John Doe No. 2 v. Boy Scouts of America
66 N.E.3d 433
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Plaintiff (Doe No. 2) joined a multi-plaintiff suit alleging he was sexually abused by scoutmaster Thomas Hacker between 1983–1986; Hacker was later convicted for molesting scouts but was dismissed as a defendant here.
- Plaintiff alleges BSA and the Chicago Area Council (CAC) knew of Hacker’s prior misconduct (BSA maintained confidential “IV”/Perversion Files) yet allowed him to serve and concealed that knowledge; claims include negligence and fraudulent concealment.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the two-year limitations period (tolled only while plaintiff was a minor) expired long before suit was filed; plaintiff invoked the fraudulent concealment statute to toll/revive his otherwise time-barred claim after public disclosure of IV files in 2012–2013.
- Trial court denied summary judgment and certified a Rule 308 question asking whether fraudulent concealment can apply where plaintiff knew he sustained physical injury and that the abuser had been arrested/tried before the limitations period expired.
- The appellate court answered the certified question “yes,” holding that as a matter of law such knowledge does not automatically bar invocation of the fraudulent concealment statute; whether concealment tolled accrual remains a factual question (e.g., existence of a special relationship, affirmative concealment, and whether plaintiff exercised diligence).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fraudulent-concealment statute can permit a time-barred child-sex-abuse suit when plaintiff knew of physical injury and that abuser was arrested/tried before limitations expired | Fraudulent concealment tolls/revives the claim because BSA/CAC concealed their knowledge of Hacker and IV files; plaintiff didn’t discover cause until IV files publicized in 2012 | Plaintiff’s prior knowledge of injury and that Hacker was arrested/tried put him on notice and bars fraudulent concealment tolling as a matter of law | Yes — knowledge of injury and abuser’s arrest/trial does not automatically preclude fraudulent concealment; tolling is fact-dependent |
| Whether a “special relationship” existed that could render mere silence fraudulent | The Boy Scouts occupy a position of trust/superiority over child members and parents, so silence about institutional knowledge suffices as concealment | No special fiduciary/confidential relationship exists as a matter of law between BSA/CAC and plaintiff to convert silence into fraudulent concealment | Existence of a special relationship is a factual question for the finder of fact; reasonable juror could find such a relationship |
| Whether defendants’ acts/omissions (silence or public statements) amounted to fraudulent concealment | BSA/CAC kept IV files confidential, publicly represented that leaders were vetted, and failed to disclose institutional knowledge — conduct and silence fraudulently concealed plaintiff’s claim | Absent affirmative misrepresentations or proof BSA knew Hacker abused plaintiff specifically, plaintiff’s inaction or generic publicity about the arrest was insufficient | Whether affirmative statements or silence constitute fraudulent concealment depends on factual findings (special relationship or affirmative misrepresentations) |
| Whether plaintiff discovered his cause of action earlier (1988–1993) or only after 2012 disclosure of IV files | Plaintiff reasonably did not discover institutional fault until IV files were publicized in 2012 and thereafter suffered new psychological injury and appreciation of defendants’ role | Plaintiff’s 1988 interview and contemporaneous awareness of abuse place him on inquiry notice; thus he should have sued earlier | Whether concealment prevented discovery until 2012 is fact-specific; fraudulent concealment may apply if plaintiff lacked reason to suspect defendants earlier |
Key Cases Cited
- Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (fraudulent concealment and special-relationship framework; questions of fact for jury)
- DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49 (Ill. 2006) (discusses discovery rule and interplay with fraudulent concealment)
- Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603 (Ill. 2000) (discovery rule accrual; not a fraudulent concealment case)
- Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458 (Ill. 1992) (fraudulent concealment may excuse delayed discovery when trust prevents inquiry)
- Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482 (Ill. 1996) (special-relationship analysis and when trust/superiority creates disclosure duty)
