JOYNER v. LEAPHART, 314 Ga. 1

The Joyners filed a wrongful-death complaint arising from their infant son’s death, initially filed in Fulton County on Aug. 17, 2016 and transferred to Chatham County.
The original complaint named Dr. Lynn Leaphart and several other individuals and corporate entities; the Joyners later sought to sue Memorial Health University Medical Center (Memorial) and MPPG (Leaphart’s employer).
Instead of amending the pending Chatham County suit, the Joyners filed two separate suits in Fulton County: one against Memorial (Nov. 23, 2016) and one against MPPG (Dec. 21, 2016); those defendants were not named in the original complaint.
The Chatham County court authorized amendment to add Memorial and MPPG on Apr. 26, 2017, but before amending the Joyners voluntarily dismissed both Fulton actions on May 5, 2017.
Leaphart and MPPG moved to dismiss the Chatham County action under OCGA § 9-11-41(a)(3) (the “two-dismissal rule”); the trial court granted dismissal and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the rule applied regardless of whether the dismissed suits named the same defendants.
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals’ Division 2, and held that application of the two-dismissal rule requires a res judicata analysis (including identity of parties/privity) before dismissing a later-filed action; case remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Joyner)	Defendant's Argument (Leaphart/MPPG)	Held
Whether OCGA § 9-11-41(a)(3) (the two-dismissal rule) precludes a later action when the two prior voluntary dismissals were against different defendants	The two-dismissal rule should not bar the Chatham action because the previously dismissed Fulton suits named different defendants and therefore did not adjudicate rights as to Leaphart/MPPG	The second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits under § 9-11-41(a)(3) and, per precedent, bars pursuing the same claim regardless of which defendants were named	The Court held the two-dismissal rule does not automatically bar the later action; a res judicata analysis (including identity of parties or privity) is required before preclusion may be applied
Whether a second voluntary dismissal alone has res judicata effect to bar a subsequent suit	Joyners: A § 9-11-41(a)(3) dismissal without the other res judicata prerequisites cannot preclude a suit against different defendants	Defs: The statute’s language and Court of Appeals precedent treat a second dismissal as an "adjudication on the merits" that gives preclusive effect	Court held the statute makes the second dismissal an "adjudication on the merits," but that adjudication only contributes one element of res judicata; defendants must still prove identity of parties/privity and identity of cause of action to bar the later suit

Walker v. Mecca, 320 Ga. App. 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (Court of Appeals precedent holding two-dismissal rule applies regardless of defendants named)
Belco Elec. v. Bush, 204 Ga. App. 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (Court of Appeals case relied on by Walker regarding breadth of two-dismissal rule)
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store v. Robinson, 341 Ga. App. 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (applies two-dismissal rule to bar a third suit)
Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 304 Ga. 105 (Ga. 2018) (reciting res judicata prerequisites: identity of cause, identity of parties/privities, prior adjudication)
Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454 (Ga. 1991) (applies res judicata analysis after voluntary dismissal deemed adjudication)
Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 272 Ga. 209 (Ga. 2000) (a voluntary dismissal with prejudice does not adjudicate issues as to parties not named in that dismissal)
American Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (federal interpretation that the two-dismissal rule requires same or substantially identical defendants/privity for preclusive effect)