ques- to available its constitutional done. The power2 is, tion does the circuit court have exclusive say qualified persons which of several will aid the court getting job done? majority opinion analy

¶ 67. The offers a blurred answering question. correctly sis acknowledges that It many powers

that inherent court are government. shared with one of the other branches of I agree majority governmental pow with the that most "great ers lie within the borderlands" of shared authority. Majority op. large at In realm, 572. that "it is possible practical categorize governmen neither nor exclusively legislative, tal action as executive or judicial." Majority op. citing at 572, State ex rel. Fried County, rich v. Circuit Court 1, 14, Dane 192 Wis. 2d for 531 N.W.2d 32 powers contrast, exclusive to system separa courts are few in number.3 Under our powers, tion of those finite exclusive should be "jealously guarded." Jezwinski, See v. Arneson 206 Wis. (1996), citing Youngstown 217, 228, 2d 556 N.W.2d 721 (1952) Sawyer, Sheet & 579, Tube Co. v. 343 U.S. system Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14. Under our " balancing powers, coupled 'subtle of shared with the 2See, example, majority's analysis historical con cluding legislature historically only "the had to set the number and salaries of assistants." Maj. limited added). op. (emphasis at 586 3See, Cannon, e.g., State v. 534, 196 Wis. 221 N.W. 603 (1928) (power State ex rel. Fied attorneys); to admit and disbar Senate, ler v. Wisconsin (1990) 155 Wis. 2d 454 N.W.2d 770 (ability impose legal attorneys requirement education on ‍‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‍litem). desiring appointed guardians to be as ad *33 powers, sparing enabled exclusive demarcation of government unwieldy system deliberately to endure of nearly years.'" successfully Arneson, 206 Wis. added). omitted) (citation (emphasis 2d at 228 lays majority neatly the constitu- ¶ out The 69. legislative statutory powers and the tional and county employees then over executive branches and statu- court's constitutional identifies the circuit majority tory powers that The concludes this arena. (collective bargaining) agree- subject "the matter constitutionally- judiciary's also falls within the ment 'protect powers sphere itself to based unreasonably any against its curtail action that would efficiency,'" citing materially impair In re its or majority op. Majority contin- at 582. The Room. Court persuaded "[w]e AFSCME's more ues, are somewhat argument power remove a that the legislative exclusive branch, and not the is shared with brought junction Having judiciary." us to the to the Why? "gen- majority powers, The hesitates. shared legislature provides imprecise powers of the eral Majority op. guidance at 583. in this case." Unfortunately, imprecise guidance drives 70. early majority's Citing from statutes conclusion. county power century gave fix that boards this salary employees, change of court the number assign majority removal that the failure to deduces county power This boards never had it. means that the power change only The deduction. is wishful power employees to reduce that includes the number of to remove is shared. number. concluding bumping provi- After impermissibly intrudes on an exclusive

sion majority majority op. 588-89, the could court, at see lengthy engages in a discus- Instead, it have rested. sion, dicta, albeit of the Janitor decision and the *34 "unique" relationship judge between a and his or her placed assistant. Had that discussion been elsewhere opinion, persuasive. in the it would be no more For majority essentially Supreme instance, the elevates a Court Rule and Comment to the status of evidence prove "uniqueness" partic- sufficient to the value or of a ular assistant. Neither of those documents has any bearing appoint on whether and employees remove court is shared or exclusive. The only Rule is a recommendation for the creation of the position currently in courts that lack might meaning them. Those documents have on specific remand, but without factual determinations only speculation rosy we are left with and ideals. fact-finding ¶ 72. Remand for could have solidi- aspects majority's opinion. Again fied other of the in majority rely dicta the follows Janitor to on a historical authority "сustom"4 of exclusive circuit court in employment perspective decisions. While the historical

4Under England, the laws of Blackstone identified seven requisites every custom: long, memory 1. It must have been used so that the of man run- contrary.

neth not to the 2. It must have been continued. There must have been no inter- ruption right, though may possession. there have been of the peaceable acquiesced 3. It must have been in. reasonable, good

