This case requires us to interpret and apply the standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and to determine the meaning of the phrase “adjudicated on the merits,” which acts as a prerequisite to AEDPA review.
In Washington state court, on December 10, 1997, fifteen-year-old Donald Eugene Lambert pled guilty to aggravated first-degree murder, an offense which carries a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Shortly thereafter, Lambert filed a Personal Restraint Petition in the Washington Court of Appeals attacking his plea on the grounds that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel and the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. After unsuccessfully arguing his claims both in the Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court, Lambert petitioned the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus.
*949 In his habeas petition, Lambert reasserted his claim of ineffective assistance supported by three primary allegations: (1) his attorney, Guillermo Romero, stipulated to the juvenile court’s declination of jurisdiction and transfer to adult court; (2) Romero failed to fully advise him of the penalty he would face if he pled guilty, failed to advise him that he should not plead guilty because he would receive the same sentence if he were convicted after a trial, and failed to investigate certain impeachment evidence; and (3) Romero labored under an actual conflict of interest created by his association with an indigent defense firm that was also representing Lambert’s co-defendant. Lambert also reasserted the allegation that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because he was unaware that the sentence set forth in his plea agreement— life in prison without the possibility of parole — truly meant that he would never be released. The district court granted relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding persuasive Lambert’s second allegation, that Romero failed to investigate the government’s case and advise Lambert prior to the entry of his plea. The district court 17318 also concluded that Lambert was entitled to habeas relief on the ground that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because he was unaware of the punishment he would face. The state of Washington, through Warden James Blodgett, appeals the grounds on which the district court granted relief, and Lambert cross-appeals the issues on which he was denied relief.
Because we conclude that the district court erroneously disregarded the Washington state courts’ factual findings and conclusions of law, we reverse the district court’s decision granting habeas relief on the ground that Lambert was denied the effective assistance of counsel and his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. We otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In the early morning hours of May 21, 1997, 89-year-old Homer Smithson and his elderly wife, Vada Smithson, were abruptly awakened by two armed teenage intruders who entered the bedroom of their rural home in Grant County, Washington, shouting expletives. As the teens repeatedly and fatally shot Homer in the couple’s bed, Vada — in an effort to telephone her son for help — ran into the kitchen. The two teens ran outside to reload their firearms with ammunition they had stolen from a shed on the Smithsons’ property. Entering the house a second time, the teens concentrated their fire on Mrs. Smithson. After emptying their weapons again, the teens exited the house to reload once more. Through the kitchen window, one of the teens noticed Vada Smithson on the telephone and heard her exclaim, “they’re killing me, they’re killing me!” Believing she was calling the police, the teen shot her multiple times, firing six or seven rounds until the gun was empty.
Police detectives from the Grant County Sheriffs Office responded to the scene. They found Homer Smithson in bed, still alive but semi-conscious, thrashing around. He died at the Sacred Heart Hospital in Spokane, Washington shortly thereafter, having sustained multiple gunshot wounds to the head, chest, legs and abdomen. Vada Smithson was found dead in her kitchen, holding the handset of a telephone. She appeared to have been shot multiple times, and lost large quantities of blood. According to detectives, the house had not been ransacked, but numerous .22 cartridge casings were found at the scene.
*950 Investigation later that day led police to the home of Marcus Wawers, where they found the murder weapons. Police questioned 15-year-old Melanie Hinkle, who was then residing at the Wawers’s residence. Hinkle disclosed a plan to rob and kill the Smithsons that she and three other teens, including Wawers, age 15, Adam Betancourt, age 16, and 15-year-old Donald Eugene Lambert, had devised over the course of two weeks. Hinkle said that the plan on the evening of May 20 was for Lambert, Wawers and Betancourt to shoot Homer Smithson and then hold a gun to Mrs. Smithson’s head, forcing her to tell them where the valuables were in the house. After she had done so, they planned to shoot Mrs. Smithson as well. Hinkle said that she had intended to accompany the boys that evening, but was unable to after she injured her leg. In her sworn statement she reported that, in connection with the plan to rob the Smithsons, Lambert had expressed the possibility that Mr. and Mrs. Smithson might both be killed, stating, “whatever happens, happens.”
The Grant County Sheriffs Office interviewed Lambert regarding his whereabouts on the evening of the murders. After waiving his Miranda rights, Lambert initially denied any involvement in the murders, claiming to have been at Waw-ers’s home the entire evening. He did acknowledge knowing Homer Smithson, reporting that he used to live on the Smithsons’ sod farm.
Later in the interview, however, Lambert confessed his involvement in the crimes. He stated that he, Wawers and Betancourt went to the Smithsons’ home that evening to rob them. The three proceeded first to the Smithsons’ shed, stealing approximately 35 rounds of ammunition. Lambert initially carried a nine shot .22 revolver, Betancourt carried a single shot rifle, and Wawers planned to stand watch over the robbery with a pellet gun. Betancourt and Lambert subsequently traded guns, and the two entered the Smithsons’ home. After hearing Mr. Smithson coughing, Lambert and Betanc-ourt followed the sound to the bedroom and opened fire. Once they had depleted their ammunition, the two ran outside, traded weapons again, and reloaded. After entering, firing and exiting a second time, Lambert, overhearing Vada Smithson’s panicked phone call, then shot six or seven bullets at her through the kitchen window. According to Lambert, Betanc-ourt then joined in, shooting her in the head. Following the shootings, the three boys ran from the Smithsons’ property back toward Wawers’s residence. According to Lambert, before reaching the home, Betancourt recalled leaving his flashlight in the Smithsons’ shed, and he returned to the scene to retrieve it. Betancourt later reported to Lambert that, upon his return, he found Vada Smithson still alive, and he stabbed her with his knife. In retrospect, Lambert recalled thinking that the plan was “all a game, like we were just gonna jack whatever, rob whatever and then leave.”
On May 22, 1997, Lambert was arraigned in juvenile court in Grant County on two counts of aggravated first-degree murder for the deaths of Homer and Vada Smithson. The Grant County Superior Court appointed attorney Guillermo Romero to represent Lambert. Romero was associated with The Defenders, an indigent defense firm which contracted with Grant County to provide legal services. Thomas Earl, another attorney associated with The Defenders, was appointed to represent Be-tancourt. Hinkle was represented by yet another attorney associated with The Defenders, while Wawers retained private counsel. All four youths were charged with two counts of aggravated first-degree *951 murder. Sixteen-year-old Betancourt was directly charged in Superior Court. He subsequently pled guilty to two counts of non-aggravated first-degree murder and agreed to testify in hearings pertaining to Lambert, Hinkle and Wawers. 1 The other three defendants, Lambert (15), Wawers (15), and Hinkle (15), were initially charged in juvenile court, but the State immediately petitioned the juvenile court to decline jurisdiction and transfer the case to Superior Court. In preparation for the hearing on this motion, Romero retained Dr. Mark Mays, a psychologist and attorney, to conduct a psychological evaluation of Lambert. Dr. Mays’s report concluded that Lambert was extremely dangerous and had no mental problems. Through his attorney, Lambert stipulated to the transfer of his case from juvenile to adult court, conceding that no mitigating factors favored retaining juvenile jurisdiction. The juvenile court declined jurisdiction and transferred Lambert’s case to adult court on July 22,1997.
That same day, Lambert was charged as an adult on two counts of aggravated first-degree murder in Grant County Superior Court. Lambert entered a plea of not guilty. In preparation for trial, Lambert submitted to an interview with the Washington Department of Social and Health Services for the purpose of assessing his competency to stand trial, his capacity at the time of the alleged offense, and his dangerousness. During this interview, Lambert stated, “[I]t’s not right to go and kill somebody but I can’t take it back. I guess I should go to prison, take classes, work to be a better person when I get out.” 2 His interviewers concluded that Lambert was “well acquainted with the justice system, and [ ] knowledgeable about legal proceedings,” even demonstrating a “moderate level of sophistication about the legal system.” Lambert was deemed competent to stand trial, free of any serious mental illness or defect, and highly dangerous.
