Joseph Angel Alvarez v. the State of Texas, 08-24-00004-CR

Background

On November 14, 2020, Georgette Kaufmann was killed and her husband Daniel was shot in their El Paso home; initial investigation produced no viable suspects.
Police obtained a geofence warrant directed to Google’s location-history database (Sensorvault) covering a 400-foot radius and a limited time window; Google returned anonymized device-location points that were narrowed in three steps and ultimately identified a device linked to an account registered to Joseph Angel Alvarez.
Using the geofence result, investigators secured warrants for a Gmail account and social‑media accounts, which produced incriminating communications and helped justify a residential search; the residence search produced a firearm later ballistically linked to the killing.
Alvarez was tried, presented an insanity defense (experts conflicted), and was convicted of murder and aggravated assault; he appealed, challenging the geofence warrant and subsequent warrants, the denial of suppression, the factual sufficiency of the rejection of his insanity defense, and admission of a walk‑through video.
The State’s brief argues: Alvarez lacks Fourth Amendment standing (or, alternatively, the geofence warrant was supported by probable cause and particularity); subsequent warrants were supported by particularized probable cause or protected by Texas’s Article 38.23(b) good‑faith exception; the jury reasonably rejected insanity; and any video‑admission error (if any) was waived or harmless.

Issues

Issue	Alvarez’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held / Relief Sought
Validity of geofence warrant (standing, search, particularity, overbreadth)	Geofence was an impermissible, overbroad, non‑particular, general exploratory search that lacked probable cause and invaded privacy.	Geofence searched Google’s Sensorvault (a third‑party repository); Alvarez lacked a protected expectation of privacy; affidavit provided a substantial basis for probable cause; geographic/temporal limits and the three‑step protocol were sufficiently particular and narrowly tailored.	Court should reject suppression: either no Fourth Amendment search/standing or warrant valid.
Sufficiency of Gmail and social‑media warrants; taint from geofence	Warranted searches were tainted fruits of an invalid geofence, lacked particularized probable cause and amounted to wholesale rummaging.	Warrants targeted accounts and specific categories of records tied to the offense; Ybarra inapplicable because the warrants searched places (service providers), not persons; warrant affidavits gave substantial basis for probable cause.	Court should affirm denial of suppression for Gmail and social‑media searches.
Residence and cell‑phone search / phone “dump”	House warrant and/or authorization to forensically dump the phone lacked sufficient probable cause; evidence from phone should be suppressed.	Defendant conceded the house warrant’s probable cause at trial; any complaint on dump was harmless because equivalent photographic evidence was admitted without objection; waiver applies.	Court should deem house‑warrant complaint waived and any remaining error harmless.
Application of Article 38.23(b) good‑faith exception / fruit‑of‑poisonous‑tree	Even if geofence was invalid, subsequent warrants and resulting evidence are tainted and must be excluded.	Officers reasonably relied on warrants and contemporaneous judicial approval; geofence lawfulness was unsettled at the time; under McClintock/Leon, Article 38.23(b) shields evidence obtained in objective good faith.	Court should apply Article 38.23(b) and deny suppression of subsequent evidence.
Factual sufficiency of jury’s rejection of insanity defense	Alvarez’s severe mental illness and expert testimony established he did not know his conduct was wrong; jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.	Although Alvarez had delusions, record shows he understood societal law and took steps to avoid detection (mask, gloves, conceal weapon, flee); experts conflict, but jury owed deference.	Court should uphold jury’s rejection of insanity; no manifest injustice.
Admission of walk‑through video	Video showed prejudicial weapons/literature and was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.	Defense failed to review video fully and identify specific objectionable portions; objection not preserved; even if error, it was harmless in light of the strong case.	Court should find the complaint waived and any error harmless.

Key Cases Cited

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (recognizing limits on the third‑party doctrine for extended CSLI and privacy concerns)
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (third‑party doctrine—no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (reasonable expectation of privacy test)
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (use of sense‑enhancing technology implicates Fourth Amendment)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule)
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (limitations on searching persons present at premises searched)
McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63 (Tex.Crim.App.) (Article 38.23(b) good‑faith exception applies where officers reasonably rely on warrants)
United States v. Chatrie, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir.) (recent Fourth Circuit analysis on geofence/location‑history and third‑party doctrine)
United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir.) (addressing geofence warrants and application of Leon exception)
Wells v. State, 675 S.W.3d 814 (Tex.App.—Dallas) (upholding geofence use under good‑faith reasoning)