4. It must be or at least no reason can be assigned against it. ought It 5. to be certain. ought compulsory, although originally It to be established ought man, option every consent. It to be left to the whether he

will use it or not. other, 7. Customs must be consistent with each and must be strictly king's prerogative. construed and submit to the of exclu- in the core zone identifying assist courts can Friedrich, 2d function, see 192 Wis. court sive circuit not determinative references to "custom" are 14, vague If the record anything, this question.5 constitutional authority. shared here a "custom" of demonstrates do have not Eau Claire circuit employ- decision-making exclusive in the have judges only input ment Eau Claire realm. if the normal posting assistants employment bargaining agreement under the collective procedures interested any qualified do not result candidates.6 (Bernard ed., on Law C. Gavit

Blackstone's Commentaries 1941) 43-44. Washington Law Book *35 5 rights property in a of reliance on custom For criticism case, appellate court draws a fact-intensive conclusion when the analysis, City see Stevens v. without of trial court benefit of (1994) 1332, Beach, 1207, 114 Ct. 1335 Cannon 510 U.S. S. (mem.) (1993), 131, P.2d denying cert. to 317 Or. 854 449 (Scalia, O'Connor, dissenting): J. and J. (of custom) included, by requirements "The set forth Blackstone alia, public right inter- inter that the of access be exercised without i.e., ruption, obligatory, present in the the and that custom be option it not be to the of each landowner whether context that left dry-sand recognize right go public's the to on the area for

he will Thornton, however, Supreme purposes. of In the Court recreational Oregon these the historical existence of fact-intensive determined others) (as as in a that took less than criteria well five discussion Reporter. page the is all the more remarka- one full of Pacific That investigating Oregon Supreme a Court of was ble feat since instance', its court had not rested these criteria in the trial first argue not that the basis custom and the State did decision on of theory Supreme to the Court.” 6 not under the case I that Ms. Melland is even this note supervision indicates that Ms. Judge sole Lenz. record family reports Melland court commissioner. also

602 County cites Iowa again, Dicta the majority Courthouse, v. Iowa County 166 2dWis. 480 (1992), N.W.2d 499 to assert that a court's inherent authority to staff appoint cannot be modified a col- lective "In bargaining agreement. essence, the judge's statutory authority a appoint register probate was held to be Majority However, exclusive." at 594. op. Iowa County court expressly declined to consider whether a circuit court judge's a appoint regis- ter an probate was constitutional power. Instead the measured opinion only the court's statu- tory powers against terms of a bargaining collective agreement. See 166 Wis. 2d at 618. Iowa Consequently adds nothing to a determination of whether was shared; exclusive or nor did it apply the undue burden/substantial interference test.7 Holmes, Other iterations of this test exist. In State v. 31, 69, (1982), Wis. 2d 315 N.W.2d 703 the court considered operation whether the of a substitution statute "materi ally impaired] practically defeat[ed]" the circuit court's jurisdiction exercise of so as to constitute violation of the separation powers Integration Case, doctrine. In Bar 8, 49, 11 604, 12 (1943), N.W.2d N.W.2d 699 this court said separation that the doctrine would be if violated legislative regulating attorneys conduct in had "so far invaded field as impair proper to embarrass the court and its functioning." While each of these articulations bear some ambi guity, Holmes, 70, they see essentially 106 Wis. 2d at are *36 interchangeable. Each seeks to measure the intrusion on the ability court's to conduct its constitutional functions and responsibilities. adopted Each of these tests resembles the test Room, (1912), upon In re Court 148 Wis. 134 N.W. 490 majority frequently support which the relies to its identification power: of an unreasonably exclusive "actions that would curtail powers materially their impair efficiency" conducting or their 578, 580, majority op. business". See at and 582.

603 analysis, majority's described as 74. The own employment that staff above, for court demonstrates catego- practical possible nor to it neither decisions is exclusively governmental that action as rize legislative, judicial. Friedrich, 192 executive, or See Aрpointment Revisor, 141 In re 14; 2d at see also Wis. (1910). 124 The constitutional 592, 598, N.W. 670 Wis. authority legislative delegation employment deci- quite already the been described sions to counties op. fully by majority, majority at 574-76. The the see perform judiciary's inherent constitutional functions is also demonstrated its administrative authority, majority. I on both lines of would the Based regulation employment staff of court conclude that legislative area where falls within an responsibilities overlap. analysis step next in the is whether 75. The unconstitutionally overlap or substan burdens