Lambert authored several key notes before, during, and after his trial. Prior to his trial, on October 14, 1997, Lambert wrote to John Knodell, the prosecuting attorney assigned to his case. In the note Lambert stated, “if I lose my trial I face life in prison without parole.” He continued,”[T]o me I would rather prefer the death penelty [sic] and just get everything out of the way instead of sitting and rotting in a cell just waiting to die anyway.”
On the first day of his criminal trial, immediately following opening statements, Lambert authored another note, this time addressed to his court-appointed attorney, Romero. The text of the note indicated a strong personal desire to. plead guilty to, and take responsibility for, Mrs. Smithson’s murder, but an ambiguous reference in the margin suggested that Lambert might have harbored some confusion as to the punishment which would attach to his plea. 3
After receiving the note, Romero asked for and was granted a recess, lasting somewhere between five and twenty minutes. During this time, in the presence of a Grant County security officer, Lambert discussed his desire to change his plea with Romero. After talking with Lambert, Romero informed prosecutor Knodell of his client’s decision. Knodell agreed to *952 dismiss the aggravated first-degree murder charge for the death of Homer Smithson, and amend the Information to charge Lambert with one count of aggravated first-degree murder for the death of Vada Smithson. The court then proceeded to a hearing in which Lambert pled guilty to the aggravated first-degree murder of Vada Smithson.
The trial judge thoroughly questioned Lambert as to whether he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty, seeking to verify, as well, that he understood the punishment for his crime. Because adjudication of the constitutional claims that Lambert raised after the entry of his guilty plea calls for a highly contextual and fact-dependent analysis, we reproduce, in full, the heart of the plea colloquy:
The Court: Mr. Lambert; is your mind clear?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: At this moment are you under the influence of alcohol, drugs or prescription medicine?
Lambert: No, Your Honor.
The Court: Mr. Lambert, do you understand that by an amendment to the Information against you, you are now charged with Aggravated Murder in the First Degree of Veda [sic] Smithson?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: Mr. Lambert, the punishment imposed by law for that offense, whether a person is convicted after a trial or pleads guilty, is a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: Understand that?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
Lambert signed the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty to a Felony, which included provisions plainly setting forth the elements of the crime to which he had pled and the sentence. Section 6(a) of the Statement provided, “The crime with which I am charged carries a maximum sentence, a fine, and a STANDARD SENTENCING RANGE as follows: Count No. 1 ... Life imprisonment without possibility of parole.” The Statement concluded with the declaration, “My lawyer has explained to me, and we have fully discussed, all of the above paragraphs. I understand them all. I have been given a copy of ‘Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty.’ I have no further questions to ask of the judge.” The court questioned Lambert to ascertain whether he understood the document:
The Court: Mr. Lambert, I have in hand here a document called Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty to a felony. Did you sign this document here today?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor, and I dated it.
The Court: Before you signed it did you read the document carefully?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor and discussed it with my lawyer.
The Court: Did you have a full opportunity to discuss the amended charge and your plea and the matters regarding the sentence with Mr. Romero?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor.
The trial court emphasized that Lambert stood to gain no advantage by pleading guilty, stating that “the punishment imposed by law for [aggravated first-degree murder], whether a person is convicted after a trial or pleads guilty, is a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.” Lambert said that he understood. The court questioned Lambert at length to ensure that he comprehended the consequences of pleading guilty:
*953 The Court: Do you understand, Mr. Lambert, that by pleading guilty you’re giving up certain valuable constitutional rights?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor. I went over that with my lawyer too.
The Court: Good, I’m glad you did, and we’ll go over it here for the record and then when we finish that, if you need any more time to talk with your lawyer or have any questions for me, we’ll have a chance for that too. Perhaps, most significantly, by pleading guilty you’re giving up the right to have a trial, which we’ve already begun here. Now, do you understand that?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: In other words, to say it as simply as possible, if you plead guilty the trial will end and the next thing that will happen will be sentencing.
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. You also give up the right to appeal to a higher court after a trial. Do you understand that?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: If we completed the trial, Mr. Lambert, or continued with it, you would have the right to hear and to see anyone who gave evidence against you, you would have the right to require witnesses to appear and testify on your behalf, you would have the right to testify yourself or not as you saw fit, and you would be convicted of an offense only if the jury unanimously found that you were guilty based on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: Mr. Lambert, before I call upon you to state your plea, do you want any more time to consult with your lawyer?
Lambert: No, sir.
The Court: Do you have any questions for me?
Lambert: No sir.
Next, the trial court inquired into Lambert’s competency to plead guilty. The court questioned Lambert’s attorney, Romero, and the prosecuting attorney, Rnodell, about the findings of Dr. Mays, the mental health professional who had examined Lambert prior to trial. Satisfied that Lambert was competent, the court then heard the following testimony from Romero:
Mr. Romero: For the record, my client has indicated to me that he had been thinking about this decision for quite sometime [sic]. We had — I had met with him on a regular, on a daily basis for the last two weeks preparing him for trial, and also with an anticipation of a plea agreement that was initially rejected by the State also. So it’s not something he decided spontaneously or made a compulsive decision, impulsive decision, excuse me. I gave him the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty and he read it to me aloud, word by word, except for pages, the last two pages. Also present during the reading of the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty was an employee for Grant County jail. After thoroughly reading the statement on the plea of guilty I asked my client specifically if he understood the charge and he responded affirmative. He agreed with the elements. Also I made it quite clear to him if he understood the rights that he was giving up and he responded affirmative that he understood every right. And that the sentence for this was life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He also agreed to the other parts of the statement on plea of guilty, Your Honor.
The trial court then methodologically recited each inapplicable provision of the *954 plea agreement to ensure that Lambert understood precisely what he was — and what he was not — agreeing to:
The Court: All Right. Thank you, Counsel. Mr. Lambert, if you’ll stand please. One last detail here, Mr. Lambert. There are several paragraphs of this statement that I’m sure you discovered as you read through don’t really apply to this case.
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: And the way the form is printed, they ask you and I both initial, crossing those out. Instead of doing that I’m simply going to do it aloud. There is a paragraph here called paragraph I that relates to being sentenced for two or more violent offenses, do you understand that does not apply?
Lambert: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: There is a paragraph called paragraph J that applies to or relates to placement in the community after release from prison, and understand that because of the sentence that’s mandatory in this matter, there will be no release to community placement?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: There is a paragraph K relating to first-time offenders and you realize that you are not eligible to be sentenced as a first-time offender? Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: There is a paragraph called M that relates to sex offenses, prostitution and drug offenses with hypodermic needles; you recognize that does not apply?
Lambert’s answers demonstrated that he had thoroughly read each provision of the plea agreement:
Lambert: Yes, sir. I think you forgot one, Your Honor, number L.
The Court: Well that one begins with or says “if I have a driver’s license” and I recognize that you do not. I appreciate your pointing that out. Paragraph P also relates to sex offenses. You recognize that does not apply?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
Finally, the trial court questioned Lambert to determine whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty:
The Court: Mr. Lambert, has anyone put any pressure on you to enter a plea to this amended charge?
Lambert: No, sir.
The Court: Has anyone promised you any treatment other than the mandatory sentence I’ve outlined?
Lambert: No, sir.
The Court: Has anyone threatened you in any way?
Lambert: No, sir.
The Court: When I say anyone, I mean that literally; anyone inside the court system, in the jail, outside?
Lambert: No, sir.
The Court: Is the plea that you intend to enter to this charge a free and voluntary act and decision on your part?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: And do you base that decision on what you believe to be in your best legal interest?
Lambert: Yes, sir.
The Court: Mr. Lambert, do you have any questions for me?
Lambert: No, sir.
The Court: To the Amended Information in this case charging you with Aggravated Murder in the First Degree in the death of Veda [sic] Smithson, what is your plea?
Lambert: Guilty.
The Court: Noting that the defendant has adopted the probable cause state *955 ment filed by the State as a factual basis for the plea, that plea is accepted.
