Jonathan Gentry v. Stephen Sinclair
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18210
9th Cir.2012Background
- Gentry was convicted in Washington state court of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to death; WA Supreme Court affirmed, certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.
- During post-conviction review, Gentry raised ineffective assistance claims tied to penalty-phase mitigation and to failure to investigate psychological history.
- For trial, the State admitted DNA, hair, and other forensic evidence linking Gentry to the crime; jailhouse witnesses testified about his statements.
- The penalty phase included victim impact evidence following Payne v. Tennessee, and the jury fixed the death sentence after mitigation was found insufficient.
- Gentry’s PRP and federal habeas petition asserted multiple Brady/Napue and other constitutional claims, many of which were resolved against him; Pinholster narrowed the evidentiary scope for merits review.
- The district court and this court analyzed exhaustion, procedural default, and AEDPA standards, ultimately denying habeas relief on all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Gentry’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim exhausted and adjudicated on the merits? | Gentry exhausted; Washington Supreme Court addressed merits. | District court found default; petition not properly exhausted. | Exhausted and adjudicated on the merits; AEDPA review applied. |
| Did the Smith Brady/Napue claim survive exhaustion and merits review? | Smith claim exhausted and merits adjudicated. | Smith claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted; other Brady claims meritless. | Smith claim procedurally defaulted; other Brady claims denied. |
| Did victim-impact evidence at sentencing violate the Ex Post Facto or due process clauses? | Victim impact evidence unfairly prejudiced sentencing; unconstitutional. | Payne authorized victim impact evidence; no due process violation. | No ex post facto or due process violation. |
| Was Juror 22 properly excluded under the substantial impairment standard? | Juror 22 could be biased; exclusion violated Witherspoon framework. | Juror 22’s responses showed substantial impairment; exclusion valid. | Exclusion was reasonable and not an unreasonable application of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standards for ineffective assistance of counsel; deficient performance and prejudice)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (admission of victim impact evidence authorized; no due process violation)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (S. Ct. 2011) (limits habeas review to state-court record for merits evidence)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (S. Ct. 2011) (deferential review of Strickland under AEDPA)
- Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (adjudication on the merits; when claims are treated as merits-based)
- Pinholster v. Cullen, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (S. Ct. 2011) (limits evidence in § 2254(d) review to record before state court)
- Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2009) (discusses exhaustion and deference principles)
- Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (Napue/Brady prejudice analysis in DNA-rich cases)