Jordan Jacobs v. State of Indiana, 2017 Ind. LEXIS 501

On Sept. 2, 2015, officers observed a group in a high-crime Indianapolis park; some youths in the group wore red (a known gang color). Jacobs (age 18) was present and briefly draped a red T‑shirt over his shoulder earlier but was not wearing it when approached.
Officers surveilled the group for several hours from an unmarked car; a marked park‑ranger car passed, after which Jacobs and another person briefly left the area and then returned.
When additional marked police arrived, Jacobs walked away from officers; he did not comply with an initial order to stop and was ordered to the ground and handcuffed (officers told him he was not under arrest).
After Jacobs was on the ground and handcuffed, an outline of a handgun was visible in his pocket; officers seized the gun and charged him with Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun without a license.
Jacobs moved to suppress the gun as the product of an unlawful stop; the trial court denied the motion, convicted him, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided decision. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to detain Jacobs (Terry stop)	The State argued Jacobs’s behavior (evading police in a high‑crime area), his presence among youths wearing gang colors, and belief he was truant supported reasonable suspicion	Jacobs argued the alleged truancy had expired, his brief movement away was not flight, and wearing/holding a red shirt and mere presence among others in red did not link him to criminal activity	No. The Court held the totality of circumstances did not provide particularized, objective reasonable suspicion to detain Jacobs; stop violated the Fourth Amendment
Whether detention/search was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution	The State argued public‑safety needs (recent shootings, juvenile group, gang colors) justified detention and search	Jacobs argued the Litchfield factors weigh against reasonableness: weak suspicion tied to criminality, non‑minimal intrusion (handcuffed and placed on ground), and limited law‑enforcement need re: Jacobs individually	No. Under Litchfield, the State failed to show the intrusion was reasonable as applied to Jacobs; detention/search violated Article 1, Section 11

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes investigatory stop/reasonable‑suspicion standard)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (unprovoked flight can constitute reasonable suspicion)
Stalling v. State, 713 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. Ct. App.) (turning/walking away in high‑crime area insufficient alone for reasonable suspicion)
Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005) (sets three‑factor reasonableness test under Article 1, § 11)
Keck v. State, 4 N.E.3d 1180 (explains totality‑of‑circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
Klein v. State, 698 N.E.2d 296 (membership/association with gang is not, by itself, criminal activity)