That afternoon, Lambert received the sentence mandated by state law and set forth in his plea agreement: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or other release. Significantly, the record contains another note, presumably written by Lambert on the day of his plea, entitled “Responsibility.” In the note, Lambert stated:
Today is the day I took responsibility for my actions, it is also the day I start my life in prison.... Maybe I will survive where I’m going, but we can never tell, the guards may come one day and find me dead in my cell, but at least I know in my heart and mind that I have taken responsibility for my crime. 4
B. State Court Post-Conviction Revieiv and Procedural History
1. Washington Court of Appeals
After serving approximately one year of his life sentence, Lambert procured new counsel and filed a Personal Restraint Petition with the Washington Court of Appeals, challenging his conviction on numerous grounds. He alleged that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because he entered it without the advice of counsel and did not understand that it would result in life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Romero, was associated in the same public defender group as Earl, the attorney representing Betancourt (Lambert’s co-defendant). He also alleged that he was denied constitutionally adequate representation because his attorney misadvised him to stipulate to adult court jurisdiction and failed to advise him against entering a plea that resulted in the same sentence he would have received had he been convicted after a trial.
In an effort to permit Lambert to make a record in support of his claims, the Washington Court of Appeals ordered Lambert’s prior attorney, Romero, to submit to a deposition by Lambert’s current counsel. At the deposition, Romero was questioned at length regarding his relationship with Betancourt’s attorney, Earl, and his representation of Lambert both prior to and in connection with his guilty plea. At several points during the deposition, Lambert’s current attorney effectively dissuaded Romero from answering several questions regarding his representation of Lambert by asserting attorney-client privilege. 5
After reviewing the evidence and deposition testimony, the Washington Court of Appeals issued an eleven-page Order Dismissing Lambert’s Personal Restraint Petition, in which the court outlined its understanding of the facts and its reasons for dismissing each of Lambert’s claims. In re Lambert, No. 18069-7-III (Wash.Ct.App., Nov. 17, 1999) (hereinafter “Order”). Beginning with the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest, the court observed that “If Mr. Earl and Mr. Romero were associated in the same firm, then their representations *956 of Mr. Betancourt and Mr. Lambert were adverse and violated [Washington Rule of Professional Conduct] 1.7(b).” Order, supra, at 3. After reviewing the deposition testimony, however, the court concluded that Romero and Earl were not associated in the same firm; rather, they were each independent contractors of The Defenders, which held the public defense contract for Grant County. Order, supra, at 3-4. Romero and Earl each maintained separate law offices in the same building. Different clerical workers were assigned to each attorney. Romero kept his files separate, did not share a bank or trust account with Earl or with Earl’s firm, and had his own business cards and letterhead. Therefore, the court concluded that”[t]he record does not support Mr. Lambert’s allegations that Mr. Romero had a conflict of interest.” Order, supra, at 4.
The court then proceeded to analyze Lambert’s claim that Romero provided him ineffective assistance of counsel because he allegedly did not advise him, at the time he stipulated to the decimation of juvenile court jurisdiction, that the sentence in superior court for an aggravated murder conviction was mandatory life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. In support of this claim, the court considered the declaration of Simmie Baer, an attorney specializing in juvenile law, that Romero’s representation in this regard fell below the minimum standards of competency in the profession. The court also considered Romero’s deposition testimony, wherein he stated that he did not recall the specifics of his conversations and advice to Lambert, but believed he probably told Lambert it was not to his advantage to stipulate to the declination. The court phrased the legal standard for judging this claim as follows:
To prevail in a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner in a personal restraint petition must show by competent evidence that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in his actual and substantial prejudice. Here, Mr. Lambert must show that Mr. Romero’s performance was deficient because he allegedly failed to advise him of the mandatory sentence in adult court, and that it was probable he could have opposed declination of juvenile court jurisdiction successfully, if he had chosen to do so.
Order,
supra,
at 5 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Citing the factors influencing a juvenile court’s decision to decline jurisdiction as outlined in
Kent v. United States,
The court next assessed Lambert’s claim of inadequate representation due to his alleged belief that he would get a shorter sentence if he pled guilty rather than proceeding with trial and potential conviction. Lambert again claimed that Romero did not advise him to the contrary. The court found this allegation contradicted by the record:
His statement on plea of guilty recites that the punishment for aggravated first degree murder is mandatory life imprisonment. And, at the guilty plea hearing, the superior court was careful to insure that Mr. Lambert understood that the court had no discretion in this regard, and the punishment was the same whether he pleaded guilty or the jury convicted him. Regardless of Mr. Lambert’s assertions about his counsel’s failure to advise him, it is clear that a reasonable person in Mr. Lambert’s position would have known what his sentence was even before the court formally imposed it.
Order,
supra,
at 7-8 (citing
People v. Thew,
Finally, the court considered Lambert’s claim of ineffective assistance premised on the fact that Romero accepted his decision to plead guilty after consulting with him for a very short time and in the presence of a jail employee. Lambert contended that he had questions he wanted to ask Romero during their brief conversation regarding his guilty plea, but he did not feel comfortable asking them within earshot of the jailer. The court considered Lambert’s allegation that he was unaware if he proceeded to trial he might be convicted of a lesser offense, and that his conversation with Romero about his decision to plead guilty lasted between five and ten minutes and went as follows:
When I told Mr. Romero I wanted to plead guilty, he said, “Whatever you want.” He did not ask me why I wanted to plead guilty. He did not suggest that we go on with the trial for a day or two, while I thought very carefully about whether I really wanted to plead guilty. He did not try to talk me out of pleading guilty. He did not give me any advice one way or another on whether I should plead guilty.
*958 Order, supra, at 8. To resolve this claim, the court again reviewed the deposition testimony in which Romero testified that he told Lambert he would not gain any advantage by pleading guilty. Romero consistently asserted that Lambert expressed a desire to plead guilty in order to feel better about himself and to resolve the entire situation. 6 The court noted Romero’s testimony that he had no specific recollection as to whether he advised Lambert not to plead guilty, and his testimony that a reasonable probability existed that a jury would have acquitted Lambert of the first-degree aggravated murder of Mr. Smithson and convicted him only of the non-aggravated first-degree murder of Mrs. Smithson. The court also considered the declaration of Michael Iaria, an attorney specializing in criminal defense, who testified that Romero’s performance fell below the objective standard of practice in the profession in several areas, including his meeting with Lambert in the presence of a jail employee.
Yet, the court found other evidence which contradicted this testimony. Notably, at the guilty plea hearing, Romero advised the court in Lambert’s presence that Lambert had indicated to him that he had been thinking about pleading guilty “for a long time.” Order, supra, at 10. Romero stated that he had instructed Lambert to read the statement on plea of guilty out loud, and that he had ensured that Lambert understood the charge. The court also noted that Lambert was questioned directly by the trial court on these issues.
Applying the law to the facts so found, the court articulated the following test for challenging a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance:
(1) he must show counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced him. In re Personal Restraint of Oseguera-Acevedo,137 Wash.2d 179 , 198,970 P.2d 299 (1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668 [104 S.Ct. 2052 ,80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984)). In the context of a guilty plea, he must show “a reasonable probability [existed] that, but for counsel’s errors, [he] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 198-99 [970 P.2d 299 ], “A bare allegation that a petitioner would not have pleaded guilty if he had known all the consequences of the plea is not sufficient to establish prejudice under the ... test.” Riley,122 Wash.2d at 782 [863 P.2d 554 ]. Rather, “the petitioner must present [] at least a prima facie case showing actual prejudice.” Id.
Order, supra, at 11. The court concluded that Lambert’s bare allegation that he would not have pled guilty had Romero strongly opposed his decision was contradicted by the weight of the evidence and was insufficient to establish prejudice. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Lambert’s Statement on Plea of Guilty and the record of the plea hearing, both of which tended to establish that Lambert understood the charge and sentence to which he was pleading. Moreover, despite Romero’s unsupported assertion that a jury may have convicted Lambert of only one count of non-aggravated first-degree murder, the court found that Lambert’s own confession — by itself — described facts that would support a conviction of two *959 counts of aggravated first degree murder. After distinguishing other cases addressing effectiveness of counsel representing minors in guilty pleas, the court concluded that Lambert had failed to establish the prejudice prong of his argument and was not entitled to relief on the basis of ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the court denied Lambert’s personal restraint petition. Order, supra, at 12.
