Juan Carlos Chavez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2482
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Juan Carlos Chavez was convicted in Florida (1998) of kidnapping, sexual battery, and first-degree murder of a child and sentenced to death; direct appeals and certiorari were denied.
- Multiple state post-conviction counsel were appointed (Lipinski, Weissenborn, Andrea Norgard); early counsel’s delays contributed to a missed one-year federal habeas limitations period. Andrea and then Robert Norgard later represented Chavez in state and federal proceedings.
- Chavez’s initial federal §2254 petition (filed 2010) was dismissed as untimely; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and denied equitable tolling based on early state counsel conduct.
- After Martinez v. Ryan (2012), Chavez sought to use Martinez doctrine to excuse procedural defaults and to challenge the effectiveness of state post-conviction counsel; state courts rejected those Martinez-based claims.
- With a death warrant issued for February 12, 2014, Chavez filed a pro se district-court motion seeking appointment/substitution of conflict-free federal counsel to investigate Martinez claims; the district court denied it as legally misconceived and futile.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: substitution/appointment was denied because (1) Martinez does not create a freestanding basis for relief against post-conviction counsel, (2) any trial-ineffective-assistance claims would be time-barred or successive, and (3) appointing counsel to pursue such futile claims is not required under §3599.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chavez was entitled to appointment/substitution of federal counsel to investigate/pursue Martinez-based claims | Chavez: Martinez allows investigation of ineffective post-conviction counsel to excuse procedural default; he needs conflict-free counsel to pursue those claims | Govt/District: Martinez is narrow, does not create a freestanding claim against post-conviction counsel; claims would be futile because of AEDPA bars (statute of limitations, successive-petition rules) | Denied — substitution/appointment futile; Martinez cannot be the basis for relief here |
| Whether Martinez provides a new constitutional rule triggering §2244(d)(1)(C) or authorization for a second/successive petition | Chavez: Martinez creates a vehicle to overcome procedural bars for trial-ineffective-assistance claims | Respondents: Martinez is an equitable, not constitutional, rule; it does not toll §2244(d) or permit second/successive petitions absent §2244(b) criteria | Held Martinez is nonconstitutional and does not reset the AEDPA limitations or gatekeeping requirements |
| Whether equitable tolling or Martinez can excuse the untimely initial §2254 petition | Chavez: ineffective state collateral counsel excused the delay under Martinez-equitable theory | Respondents: Eleventh Circuit precedent rejects using Martinez to equitably toll the statute of limitations | Held: No equitable tolling based on Martinez; prior dismissal as untimely stands |
| Whether a stay of execution should issue pending appeal | Chavez: needs stay to allow appeal and counsel substitution to be resolved | Respondents: Chavez failed to show substantial likelihood of success; procedural bars and futility counsel against a stay | Denied as moot; would be denied on merits for lack of substantial likelihood of success |
Key Cases Cited
- McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (appointment of counsel includes assistance before filing a habeas petition)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings; ineffectiveness of collateral counsel is not a ground for federal habeas relief)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (narrow equitable exception allowing cause to excuse procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims when state law requires raising them in initial-review collateral proceedings)
- Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012) (substitution of appointed counsel warranted only when in the interests of justice)
- Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) (§3599 requires appointed counsel to represent petitioner through subsequent stages of post-conviction proceedings)
- Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martinez limited to excusing procedural default of trial-ineffective-assistance claims; does not affect AEDPA limitations)
- Gore v. Crews, 720 F.3d 811 (11th Cir. 2013) (Martinez limited in scope to ineffective-trial-counsel claims barred by ineffective post-conviction counsel)
- Chavez v. State, 12 So.3d 199 (Fla. 2009) (state post-conviction proceedings and denial on merits)
- Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of Chavez’s initial §2254 petition as untimely)
- In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004) (procedural bars can be so conclusive that §3599 appointment is unavailable)
- Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) (Martinez did not announce a new constitutional rule; cannot justify a second or successive petition)
- Bowersox v. Williams, 517 U.S. 345 (1996) (stays for second or successive habeas require substantial grounds for relief)
- Weeks v. Jones, 100 F.3d 124 (11th Cir. 1996) (appointment of counsel under §3599 does not require merits assessment, but procedural bars may preclude appointment)