Juan Amaya v. Jeffrey Rosen
986 F.3d 424
| 4th Cir. | 2021Background
- Juan Carlos Amaya, a Salvadoran who says he was a former MS-13 member, was deported in 2012, reentered the U.S., and had his removal order reinstated in 2017; he sought withholding of removal claiming persecution as a member of the PSG “former Salvadoran MS-13 members.”
- At the IJ hearing Amaya testified about forced recruitment, threats and violence after leaving the gang; the IJ found him not credible and alternatively held the proposed PSG lacked particularity and social distinction.
- The BIA affirmed in a single-member decision, adopting the IJ’s view that the PSG was “too diffuse” under Matter of W-G-R- and dismissed Amaya’s withholding claim on particularity grounds (it did not address social distinction); it affirmed the IJ’s denial of CAT relief.
- On judicial review the Fourth Circuit addressed only whether the PSG satisfies the BIA’s particularity requirement (the BIA’s sole ground); other IJ findings were not before the court.
- The Fourth Circuit assumed Chevron deference would apply but held the BIA’s particularity application in W-G-R- was unreasonable because it impermissibly conflated particularity with social distinction and misapplied the definitional inquiry; the court granted the petition in part and remanded for further consideration of the remaining withholding issues, but denied review of the CAT denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Amaya) | Defendant's Argument (Government/BIA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PSG “former Salvadoran MS-13 members” satisfies the particularity requirement | The PSG is self-limiting (excludes current members, non-Salvadorans, and non-members) and provides clear boundaries | The category is indeterminate/ diffuse; "former" and "member" have amorphous gradations making group membership unclear | The Fourth Circuit held the BIA’s particularity finding was unreasonable and remanded for further consideration (BIA must reassess other withholding issues) |
| Whether Chevron deference applies to the BIA’s single-member decision applying W-G-R- | (implicit) Deference not outcome-determinative; but particularity is a legal question | BIA interpretation (and reliance on W-G-R-) is entitled to Chevron deference | The court assumed Chevron applied but found the BIA’s application unreasonable under Chevron step two, so the result stands reversed on that ground |
| Whether particularity is a legal/definitional inquiry or an evidentiary/societal one | Particularity is a legal question about definable boundaries; it should not depend on evidence that society recognizes the group | BIA treated particularity as including societal recognition (overlaps with social distinction) | The court held particularity is a definitional legal inquiry and faulted the BIA for conflating it with social-distinction (that was unreasonable) |
| Whether Amaya’s CAT claim warranted relief | Argued CAT protection unnecessary here | Government relied on IJ/BIA factual findings and substantial-evidence review | The Fourth Circuit denied review of the CAT claim—substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (clarifies scope of Chevron deference and reasonableness review)
- INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (applies Chevron deference to BIA interpretations in immigration context)
- Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018) (standard-of-review principle that courts must independently assess Chevron applicability)
- Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (particularity requires an adequate benchmark for determining group membership)
- Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussion of self-limiting groups and particularity)
- Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding W-G-R- and treating particularity with evidentiary/practical considerations)
- Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam; upheld agency approach to former‑gang-member PSGs)
- Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding BIA denial where proposed PSG lacked particularity)
- Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2011) (explains the withholding-of-removal clear-probability standard)