199 Conn.App. 829
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Tenant Diana Kelly leased an apartment at Josephine Towers (federally subsidized) and agreed to house rules and lease terms including §47a-11 obligations.
- On Oct. 12, 2017 plaintiffs served a §47a-15 pretermination (Kapa) notice listing eleven specific disruptive acts and alleging violations of the lease, house rules, and §47a-11(a)–(g).
- On Jan. 30, 2018 a kitchen fire occurred in Kelly’s unit after she fell asleep while cooking; damage was minor (~$330). No new pretermination notice was served.
- On Feb. 10, 2018 plaintiffs served a notice to quit that repeated prior allegations and added the fire, alleging nuisance and §47a-11 violations; complaint followed March 8, 2018 (two counts: lease violations; nuisance).
- After a bench trial the court awarded immediate possession to plaintiffs. Postjudgment motions to open and to dismiss (arguing the notice to quit was jurisdictionally deficient) were denied; defendant appealed the denial, contending lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to defects in the notice to quit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the notice to quit conferred subject matter jurisdiction where it added the Jan. 30 fire but no new pretermination notice was issued | Landlord need only deliver the statutorily required pretermination notice (which was given in Oct. 2017); a notice to quit need only use statutory language and may reference the prior pretermination notice | A new pretermination notice was required for the kitchen fire because it was not “substantially the same” act as the earlier listed violations; without it the notice to quit was defective and court lacked jurisdiction | Court held notice to quit and earlier pretermination notice together satisfied jurisdiction as to nuisance; landlord not required to serve an additional pretermination notice for the fire |
| Whether the notice to quit adequately alleged serious nuisance | Plaintiffs alleged nuisance/§47a-11 violations in the pretermination notice and stated nuisance language in the notice to quit | Defendant argued the notice to quit did not sufficiently allege serious nuisance (or cite specific subsection) | Court concluded it had jurisdiction on the ground of nuisance (as defined in §47a-32) and did not need to resolve separately whether ‘‘serious nuisance’’ was specifically pled |
| Procedural propriety of denying motions to open and to dismiss filed together after appeal period | Plaintiffs argued the motions were effectively inextricably intertwined and the trial court’s joint consideration was permissible | Defendant contended the court should have addressed the motion to open first and that denial was improper | Court treated the near-simultaneous motions as raising the same issues and declined to apply a hypertechnical form-over-substance rule; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Housing Authority v. Rodriguez, 178 Conn. App. 120 (Conn. App. 2017) (discussing §47a-15 pretermination notice purpose and cure period)
- Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC, 133 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. 2011) (distinguishing specificity required in pretermination notice from the perfunctory statutory language sufficient in a notice to quit)
- Housing Authority v. Martin, 95 Conn. App. 802 (Conn. App. 2006) (landlord must plead compliance with notice requirements but need only deliver the statutorily required pretermination notice)
- Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514 (Conn. 2006) (plenary review standard for subject matter jurisdiction issues)