that tially the functions and interferes with constitutional responsibilities court. See State v. circuit 352, 360, 441 2d N.W.2d Unnamed Defendant, county argued that there are no The that prove that of the county in this record enforcement facts provision bumping The is unconstitutional. alleged plaintiffs emphasized an have not that insufficient number of court staff that because agreement bump bargaining provides collective employee only ing when there is a senior will occur necessary qualifications, there is no undue with the with function of interference burden substantial bumping, according the circuit court. effect of only county, "temporary is inconvenience" to is asserts that because there no the court. AFSCME efficiency, provision bumping can be loss of court power. the court's inherent harmonized with *37 ¶ 76. AFSCME's counsel also contended at oral argument operation that there is no difference permanent employee the circuit court bumped a when is per- than when accommodations are made for maternity sonnel situations such as leave or sick leave. predicted AFSCME that the likelihood that a circuit judicial bumped assistant would be is much less employee than the likelihood that such an would pregnant become or leave for his or her own reasons. may they While AFSCME's assertions be true are not dispositive. proper powers analy- The focus in a shared particular person occupies sis is on neither the who frequency potential assistant desk nor the personnel changes. proper degree 77. The focus is on the independence functioning

threat to the and efficient Certainly branch. no one asserts that the separation doctrine is violated whenever a judicial employee resign decides to and seek other government, pur- work. When another branch of albeit bargaining agreement, suant to a collective acts unilaterally replace permanent, exper- to remove and member, ienced circuit court staff that unilateral act may infringe on the inherent of the court to dignity, maintain its transact its business and accom- plish purposes E.C., of its existence. See Breier v. 376, 386, 130 Wis. 2d 387 N.W.2d 72 argument county ¶ 78. At oral counsel for the agreed that all three circuit court assistants bumped county employee could in the be event of a contemplated reduction in force. Janitor court possibility. empowered such a Were the court not prevent "[i]t employees, unilateral ouster of its would impossible be to foresee when or how often such changes they might made, would be rendered be *38 very frequency." 35 at 417-18.

intolerable their only might again changes intolerable, not be but Then utility fact- the of the And therein lies inconvenient. specific interference test. undue burden/substantial the deci- 79. contends that Holmes AESCME judicial prohibits use of inherent the sion I do not read Holmes so mere inconvenience. avoid broadly. application example the Holmes is an of interference test where the undue burden/substantial interruption alleged is of interference unconstitutional court routine. effect of a Holmes court addressed the The upon the circuit court's substitution statute jurisdiction. See 106 Wis. 2d exercise

constitutional acknowledged that the statute 52. The court while at productive in time a decrease in resulted travel an in of increased and increase because legislature system operating state, costs to the inefficiencies, inconve- must have decided that higher by peremptory caused niences and costs price acceptable an for the benefits substitution were gained. See id. at 62. upheld

¶ 81. Holmes the substitution The court purpose fair trial its was ensure a statute because judge impartial harmo- an and the court could before legislative balancing nize the with need avoid significant interference with administration work. See id. at 66-67. Holmes also noted court's jurisdic- upheld similar had been other that statutes resulting despite on state courts. That tions burden calendaring court increased burden included scheduling problems as as interference with the well operation of the trial See id. normal and routine courts. Ultimately recognized that even if at 63-64. particular judge hearing prevented a from substitution case, cases were nevertheless heard and resolved. legis- See id. at 69-70. court also observed that the making lature was efforts to diminish the inefficiencies arising from the statute. concluding peremptory

¶ 82. substitution did not rise to the level of substantial interfer- ence or undue burden on the constitutional functions responsibilities system, of the court the Holmes court considered statistical evidence offered to show frequency requests the requests for substitution. Substitution percent