2. Washington Supreme Court
On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Lambert again challenged his plea and conviction. To resolve his claims, the Washington Supreme Court undertook an independent review of the record. In an eight-page written Ruling Denying Review by the Commissioner, it concluded that Lambert had failed to state facts that would entitle him to post-conviction relief. In re Personal Restraint Pet. of Lambert, No. 68929-6 (Wash., Feb. 7, 2000) (hereinafter “Ruling”).
Initially, the court noted that the attorney-client privilege was improperly asserted during Romero’s deposition because “by accusing Mr. Romero of representing him ineffectively, Mr. Lambert waived the attorney-client privilege to the extent necessary to enable counsel to respond to his allegations.” Ruling,
supra,
at 3 (citing
Strickland,
The court used a similar analysis to dispose of Lambert’s claim that Romero failed to investigate Betancourt’s criminal history because of his relationship with Earl. Id. The court found this allegation speculative, unsupported, and largely immaterial. Reasoning, primarily, that Be-tancourt was merely one of three witnesses expected to provide extremely damaging testimony against Lambert at trial, 7 the court ultimately concluded that *960 Lambert had not shown that Romero’s error was caused by, or even related to, Earl’s representation of Betancourt. Id.
Next, the court addressed Lambert’s claim of ineffective assistance premised on Romero’s decision to stipulate to the declination of juvenile court jurisdiction. Ruling,
supra,
at 6. Citing
Strickland,
Finally, the court addressed Lambert’s arguments challenging the validity of his guilty plea. Ruling, supra, at 7-8. Reviewing the evidence in the record, the court found that, under the circumstances, a reasonably competent attorney could conclude that Lambert stood to gain some personal advantage by entering the guilty plea that he had proposed; namely, Lambert avoided being labeled a double murderer and sitting through a trial in which the State’s case against him was extremely strong. Based on the evidence in the record, both of these results were apparently of some importance to Lambert at the time. Ruling, supra, at 7.
Additionally, the court found Lambert’s claim that he thought he was shortening his sentence by pleading guilty unsupported by the evidence in the record. In particular, the court noted that the psychological report on Lambert demonstrates that he understood the seriousness of his crime and the punishment which could attach. Ruling, supra, at 8. The court also relied on Lambert’s statements to the court before entering his plea that he understood a conviction on one count carried a mandatory sentence of “life in prison without the possibility of parole.” Id. Lambert did not explain by affidavit or otherwise the alternative meaning he ascribed to these words, and the court found the term of confinement neither confusing nor unclear. On the basis of all of the evidence in the record before the court, it concluded that Lambert had not shown that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his personal restraint petition or that review was otherwise called for. Id. Accordingly, the court denied Lambert’s motion for discretionary review. Soon thereafter, Lambert filed a motion to modify the ruling. The supreme court denied that motion on May 2, 2000.
C. Federal Court Habeas Review and Procedural History
After exhausting his constitutional claims in state court, Lambert filed an *961 initial habeas petition, on May 3, 2000, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The matter was transferred to the Eastern District of Washington, and an amended petition was filed on May 19, 2000. 9
Lambert’s habeas petition renewed his two main allegations — that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Specifically, Lambert alleged that Romero provided ineffective assistance of counsel (a) when he stipulated to the juvenile court’s declination of jurisdiction and transfer of Lambert’s case to adult court, (b) in conjunction with Lambert’s guilty plea and the investigation preceding it, and (c) because Romero labored under an actual conflict of interest created by his relationship with the attorney representing Lambert’s co-defendant.
See Lambert v. Blodgett,
The district court granted Lambert’s request to conduct discovery. Concluding that the Washington state courts had failed to conduct a “full and fair hearing to reasonably find the relevant facts and resolve inconsistencies,” the district court also granted Lambert’s request for an evi-dentiary hearing.
Id.
at 994. In the evi-dentiary hearing, which commenced June 11, 2002 and concluded the following day, the district court heard testimony from nine witnesses for Lambert and one witness for the state.
10
Id.
After the hearing, the district court allowed the parties to file post-hearing briefing and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its post-hearing brief, the State challenged an allegation that Lambert raised for the first time in federal court: that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel because Romero did not learn that the tape-recorded confession he provided to police had been “enhanced,” or re-recorded at a higher volume, by police. Detective Mat-ney of the Grant County Sheriffs Department had filed a report explaining his actions on May 24, 1997, and this evidence was provided to Lambert’s counsel during discovery prior to the Washington Court of Appeals’ ruling on his Personal Re
*962
straint Petition.
Id.
11
The district court rejected the State’s contention that Lambert failed to exhaust the “enhanced tape recording” basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Id.
Finding “no evidence that Mr. Lambert knew of the enhanced tape issue prior to filing his federal habeas petition and deliberately withheld it from the state courts,” the court concluded that the issue did not fundamentally alter the ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented to the state courts.
Id.
at 995 (citing
Vasquez v. Hillery,
The district court next inquired into the applicable standard of review.
Id.
at 997. After noting that the case is governed by AEDPA, the court outlined its understanding of the deferential review mandated by the statute.
Id.
According to the district court, a habeas petition is appropriately granted if the state court’s “factual findings were clearly erroneous,” which requires a finding, “in effect, that the state court was wrong and the petitioner is correct.”
Id.
(citing
Avila v. Galaza,
*963
Relieved of the state court’s findings, the district court then proceeded to adjudicate the merits of Lambert’s claims anew.
Id.
at 998-1008. First, concluding that the state courts erroneously considered the claim, the district court dismissed, with prejudice, Lambert’s claim of ineffective assistance premised on Romero’s stipulation to transfer his case from juvenile court.
Id.
at 999-1000. According to the district court, this ground could not be considered as an independent constitutional violation because it occurred prior to the entry of Lambert’s guilty plea.
Id.
at 999 (citing
Tollett v. Henderson,
The court next considered Lambert’s claim that Romero provided ineffective assistance in conjunction with his guilty plea and the investigation preceding it. Id. at 1000. Remarking that the “state court did not comment on Mr. Romero’s duty to investigate imposed by Strickland,” the court initially concluded that “there are no findings by the state court to which deference must be given.” Id. The court then considered the expert testimony of Michael Iaria — the very same expert witness heard by the state court — that Romero’s conduct fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. The district court concluded that, because of Lambert’s age and “possible medical problems,” Romero’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1001. 13
The court next characterized the state court’s finding that “a reasonably competent attorney could conclude that Mr. Lambert had nothing to lose by pleading guilty” as an unreasonable application of the law of Strickland and Hill. Id. The court concluded that Romero’s failure to investigate prior to Lambert’s plea and his failure to dissuade Lambert from pleading guilty were objectively unreasonable, and held that the Washington court’s contrary finding was “clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1001.
Revisiting the second prong of Strickland (i.e., that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense), the district court again ruled that two state court factual findings — (1) the finding that Lambert understood the meaning of his sentence, and (2) the rejection, based upon the record, of Lambert’s contention that he thought he was shortening his sentence by pleading guilty- — were “clearly erroneous” and rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1002. After accepting other evidence and testimony offered by Lambert, the court concluded that “prejudice resulted from Mr. Romero’s failure to offer advice on the plea that adequately informed Mr. Lambert of the consequences.” Id. at 1004. The court also accepted Lambert’s testimony that “had he known of the enhanced tape recording and the transcription error he would have proceeded differently,” concluding that “prejudice resulted from Mr. Romero’s failure to investigate” as well. Id.
Moving on to Lambert’s conflict of interest claim, the court again disagreed with the state court’s factual findings and, using an ethical imputed disqualification analysis, expressed concern about Romero’s ability to effectively represent Lambert.
Id.
at 1006-07. However, noting that the
*964
United States “Supreme Court has never applied the ethical imputed disqualification rule in Sixth Amendment analysis, but has only ‘assum[ed] without deciding that two law partners are considered as one attorney,’ ” the court concluded that Lambert had not established ineffective assistance of counsel based upon 17346 this ground.
