Jose Cornejo-Villagrana v. Jefferson Sessions
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17895
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Petitioner Jose Antonio Cornejo-Villagrana, a lawful permanent resident since 2008, pleaded guilty in Arizona to "Assault — Domestic Violence Offense," a Class 1 misdemeanor under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203, and received 12 months probation.
- The underlying conduct admitted in the plea colloquy: while fighting with his wife he "either punched or pushed her in the back of the head" and acted "with the intention to insult or provoke her."
- DHS charged Cornejo as removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)) as an alien convicted of a crime of domestic violence; removal proceedings were initially terminated, later remanded, and the IJ sustained removability under the modified categorical approach.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ, concluding the conviction qualified as a federal "crime of domestic violence" because the Arizona class 1 misdemeanor requires intentionally or knowingly causing physical injury.
- Cornejo petitioned for review, arguing his Arizona conviction does not categorically (or under the modified approach) match the federal crime-of-violence requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it can encompass non-violent or reckless conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Cornejo's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cornejo is removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) as convicted of a "crime of domestic violence" | The Arizona conviction is not a categorical crime of violence and is overbroad; plea record inconclusive | The record and plea documents show a Class 1 assault requiring intentional or knowing physical injury to a spouse, meeting the federal definition | Held: Removable — conviction qualifies as a crime of domestic violence under the modified categorical approach |
| Whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203 is divisible (triggering modified categorical analysis) | Argues statute can cover non-violent variants and is therefore overbroad | Arizona courts treat the statute as distinct offenses (divisible) and only one subsection corresponds to Class 1 misdemeanor | Held: § 13-1203 is divisible; modified categorical approach appropriate |
| Whether a Class 1 Arizona assault (intentionally/knowingly causing physical injury) requires "physical force" or "violent force" under § 16(a) | Argues the statute may be committed without violent physical force and thus fails § 16(a) | State law and federal precedent (Castleman, Johnson line) support that causing physical injury entails use of force sufficient for § 16(a) analysis | Held: Causing physical injury under § 13-1203(A)(1) involves the requisite physical/violent force; aligns with federal crime-of-violence definition |
| Whether the plea colloquy/facts may be reinterpreted to avoid removability | Argues plea factual statements track a different subsection and are ambiguous | Shepard documents (plea, plea acceptance, sentence) unambiguously show conviction for Class 1 assault (intentional/knowing injury); courts cannot re-litigate underlying conduct beyond Shepard materials | Held: Shepard documents suffice; court will not probe beyond permitted documents — conviction supports removability |
Key Cases Cited
- Ortega v. Holder, 747 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.) (standard of review for legal issues)
- Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir.) (substantial-evidence review of factual findings)
- Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.) (reckless-causing-injury under Arizona assault not categorical crime of violence)
- Cabrera-Perez v. United States, 751 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.) (Arizona intentional-causing-injury assault is a crime of violence)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S.) (limits use of modified categorical approach to Shepard documents)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (U.S.) (causing bodily injury can satisfy the force requirement; domestic-violence context interpreted broadly)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (U.S.) (definition of "physical force" as "violent force" for certain statutes)
- Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.) (application of force/physical injury analyses in § 16(a) context)
- United States v. Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.) (assault causing bodily injury necessarily involves force)
- Calvillo-Palacios v. United States, 860 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir.) (threat and assault statutes involve violent physical force when intentional/knowing)