Juan Reyes-Soto v. Loretta E. Lynch
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21343
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Juan Reyes-Soto, a Mexican national and lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in 1993 to violating S.C. Code § 16-23-410 (pointing/presenting a firearm) and received a three-year suspended sentence.
- Years later, USCIS denied his N-400 naturalization application, finding the conviction was an aggravated felony that precludes establishing “good moral character” under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
- The immigration officer and then the district court concluded the South Carolina statute qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).
- Reyes-Soto appealed, arguing § 16-23-410 is a strict-liability offense (no mens rea), so it cannot be a § 16(b) crime of violence and thus not an aggravated felony.
- The Eighth Circuit predicted South Carolina law: following In re Spencer R. and other precedent, § 16-23-410 includes an implied mens rea—intent to threaten—so the statute necessarily involves threatened use of physical force.
- The court held § 16-23-410 categorically qualifies under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) as a crime involving threatened physical force, making Reyes-Soto’s conviction an aggravated felony and rendering him ineligible for naturalization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether S.C. § 16-23-410 has a mens rea such that it can be a crime of violence under § 16(b) | Reyes-Soto: statute is strict liability (no mens rea), so cannot meet Leocal’s mens rea requirement for § 16(b) | Government: statute implies intent to threaten or present the firearm in a threatening manner | Court: statute includes intent to threaten; but analysis better under § 16(a) because it necessarily involves threatened use of force |
| Whether § 16-23-410 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) | Reyes-Soto: N/A (focus on strict-liability claim) | Government: statute’s elements require pointing/presenting at another in a threatening way, i.e., threatened use of force | Held: statute categorically involves threatened use of physical force and is a § 16(a) crime of violence |
| Whether the conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony for naturalization purposes | Reyes-Soto: conviction shouldn’t be an aggravated felony if statute lacks requisite mens rea | Government: conviction is an aggravated felony because it is a § 16(a) crime of violence and the sentence meets the one-year requirement | Held: conviction is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); Reyes-Soto is not of good moral character and is ineligible for naturalization |
| Whether analysis under § 16(b) / Johnson challenge affects outcome | Reyes-Soto: urged that § 16(b) can’t apply because of strict-liability nature; raised vagueness post-Johnson | Government: Court resolves case under § 16(a), avoiding § 16(b) vagueness question | Held: Court affirms under § 16(a) and does not reach § 16(b)/vagueness issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (statute defining crime of violence requires a mens rea beyond negligence)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (silence in a statute does not always eliminate a common-law mens rea requirement)
- United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.) (S.C. pointing/presenting statute requires threatening behavior and qualifies as crime of violence)
- In re Spencer R., 692 S.E.2d 569 (S.C. Ct. App.) (interpreting “present” to require showing a firearm in a threatening manner)
- U.S. v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607 (look to elements/nature of the offense, not petitioner’s specific conduct)
- U.S. v. Maid, 772 F.3d 1118 (8th Cir.) (statute requiring intentional pointing/display in threatening manner categorically a crime of violence)