964 F.3d 747
8th Cir.2020Background
- Shelton committed a brutal assault; police obtained a warrant and pursued him after he fled in a vehicle and later on foot following a crash.
- Officers caught Shelton pinned on the ground by multiple officers; he refused commands and kept his hands underneath his body ("turtling"), and officers believed he might be armed.
- During the struggle, other officers struck Shelton (ribs, chokehold causing brief unconsciousness, blow with a radio). About two seconds after a radio strike, Officer Stevens allegedly stomped on Shelton’s ankle, which was later fractured and required surgery.
- Shelton sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force; the district court granted qualified immunity to several officers but denied it to Stevens; Stevens appealed asserting qualified immunity.
- The Eighth Circuit assumed for summary-judgment purposes that Stevens caused the broken ankle, concluded the ankle-stomp was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but held the unlawfulness was not clearly established and reversed the denial of qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stevens used excessive force in arrest | Shelton: the ankle-stomp was gratuitous and caused a serious injury and was unreasonable given Shelton was substantially subdued | Stevens: stomp was a reasonable, supplemental tactic to distract/secure hands of a potentially armed, noncompliant suspect | Court: On assumed facts, the stomp was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment |
| Whether Shelton posed an immediate threat / was actively resisting when stomp occurred | Shelton: he was substantially subdued and not fully resisting when Stevens acted | Stevens: at least one hand remained unrestrained; Shelton was a violent, potentially armed felon who had fled; officers could reasonably perceive a threat | Court: A reasonable officer could perceive an ongoing threat and some additional force was justified, but degree of force matters |
| Whether the right violated was clearly established (qualified immunity) | Shelton: precedent makes gratuitous force against subdued arrestees unlawful and thus Stevens should not receive immunity | Stevens: law is fact-specific and precedent does not squarely govern an ankle-stomp amid multiple officers subduing a potentially armed suspect | Court: The law was not "beyond debate" on these facts; Stevens is entitled to qualified immunity (reversed denial) |
| Whether cited precedent controls Stevens’s conduct | Shelton: cases on force against subdued/handcuffed suspects show unreasonableness | Stevens: those cases are distinguishable because Shelton was an alleged violent felon, potentially armed, and not fully subdued | Court: Precedent did not squarely govern these particular facts; distinctions make the applicability hazy |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness Fourth Amendment standard for use of force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (force in seizure must be balanced against governmental interests)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (line between acceptable and excessive force can be hazy)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (video evidence may conclusively resolve factual disputes in excessive-force claims)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (video evidence does not automatically defeat plaintiff’s version if it is not unambiguous)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (officers may be mistaken but still entitled to qualified immunity if the mistake is reasonable)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (excessive-force cases are fact-specific; qualified immunity often appropriate absent controlling precedent)
- City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019) (to defeat qualified immunity, existing precedent must place the unlawfulness beyond debate)
- Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2012) (use of a taser was justified where a prone suspect refused to surrender hands)
- Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2009) (gratuitous force against a handcuffed, nonresisting arrestee is unreasonable)
- Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2012) (leg sweep causing serious injury to a nonthreatening misdemeanant was unreasonable)