Id.
at 1007 (quoting
Burger,
Finally, the district court reached Lambert’s allegation that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Id. The court declared that the state court’s determination that Lambert understood the meaning of his sentence was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Reasoning that the finding was clearly erroneous and rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the district court concluded that Lambert’s plea was not knowing and voluntary and his due process rights were, therefore, violated. Id. at 1008-09. On January 17, 2003, the district court granted Lambert’s habe-as petition and ordered the State to release Lambert from custody or to vacate his guilty plea and conduct a new trial in ninety days.
The state of Washington subsequently timely appealed to this court, alleging numerous grounds for error. The State alleges that the district court erred by (1) not deferring to the state court’s factual findings and by applying a “clearly erroneous” standard of review; (2) finding that Lambert had exhausted his federal claims in state court; (3) granting Lambert habe-as relief on the basis that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent; (4) granting Lambert habeas relief on the basis that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his plea and trial; (5) admitting the testimony of two experts in support of Lambert’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (6) abusing its discretion by issuing a protective order sealing one exhibit and portions of the testimony at the evi-dentiary hearing; and (7) abusing its discretion by limiting who could represent Lambert at re-trial.
Lambert cross-appeals on the issues that the district court did not decide in his favor; namely, that his counsel had a conflict of interest because of an imputed disqualification and that his counsel was ineffective in stipulating to the transfer of juvenile jurisdiction.
II. STANDARDS AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
The outcome of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is frequently dictated by the applicable standard of review. In reviewing state proceedings under AEDPA, we are not called upon to decide the matter anew, nor are we permitted to review the state’s judgment under the same standards as we would a judgment on direct appeal from a district court. Before proceeding to analyze the various claims brought here on appeal by the state of Washington and on cross-appeal by Lambert, we must first determine the standard that we should employ when reviewing the district court’s decision to grant Lambert’s habeas petition and, second, the standard that a federal district court should employ when reviewing a habeas corpus petition.
As to the first standard, we review
de novo
the district court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
See DePetris v. Kuykendall,
The second standard — the standard that a federal district court should employ when reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the first instance — requires a more complex analysis. As noted by the district court, because Lambert’s application for habeas relief was filed after the April 24, 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), the extent of review is governed by AEDPA.
Woodford v. Garceau,
A. Adjudication on the Merits
Analysis and application of AEDPA’s standard of review is separate from the question of whether a state “adjudicated” a prisoner’s federal claims “on the merits.” However, the precise meaning of “adjudicated on the merits” is itself a difficult question that has divided the courts of appeals.
See Washington v. Schriver,
For shorthand description, our cases employ the term “evidentiary hearing” to signify a form of adjudication that is sufficient to trigger AEDPA deference.
See Sophanthavong v. Palmateer,
We decline to hold that AED-PA’s reference to “adjudicated on the mer
*966
its” authorizes us to review the form or sufficiency of the proceedings conducted by the state court. Thus, we will not read into “adjudicated on the merits” a requirement that the state have conducted an evidentiary hearing, or indeed, any particular kind of hearing. Rather, we give the phrase its ordinary meaning: in general, “an ‘adjudication upon the merits’ is the opposite of a ‘dismissal without prejudice.’ ”
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
AEDPA states that an application for a writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless deferential review warrants issuance of the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The same section also refers to situations in which “the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision,”
id.
at §§ 2254(d)(1), (d)(2), giving rise to the argument that the phrase “adjudicated on the merits” necessarily contemplates some sort of judicial process beyond simply rendering “a decision.”
See
Scott Dodson,
Habeas Review of Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the Merits,
29 Am. J. Crim. L. 223, 230-31 (2002);
see also Schriver,
Elsewhere, the statute provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (emphasis added). As exhaustion is typically considered a procedural bar to relief, use of the phrase “on the merits” in this section signifies an exception to the general rule, and use of the word “denied” directly limits this exception to a particular category of adjudications. Read in pari materia with § 2254(d), we are persuaded that, in this context, the term “adjudicated” refers to whether the petition for post-conviction relief was either granted or denied, whereas the phrase “on the merits” requires that the grant or denial rest on substantive, rather than procedural, grounds.
Reinforcing our textual analysis is the usual presumption that when Congress employs a commonly used phrase like “adjudicated on the merits,” it intends that term to retain its ordinary meaning.
See Miles v. Apex Marine,
Our prior cases likewise establish that the adjudication necessary to trigger AEDPA review is not restricted to any particular form of hearing. Instead, where we have inquired into whether a state court conducted an adjudication on the merits we have generally looked at whether the state court reached the merits of the petitioner’s claim without dismissing it on procedural grounds. In
Brodit v. Cambra,
Although the jurisprudence interpreting the meaning of “adjudicated on the merits” lacks a certain precision and consistency, our interpretation is in accord with the reading adopted by the majority of the other circuit courts of appeals.
See, e.g., Eze v. Senkowski,
*969
In sum, the text and structure of AEDPA, as well as our prior cases interpreting the statute, suggest that the phrase “adjudicated on the merits” was not used as a term of art unique to this context, but was understood to mean precisely what it does in nearly all modern legal contexts: “a decision finally resolving the parties’ claims ... that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.”
Sellan v. Kuhlman,
The record more than demonstrates that the Washington courts adjudicated Lambert’s constitutional claims on the merits. In considering Lambert’s personal restraint petition, the Washington Court of Appeals ordered Mr. Romero to submit to a deposition by Lambert’s current counsel. 16 The court considered Lam *970 bert’s own testimony and documents he provided. In addition, it considered the expert testimony of Michael Iaria, a criminal defense attorney, and Simmie Baer, an attorney who specializes in juvenile law. Moreover, over the State’s objection, the court allowed Lambert to amend his personal restraint petition to raise, for the first time, two additional issues — Mr. Romero’s alleged conflict of interest and ineffective assistance in advising Lambert regarding declination of juvenile court jurisdiction — and the court weighed each of these claims against the evidence. After conducting an extensive review of the record and considering the evidence supporting each of his constitutional claims, the court concluded that the record did not support Lambert’s allegations. Accordingly, in an eleven-page written opinion addressing the merits of Lambert’s claims of ineffective assistance and involuntariness, the court dismissed Lambert’s personal restraint petition.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the record anew. In its Ruling Denying Review, the court weighed each of Lambert’s constitutional claims against both the evidence in the trial court record and the additional evidence submitted to the Washington Court of Appeals. In an eight-page written opinion, the court reasoned that Romero’s testimony, together with the weight of the other evidence, was adequate to dispose of Lambert’s claims. 17
We find that the Washington courts adjudicated Lambert’s constitutional claims on the merits. The Washington Court of Appeals had before it a “sufficiently complete[reeord] to allow [it] to decide the issue,”
United States v. Hanoum,
*971 We, thus, conclude that Washington’s adjudication on the merits triggers AED-PA deferential review. We next consider the standard of review for (1) questions of fact, (2) questions of law, and (3) mixed questions of law and fact.
B. AEDPA Deferential Review
1. AEDPA Review of State Court Fact-finding
AEDPA repealed former § 2254(d) and replaced it with two new provisions dealing with state court factual findings and fact finding procedures, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1), which provide as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1) (2003).
Together, these sections address whether, and to what extent, a federal district court is bound by state court findings on any of the dispositive factual questions presented in the habeas corpus petition. Courts and commentators disagree on both what these standards entail and how they interrelate.
19
It is apparent, however, that
*972
under AEDPA, “[factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision, adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).”
Miller-El,
Furthermore, in
Taylor,
After surviving this intrinsic review, or where the petitioner does not raise an intrinsic challenge to the state court’s findings of fact, the state court’s factual conclusions are then “dressed in a presumption of correctness, which[ ] helps steel them against any challenge based on extrinsic evidence.” Id. Under § 2254(e)(1), state court fact-finding “may be over-turned based on new evidence presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error.” Id. (citation omitted).
*973
Applying this analysis to Lambert’s habeas petition, we are prepared to review the following findings of the Washington state courts: (1) that Lambert understood the mandatory sentence applicable to the charge of aggravated first-degree murder; (2) that he thought for a long time about his decision to plead guilty; (3) that he desired to plead guilty in order to feel better about himself, avoid being labeled a double murderer, and to avoid a prolonged trial in which the State’s evidence against him was extremely strong; (4) that a reasonably competent attorney could conclude that Lambert stood to gain some personal advantage by entering the guilty plea he had proposed; and (5) that Romero and Earl were not associated in the same firm. These findings should not be overturned unless they constitute an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Therefore, the district court erred when it disregarded factual findings determined to be “clearly erroneous”;
20
it employed the wrong standard of review.