were filed less than two of the total percent cases, and in less than five of the criminal plaintiff judges cases. See id. at 70. The were not able to prove requests that the volume of substitution materi- *39 ally impaired operation judicial system. of the See only id. at 71. Instead the were able to offer perceptions delay inefficiency. common sense and potential This court considered the for abuse of the substitution statute concluded but that such a criticism gauged quantitatively. could not be See id. at 73. by ¶ In case, contrast, 83. this the circuit court weighing required by never undertook the factual major- court, Holmes. Instead the circuit and now the ity, by concluding power appoint erred power, staff is not a shared but an exclusive my employment of the court. view related shared, in this case is but the current state of the prevents determining record this court from as a mat- bumping ter of law whether Ms. Melland would substantially interfere with the constitutional func- responsibilities County tions and of the Eau Claire appropriate. Circuit Court. Remand is therefore remand, 84. On the circuit court could have analyzed specific position, functions of the staff responsibilities employee, impact actual of the and the bumping functions would have on the constitutional examining By responsibilities court. of the circuit could assessed factors, the circuit court have these position of Melland from her removal Ms. whether judge a court to a and to commissioner as assistant inter- undue or substantial result in an burden would responsibilities of the functions and ference with the Claire Circuit Court. Eau "appointment held that This generally function, called an executive office, while exclusively classed under our constitution be as cannot great departments," function of either of three may majority's explain the desire to cleave which "bumping" employment powers like other related from appointment. at Those Revisor, See 598.8 employment powers, other related virtue inescapably majority's rationale, to the are added now expanding Case "core functions" of the branch. majority appoint- upon relies law which the address e.g., majority op. See, at ment and tandem. removal majority relies n.18 n.22. The also and 588-89 upon industry reach recommendations and treatises to power. sources its conclusion on exclusive These majority's approach diverge because from the narrow they broadly rights courts the would reserve to the discipline, supervise hire, administer, court staff. deny relying mаjority decision, that its cannot *40 8 Revisor, holding Appointment In Re 141 Wis. of (1910), valid, recognition in despite 124 N.W. 670 is the Steven (1909), 14, 17, 121 County, 140 son v. Milwaukee N.W.654 appoint necessary upon the court that "the attendants properly perform in in it to is inherent the court order to enable by recog delegated duties to it constitution." Stevenson the in appointment power an the courts but did not determine nized power is whether this inherent exclusive shared. to all sources, application will have broad on these

part decisions. employment circuit court lim- rationale also cannot be majority's 86. The employment an over the ited to exclusive "trust rationale, Its based on the assistants." "judicial relationship, in this "unique" and confidence" involved of all circuit court to the applied employment will be that the Janitor decision, cited staff.9 Indeed it appears the trust and recognized at majority length, in many government employees. confidence reposed life, even down "In all the affairs and transactions strictly are and domestic private to those which nature, agency where the services or of others their relation, necessary, fiduciary or confidential are defined, and consti- clearly more or less marked and tuting engagement the consideration of part services, and employer of the and value between servant, known, is or master and well employed, respected. and This recognized its existence and every pervading confidence of trust and principle life, private, public both department of active upon and will recognizes law also and acts protect." enforce and

35 Wis. at broadly judges argument plaintiff for the At oral counsel staff, appoint and remove court power to asserted that bailiffs, Counsel did exclusive function. including is an bargaining agree collective argue provisions that other determined that the apply even if the court ment would still appointment over court had exclusive circuit agreed possi it was Along that line counsel removal decisions. grievances subsequently handle this court would ble although circuit court the circuit court brought by employees could, comity, grievances to collec a matter of submit as bargaining. tive *41 I declare that a circuit court 87. would authority prevent its staff member from

inherent being unilaterally replaced despite removed bargaining agreement if that terms of a collective unduly replacement or substan- removal and tially burdens the court's constitutional interferes with responsibilities. This conclusion is con- functions and of the court sistent with the recognized case, the Janitor also as far back as but delegation legislature's to coun- considers bargaining agreements to enter into collective with ties county including ‍‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‍representatives employees, those My employed staff. conclusion would not affect as court agreement validity any bargaining pro- collective unduly substantially not visions that do burden See interfere with a court's constitutional functions. County WERC, 347, 358-59, v. 141 2d Kewaunee (Ct. 1987). App. N.W.2d respectfully I am I dissent. authorized Shirley state that Chief Justice S. Abrahamson Bradley join Ann in this dissent. Justice Walsh

Case Details

Case Name: Barland v. Eau Claire County
Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 13, 1998
Citation: 575 N.W.2d 691
Docket Number: 96-1607
Court Abbreviation: Wis.
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