Jose Medina-Nunez v. Loretta E. Lynch, 607 F. App'x 701

Petitioner Jose Juan Medina-Nunez challenged the BIA’s determination that his California felony conviction under Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2(a) (evading a pursuing peace officer with willful or wanton disregard for safety) is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) making him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
The BIA relied on Matter of Ruiz-Lopez (and related authorities) concluding that eluding statutes like Washington’s are categorically CIMTs because they involve deliberately flouting authority and recklessly endangering others.
The Ninth Circuit majority deferred to the BIA under Chevron and held § 2800.2(a) is categorically a CIMT, noting California law requires a reckless mens rea and that § 2800.2(b)’s proof-by-three-traffic-violations does not reduce the requisite level of culpability below moral turpitude.
A dissent argued the BIA’s decision was not entitled to deference (Chevron or Skidmore), criticized the BIA for failing to analyze § 2800.2(b), and contended the statute criminalizes conduct too broad and insufficiently vile/base to qualify as a CIMT.
The petitioner also sought review of the BIA’s denial of cancellation of removal; the court denied the petition and separately upheld the denial of cancellation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2(a) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude	Medina-Nunez: § 2800.2(b) allows conviction for relatively minor traffic violations; the statute therefore criminalizes conduct too minor/non‑vile to be a CIMT	BIA/Respondent: § 2800.2(a) requires deliberate evasion and willful/wanton disregard (a reckless mens rea); comparable statutes have been held CIMTs	Held: Yes — the Ninth Circuit majority affirmed that § 2800.2(a) categorically constitutes a CIMT
Whether the BIA’s classification is entitled to deference and was adequately reasoned	Medina-Nunez: BIA failed to analyze § 2800.2(b) or meaningfully compare California statute to cited authorities; deference is not warranted or the decision is unreasonable	BIA/Respondent: Matter of Ruiz-Lopez and similar authority support deference under Chevron/agency interpretation	Held: Majority applied Chevron deference to In re Ruiz-Lopez and found the BIA’s reliance reasonable; dissent disagreed and would reject deference

Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming BIA that Washington eluding statute is a CIMT and focusing on deliberate flouting of authority and reckless endangerment)
Hernandez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining limits on CIMT determinations and requiring more than mere criminality for offenses lacking fraud)
Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing when unpublished BIA decisions warrant deference and outlining categorical analysis approach)
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the “realistic probability” categorical inquiry for removability)
Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding California § 2800.2 requires a reckless mens rea)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishing categorical approach for comparing statutory elements to a generic offense)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (framework for non-binding persuasive weight of agency interpretations)