See Lockyer,
In addition, the new evidence of the enhanced tape-recorded confession and the notes offered by Lambert, both presented only at the federal court evidentia-ry hearing, cannot be used to overturn the Washington courts’ findings unless this new evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness accorded state fact-finding. In order to accomplish this, the new evidence must amount to clear and convincing proof that the state court’s factual findings are erroneous. To the extent that the district court concluded, based solely on evidence already presented to the Washington state courts, that Lambert had rebutted the state courts’ findings by clear and convincing evidence, the court erred. The only evidence eligible to meet the “clear and convincing” burden is new evidence presented exclusively in federal court.
Taylor,
2. AEDPA Review of State Court Legal Conclusions
With respect to questions of law, AED-PA denies habeas relief as to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding unless the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This provision modifies the role of federal habeas courts reviewing petitions filed by state prisoners and significantly alters the previously settled rule of independent review of questions of law.
Williams v. Taylor,
“Clearly established” in § 2254(d)(1) “ ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’ ”
Lockyer,
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases
or
if the state court confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the Supreme Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different from its precedent.
Lockyer,
In
Williams,
the Supreme Court, elaborating on the latter standard, reasoned that “a federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.”
Id.
at 409,
Applying these standards to the analysis provided by the Washington state courts, the following legal conclusions may not be set aside unless they are contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, a controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court: (1) that an attorney who holds a contract to provide legal services to indigent defendants does not labor under an actual conflict of interest although he shares an office with the attorney representing his client’s co-defendant; (2) that a defendant has not shown the actual prejudice necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a decline proceeding if the factors outlined in
Kent v. United States,
To the extent that the district court set aside state legal conclusions found to be “clearly erroneous,” the district court
*976
erred. This error is magnified by the district court’s citation to our decision in
Van Tran v. Lindsey,
3. AEDPA Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions that the rules governing state court findings of fact in the former § 2254(d) applied only to a state court’s determination of “historic fact” as opposed to a “mixed determination of law and fact that requires the application of legal principles to the historical facts.”
Cuyler v. Sullivan,
Forging the precise distinction between a “factual” and a “mixed” determination has proven difficult and contentious.
Miller v. Fenton,
In
Marshall v. Lonberger,
Consequently, a federal court reviewing a state court conclusion on a mixed issue involving questions both of fact and law must first separate the legal conclusions from the factual determina *978 tions that underlie it. Fact-finding underlying the state court’s decision is accorded the full deference of §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), while the state court’s conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue — or the application of federal law to the factual findings— is reviewed per § 2254(d)(1) in order to ascertain whether the decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Thus, the state court’s conclusions that (1) Romero did not labor under an actual conflict of interest; (2) Lambert was not prejudiced by Romero’s alleged ineffective assistance in connection with the decline proceeding; (3) Lambert was not prejudiced by Romero’s alleged ineffective assistance in connection with his guilty plea; and (4) Lambert’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, may be overturned only if they are contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The factual findings supporting those conclusions are accorded full AED-PA deference.
In sum, AEDPA has fostered a complex, yet indisputably deferential, system of federal habeas review. That we have AED-PA proves that there is an important role for federal courts to check state court decisions. That AEDPA requires such deference to state courts demonstrates that, as federal courts, we may not reopen the judgments of state courts except on the terms specified by Congress; again, we may not review state court judgments on the same terms as we do for direct appeals. We summarize the layers of review mandated by AEDPA as follows: First, challenges to purely factual questions resolved by the state court are reviewed under § 2254(d)(2); the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record. Second, fact-based challenges founded on evidence raised for the first time in federal court are reviewed under § 2254(e)(1); the question on review is whether the new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness given the state court’s factual findings. Third, challenges to purely legal questions resolved by the extant state court are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1); the question on review is (a) whether the state court’s decision contradicts a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a different result on a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the Supreme Court; or (b) whether the state court, after identifying the correct governing Supreme Court holding, then unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. And, fourth, challenges to mixed questions of law and fact receive similarly mixed review; the state court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under § 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). While this scheme is complex, it is not toothless. “Deference does not by definition preclude relief. A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable.”
Miller-El,
It remains to apply AEDPA to each of the claims forming the basis of this appeal.
III. GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
Both parties to this appeal claim that the district court erred, albeit on different *979 grounds. Beginning with the state of Washington, we shall address each party’s claims in turn.
A. Washington’s Claims on Appeal
The state of Washington, through Warden James Blodgett, asserts, inter alia, the following grounds for error: (1) the district court erred in determining that Lambert’s guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and (2) the district court erred in determining that Romero’s representation of Lambert in connection with his guilty plea was ineffective.
Although Lambert’s habeas petition styles the arguments attacking his guilty plea and those faulting Romero’s representation in connection with its entry as two separate theories supporting habeas relief, Lambert’s unconditional guilty plea limits the grounds upon which he can subsequently challenge his detention. The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]here, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the volun-tariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.... [A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was [ineffective].’ ”
Hill v. Lockhart,
In his habeas petition, Lambert alleges that he was provided ineffective assistance because Lis attorney, Romero, failed to offer the required advice prior to the entry of his plea. He claims that Romero failed to inform him that his plea, which carried a mandatory punishment of life without parole, literally meant that he would spend the rest of his life in prison, and failed to advise him that a guilty plea carried no advantage. Lambert’s habeas petition also alleges that his plea was rendered involuntary because his counsel failed to investigate certain evidence prior to its entry. Specifically, he argues that Romero should have uncovered evidence that he was exposed to. alcohol in útero, that several of the witnesses scheduled to testify against him had extensive criminal records, and that his tape-recorded confession had been “enhanced.”
We proceed to address both claims of ineffective assistance.
1. Failure to Advise
In the context of a guilty plea, the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged ineffective assistance impinged on the defendant’s ability to enter an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty. To succeed, the defendant must show that counsel’s assistance was not
*980
within the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result. “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill,
The Washington courts each addressed Lambert’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims at length under the standards set forth in
Strickland,
These findings are supported by the evidence presented in state court. The evidence demonstrated that Lambert’s choice to plead guilty was not impulsive; he had been thinking about it “for quite sometime [sic].” His own statements showed that he was motivated by a desire to avoid being labeled a double murderer and undergoing a prolonged trial in which the evidence against him was unquestionably strong, as well as an emotional need to take responsibility for his crime. The state trial court judge confirmed that Lambert understood that he would receive a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, emphasizing that the provision of the plea agreement detailing community placement did not apply because he would never be released to the community. Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the state courts acted unreasonably or contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent.
We must next ascertain whether the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing is sufficient to establish by clear and convincing proof, that Lambert’s plea was rendered involuntary by virtue of Romero’s allegedly ineffective representation. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, 25 we hold that the evidence presented was insufficient to meet the burden of proof imposed by AEDPA.
*981 The district court rejected the state courts’ findings and conclusions, determining, initially, that the state courts did not comment on Romero’s failure to advise Lambert on whether he should plead guilty. We note that the Washington Court of Appeals found that Romero did, in fact, inform Lambert that he would not gain any advantage by pleading guilty. Any evidence to the contrary is not clear and convincing. The district court erred when it failed to observe this finding.
After disregarding the Court of Appeals’ contrary findings, the district court made findings of its own: that Lambert did not understand the law in relation to the facts; he did not know his sentence would be the same by pleading guilty to one count of aggravated first-degree murder as it would if he went to trial and was convicted of two counts; he was not fully aware of the direct consequences of his plea because he thought his sentence would be equivalent to twenty years; and he was not aware that the prosecutor’s dismissal of one aggravated first-degree murder count had absolutely no value to him.
Lambert,
The district court’s conclusions are not supported by the record. Accepting wholesale the self-serving testimony offered by Lambert at the federal evidentia-ry hearing, the court overlooked two pieces of evidence which objectively contradict this testimony. In the note authored by Lambert prior to his trial, on October 14, 1997, he admits his knowledge of the punishment he faced, stating, “if I lose my trial I face life in prison without parole,” and continuing, “to me I would
*982
rather prefer the death penelty [sic] and just get everything out of the way instead of sitting and rotting in a cell just waiting to die anyway.” “Sitting and rotting in a cell just waiting to die” are not the words of a 16-year-old who believed he would only remain in prison until his 36th birthday. Furthermore, on the day he entered his plea, Lambert wrote, “Today is the day I took responsibility for my actions, it is also the day I start my life in prison.” Instead of confronting or explaining this evidence, the district court found conclusive the ambiguous scribbling in the margin of a note Lambert passed to Romero before they discussed his plea. Concluding that this established Lambert’s confusion as to the punishment he faced, the district court ignored a simple and obvious fact: this note was written prior to Lambert’s discussion with Romero regarding the consequences of his plea, before Lambert read aloud and filled out the written guilty plea statement, and before the trial judge’s guilty plea colloquy with Lambert. Any latent confusion expressed in the note must be considered in the context of the entire guilty plea proceeding.
Brady,
Thus, considering all of the evidence, we conclude that the district court erred when it determined that the extrinsic evidence presented at the federal evi-dentiary hearing constituted “clear and convincing evidence” sufficient to overturn the state courts’ findings of fact. 27 The presumption of correctness stands. The district court failed to accord the deference required by AEDPA when it rejected the state courts’ conclusion. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court, granting Lambert’s habeas petition on the ground that his guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent, must be reversed.
2. Failure to Investigate
Where the alleged error is counsel’s failure to investigate a potential defense, the salient inquiry is whether “discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea.”
Hill,
Concluding that the state courts’ findings and conclusions were unworthy of deference because neither the Washington Court of Appeals nor the Washington Supreme Court commented on the portion of
Strickland
explaining a counsel’s duty to investigate, the district court simply replaced the state courts’ findings with its own: Romero’s conduct fell below the objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to “(1) hire an investigator and/or investigate Mr. Lambert’s background, including his alcohol exposure in útero, and the background of his co-defendants, who were to testify against him, for impeachment material; (2) review discovery to learn of the enhanced tape recording of Mr. Lambert’s taped statement; and (3) compare the tape recording to the transcript and discover the significant transcription error attributing a false admission of premeditation to Mr. Lambert.”
Lambert,
The record demonstrates that the evidence supporting these findings was not presented to the state courts. The framework set forth in
Taylor,
As noted by the Washington state courts, the record demonstrates that Romero retained Dr. Mays to evaluate Lambert, and, finding no basis for a mental defense, Mays concluded that he was competent to stand trial and had no severe mental illness. In fact, three separate mental health experts determined that Lambert had no mental defense. Nevertheless, based on Mr. Iaria’s testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Romero failed to provide Dr. Mays with sufficient information to investigate a defense of fetal alcohol syndrome (“FAS”). Yet, we have only imposed this particular obligation in the penalty phase of capital cases. Neither this circuit, nor the Supreme Court, has 'ever imposed such an obligation in non-capital cases.
See Wiggins v. Smith,
Additionally, the district court did not even discuss the alleged prejudice which resulted from Romero’s failure to uncover evidence tending to establish that Lambert is afflicted by FAS. To find prejudice under these circumstances would require the district court to conclude that the discovery of FAS evidence would have led Romero to change his recommendation as to the plea, which, in turn, depends on the likelihood that a defense premised on FAS would have succeeded at trial.
Hill,
The district court similarly failed to discuss the alleged prejudice resulting from Romero’s failure to uncover the background of Lambert’s co-defendants, who were scheduled to testify against him, for impeachment material. The court’s failure is compounded by the fact that the Washington Supreme Court did, in fact, consider Romero’s duty to investigate Betanc-ourt’s criminal history, and concluded that Lambert was not prejudiced in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against him. The district court erred when it failed to note this conclusion and accord it proper deference under AEDPA.
The district court also erroneously concluded that Lambert received ineffective assistance because Romero did not discover an error in the transcription of two words in Lambert’s 52-page taped confession.
Lambert,
While we express doubt as to whether Romero’s failure to uncover the transcription error falls below the objective standard of reasonableness, we find this inquiry irrelevant given the overwhelming evidence of premeditation. Indeed, the most damaging evidence of premeditation was expected to come from Hinkle, who alleged that Lambert had planned for several weeks to rob and kill the Smith-sons. Moreover, Lambert’s own confession, properly transcribed, tends to support premeditation, as he reported that upon reaching the Smithsons’ home he proceeded immediately to their shed to obtain ammunition for his gun.
Reviewing de novo the district court’s conclusion that the standards set forth in AEDPA are met, we conclude that it erred in determining that the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing constituted clear and convincing proof sufficient to rebut the state courts’ factual findings regarding Romero’s failure to investigate. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in granting habeas relief on this ground. The district court’s decision granting habeas relief must be reversed.
Because we conclude that the district court erred in granting habeas relief, we find it unnecessary to address the State’s remaining claims of error.
*985 B. Lambert’s Claims on Cross-Appeal
In his cross-appeal, Lambert alleges that the district court erred when it rejected his claims of ineffective assistance premised on an actual conflict of interest and Romero’s allegedly inadequate representation in conjunction with the decline proceedings. We review each claim de novo and, as to both, affirm the decision of the district court.
1. Actual Conflict of Interest
Lambert appeals the district court’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on the allegation that Romero labored under an “imputed” conflict of interest. The state courts rejected this claim, finding that Romero merely held an independent contract to provide indigent legal services, and was not associated in the same firm as the attorney representing Lambert’s co-defendant. The district court rejected this finding, concluding that Earl and Romero were associated in the same firm, but it nonetheless held that the imputed disqualification rule does not constitute clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the state courts’ dismissal of this claim was neither a violation of, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The district court’s conclusion on this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review
de novo. See Pullman-Standard,
Nonetheless, we hold that the district court did not err when it rejected the state courts’ factual findings. As noted previously, when conducting an intrinsic review of state court fact-finding, the facts so found must remain undisturbed unless they represent an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The state courts found that Romero and Earl maintained separate law offices, employed different clerical workers, kept separate files, did not share a bank or trust account, and maintained their own business cards and letterhead. Citing the standards set forth in
Burger,
In the federal evidentiary hearing, the district court uncovered evidence that Romero and Earl had, in fact, discussed Lambert’s case, although it found no evidence that they shared confidences regarding the ease management. The court also determined that the two were associated in the same firm. The findings supporting the latter conclusion were as follows:
(1) there was a single “boss,” Douglas Earl, who could terminate the contract with the attorneys at any time and not pay them.
(2) The attorneys were paid out of Douglas Earl’s account.
(3) There was a single investigator for the group of attorneys.
(4) Douglas Earl handled client complaints made against THE DEFENDERS.
(5) Tom Earl, one of the senior attorneys, supervised the other attorneys and reported concerns to Douglas Earl, at one time recommending that Guillermo Romero be terminated for poor performance.
(6) When Guillermo Romero was suspended from the practice of law, other attorneys in The Defenders received the cases that would otherwise have been assigned to Mr. Romero.
*986 (7) Office space was shared at one location with Thomas Earl and Guillermo Romero having offices across the hall from each other. Mr. Romero did not maintain any other legal office.
(8) The sign outside the building said “Grant County Public Defenders.”
(9) The office equipment was shared by the attorneys, including the copier, the fax machine, and the computer.
(10) The secretarial services were shared by the attorneys.
(11) The case files were prepared by the shared secretary and retained by Earl & Earl.
(12) Business cards were prepared for the attorneys noting “The Defenders,” although Douglas Earl thought that they were not used. David Boerner’s expert opinion, [adopted by the district court], was that THE DEFENDERS was a firm for conflict analysis.
See Lambert,
The district court also held that the imputed disqualification rule is not clearly established federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1). We agree.
The merits of Lambert’s imputed disqualification claim are not squarely governed by a holding of the Supreme Court. The district court correctly notes that the Supreme Court has never applied the ethical imputed disqualification rule in Sixth Amendment analysis.
Lambert,
Similarly, in
Holloway,
the Court emphasized that, “[r]equiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.”
Lambert’s representation by Romero, even in light of his association with The Defenders, fell far short of joint representation. Indeed, in this case, the district court uncovered no evidence suggesting that Romero and Earl ever shared confidences regarding the management of Lambert’s or Betancourt’s cases. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that either
*987
the Washington courts or the district court unreasonably failed to extend the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel to this context.
Cf. Yarborough v. Alvarado,
The district court’s decision dismissing Lambert’s conflict of interest claim must be affirmed.
2. Decline Proceedings
Lambert also appeals the district court’s denial of his claim that Romero provided ineffective assistance during the declination proceedings and transfer of the case to adult court. The state appellate courts rejected this claim on the ground that there was no probability that, applying the factors set forth in
Kent v. United States,
IV. CONCLUSION
While habeas relief is essential to our constitutional scheme of protecting against unlawful detention, Congress has made clear in AEDPA that the writ is not to be used as “a second criminal trial” in which federal courts “run roughshod over the considered findings and judgments of the state courts that conducted the original trial and heard the initial appeals.”
Williams,
Because the district court’s decision fails to accord the deference required by AED-PA, the decision of the district court granting habeas relief is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The decision of the district court on the cross-appeal denying habeas relief is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Betancourt’s sentencing was deferred, until after Lambert’s trial.
. During this interview, Lambert also demonstrated confusion regarding his eligibility for the death penalty, at one point suggesting that his age might engender the sympathy of the jury so as to prevent them from recommending the death penalty.
.The precise content of the note is subject to a protective order issued by the district court.
. Sometime after his trial, following commencement of his incarceration, Lambert wrote a second note to Knodell, tauntingly praising him for having sent “a sixteen year old kid to prison for the rest of his life,” and asking him to "fill out [his] pardon paper work.”
. While Lambert's current counsel repeatedly objected on the basis of attorney-client privilege throughout the deposition, Romero only claimed the privilege in response to questions regarding what Lambert told him about the crime, and the contents of the note that Lambert passed to him immediately before he pled guilty.
. We note that this testimony is also consistent with Lambert’s note, written on the day of his plea, entitled "Responsibility,” which outlines his desire to take responsibility for his actions, to start his life in prison, and to know in his heart and mind that he has taken responsibility for his crime. Additionally, Romero's testimony comports with the note Lambert wrote immediately following opening statements in his trial.
. The most damaging testimony was expected to come from Hinkle, who, had she testified consistently with her statement to police, *960 would have described a planned, cold-blooded double murder.
. In concluding that Romero’s error was not prejudicial, the court noted that the juvenile court declined jurisdiction over Melanie Hin-kle, even though she was not present during the murders and had no prior criminal history-
. The State and Lambert stipulated to a stay of the district court proceedings while the Washington State Bar Association ("WSBA”) conducted disciplinary proceedings against Lambert's former attorney, Romero. The Supreme Court of Washington ordered Romero’s disbarment on July 22, 2004, for misconduct spanning six years and involving seven different client matters, including an unlawful fee arrangement made in connection with Lambert's aggravated murder trial.
See In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero,
. Lambert moved to have portions of the evidence and courtroom discussion sealed, citing the protection of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. At the evidentiary hearing, Lambert's note, in which he said he wanted to plead guilty to killing Vada Smithson, as well as other items of Lambert's correspondence with his attorney, the prosecutor, and personal writings, were admitted under seal. The district court issued a protective order limiting the disclosure of privileged information communicated between Lambert and Romero. Additionally, the district court cleared the courtroom during Lambert’s testimony, sealed portions of the hearing transcript involving privileged communication, and made those portions subject to the protective order.
. Lambert revealed that the tape recording made of his interview with the Grant County detectives on the day of his arrest had been re-recorded by Matney on his home stereo system at a higher volume in order to make the voices audible. Lambert alleged that the transcript of his recorded confession inaccurately quoted him as saying that he planned to "shoot” Vada Smithson. He claims that his actual statement to police was that he and the boys planned to "jack” or "rob” the Smith-sons. This allegedly false admission was quoted by the prosecutor in his opening statement just before Lambert decided to plead guilty.
. The district court noted that the Washington Court of Appeals did allow Lambert to depose Romero but, referencing the Washington Supreme Court’s observation in its Ruling Denying Review that Lambert's counsel dissuaded Romero from answering several questions by asserting attorney-client privilege, the court expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of the deposition for fact development on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. The district court concluded that because the Washington Supreme Court ruled on evidence known to be incomplete, it effectively denied Lambert the last opportunity within the state courts to fully develop the factual basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. According to the district court, this rendered the factual findings unworthy of deference. Id.
. The court did not elaborate on the basis for its finding that Lambert had "possible medical problems,” despite the fact that the state court explicitly recognized and accepted the findings of psychologists who examined Lambert and concluded that he was competent and did not suffer from any serious mental disorder.
. Our decision in
Nunes v. Mueller,
. Arguments for the expansive interpretation of “adjudicated on the merits” arise primarily in the context of cases in which the state court has denied the petitioner's constitutional claims without explanation.
Compare Washington v. Schriver,
. Concluding that it was free to disregard the state courts’ factual findings, the district court faulted the Washington courts for an allegedly less than effective deposition of Romero.
Lambert,
. Because both the Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court reached the merits of Lambert's post-conviction petitions, we analyze the Washington Supreme Court’s decision as the relevant state-court determination. However, because the supreme court largely adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals, we also discuss the court of appeals’ decision.
Lewis v. Lewis,
. A review of the district court's own findings of fact demonstrates that the federal court evidentiary hearing uncovered little new
*971
evidence. Most of the court's conclusions regarding ineffective assistance rely on testimony provided by Romero — evidence that was before both the Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court. The court also relied upon the testimony of Michael Iaria, a criminal defense attorney who, likewise, testified on Lambert's behalf in the state courts. The only new evidence of any real import brought to light in the context of the evidentiary hearing consisted of the enhanced tape-recorded confession, and several notes authored by Lambert prior to and following entry of his guilty plea. Both pieces of evidence were in Lambert’s possession pri- or to the state court proceedings. Although he could have submitted the notes and an expanded affidavit or declaration discussing the enhanced tape-recorded confession, Lambert inexplicably withheld their submission until the federal court evidentiary hearing. The district court excused Lambert's failure to develop the facts surrounding these issues on the ground that he was "denied ... full discovery and an evidentiary hearing."
Lambert,
. Some courts have read 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) independently, simply choosing to apply one standard or the other.
See, e.g., Cartalino
v.
Washington,
No. 96-C2269,
. We note, initially, that the decision that state fact-finding constitutes an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence" is a mixed question of law and fact which we review
de novo. See Pullman-Standard,
. We note that
Taylor,
. We previously required federal habeas courts to review the state court’s decision
de novo
before applying AEDPA’s standard of review.
See, e.g., Van Tran v. Lindsey,
. We, and other courts, have held similarly.
See, e.g., Rupe,
. Here, again, we and other courts have followed suit.
See, e.g., Seidel v. Merkle,
. Because it is a mixed question of law and fact, we review the district court’s conclusion that its factual findings are "clear and convincing” proof sufficient to rebut the presumptively correct state court’s fact-finding
de novo. See Pullman-Standard,
. In his initial habeas petition Lambert primarily sought to attack his plea as involuntary simply because he misunderstood his eligibility for parole. As noted previously, Lambert is restricted to attacking the voluntariness of his plea by establishing that he was not provided the effective assistance of counsel. While we conclude that the state courts reasonably found that Lambert was provided the effective assistance of counsel and, further, that he actually understood his sentence, we note that the Supreme Court has never held that the United States Constitution requires furnishing a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for a guilty plea to be deemed voluntary.
Hill v. Lockhart,
. The district court at times held that the state courts’ contradictory findings were "clearly erroneous,” and at other times stated that Lambert had proven the error of such findings by clear and convincing evidence.
Lambert,