TERESA CLAY, Appellee, v. BROTHER RICHARD KUHL et al., Appellants.
(Nos. 86938, 86941 cons.—
Supreme Court of Illinois
January 21, 2000
Rehearing denied April 3, 2000
189 Ill. 2d 603
Cremer, Kopon, Shaughnessy & Spina, of Chicago (Andrew Kopon, Jr., and Michael A. Airdo, of counsel), for appellant Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart.
Joseph G. Klest, of Schaumburg (Kevin E. Bry, of Franklin Park, of counsel), for appellee.
Karen L. Kendall, Brad A. Elward, Craig L. Unrath, Timothy L. Bertschy and Patricia M. Gibson, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for amicus curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel.
Thomas A. Pavlinic, of Annapolis, Maryland, for amicus curiae False Memory Syndrome Foundation.
Cynthia Grant Bowman, of Chicago (Elizabeth Mertz, of counsel), for amici curiae Alliance for the Rights of Children et al.
The plaintiff, Teresa Clay, brought the present action in the circuit court of Kane County, alleging that defendant Brother Richard Kuhl sexually abused her while she was a minor. The plaintiff also asserted that the religious order to which Brother Kuhl belonged—defendant Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart—had notice of similar misconduct allegedly committed by Kuhl yet failed to take any steps to prevent the abuse charged here from occurring. The circuit court dismissed the action on motion of the defendants, agreeing with the defendants that the plaintiff‘s complaint was untimely. The appellate court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 301 Ill. App. 3d 694 (1998). We allowed the defendants’ petitions for leave to appeal (
The plaintiff initiated the present action by filing a complaint in the circuit court of Kane County on January 10, 1996. The allegations relevant here are found in the plaintiff‘s third amended complaint. According to the third amended complaint, Brother Richard Kuhl befriended the plaintiff, her sister, Joell, and their mother and, in 1972 or 1973, began to molest the plaintiff and Joell; the plaintiff was born on March 31, 1964. The plaintiff alleged that the abuse occurred about one or two times a week and continued for approximately seven years. According to the plaintiff‘s third amended complaint, Kuhl “would try to make [the plaintiff] touch his penis and he would penetrate her vagina with his fingers, while he was masturbating.” The plaintiff estimated that some 900 separate incidents of abuse occurred during that period. The third amended complaint further alleged that the plaintiff was examined by a psychologist, Dr. Susan Phipps Yonas, who suggested that the plaintiff,
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff‘s action under
The plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed
We note that this action was originally consolidated in the appellate court with another case making similar allegations against the same defendants. While the appeals were pending before this court, the plaintiff in the other case, Josefa Ferrer, reached a settlement agreement with the defendants, and Ferrer‘s case has been dismissed. We have accordingly limited our discussion to the remaining case, involving plaintiff Clay.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff‘s action was barred within two years of the time when she reached the age of 18, as provided by statute.
We need not determine in this case whether the instances of childhood sexual abuse alleged here must be considered “sudden traumatic events” for purposes of applying the statute of limitations. Even if the plaintiff were to prevail on this question, she would still be required to establish the timeliness of her action under the discovery rule. As we explain below, we do not believe that the discovery rule is of assistance to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff contends that application of the discovery rule is necessary in this case, given the allegations in the complaint that she did not realize the existence of her injury until much later. Under the discovery rule, a party‘s cause of action accrues when the party knows or reasonably should know of an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused. Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 171 (1981); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156 (1981). The limitations statute applicable here would be found in
The plaintiff, in her third amended complaint, alleged that it was not until June 1994 that she “realized that the sexual encounters with [Kuhl] had caused her injuries.” The plaintiff further alleged that “the abuse was not caused by force or violence and the injuries were not caused immediately but evolved with the overlay of life experience. At the time the abuse occurred, she did not know it was abnormal behavior.” The third amended complaint also stated that a psychologist who had examined the plaintiff reached the following conclusion:
“‘Because of the particular circumstances of Teresa Clay‘s early life and the nature of the abuse perpetrated by Richard Kuhl, there is good reason to believe that she was unable to comprehend that the tragic course that her life was on, until quite recently, was, at least in part, due to what the priest did to her.‘”
The issue whether an action was brought within the time allowed by the discovery rule is generally resolved as a question of fact. County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 153-54 (1985); Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 171. The question may be determined as a matter of law, however, when the answer
Examining the plaintiff‘s third amended complaint, we conclude that the present action is untimely under the discovery rule. In the present case, the allegations of the plaintiff‘s complaint make it clear that the plaintiff had sufficient information about her injury and its cause to require her to bring suit long before the date of discovery alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff does not argue that she repressed her memories of the abuse, and the allegations in the complaint indicate that the plaintiff was aware of the abuse as it occurred. From the chronology set forth in the third amended complaint, it appears that the abuse began when the plaintiff was eight or nine years old, and that it continued for about seven years, until the plaintiff was 15 or 16. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the plaintiff at one point alleges that the abuse commenced when she was four or five years old; in a later document in the circuit court, however, the plaintiff refers to that allegation as a typographical error. The plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1982. She did not bring the present action until 1996, when she was nearly 32 years old. Given the allegations in the third amended complaint, which show that the plaintiff was always aware of the misconduct charged, and the absence of any contrary assertion that the plaintiff repressed memories of the abuse, we believe that the plaintiff‘s action must be considered untimely under the discovery rule. We make no determination here whether the discovery rule would toll the running of the limitations period in a case alleging repressed memories of abuse. See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying discovery rule in case alleging delayed recollection of childhood sexual abuse).
“This court has never suggested that plaintiffs must know the full extent of their injuries before the statute of limitations is triggered. Rather, our cases adhere to the general rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff is injured, rather than when the plaintiff realizes the consequences of the injury or the full extent of her injuries.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 364.
Notably, Illinois law presumes an intent to harm and a resulting injury from the type of misconduct allegedly committed by Kuhl. Doe v. Montessori School, 287 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297 (1997); Scudder v. Hanover Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 921, 928-29 (1990). Thus, it was not necessary that the plaintiff postpone the commencement
In further support of her argument for delayed discovery of the injury, the plaintiff compares the present case to tort actions arising from exposure to asbestos. This court has applied the discovery rule in those cases, permitting plaintiffs to bring suit long after they were exposed to the substance. See, e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161 (1981). The plaintiff maintains that the injuries she incurred as a consequence of Kuhl‘s alleged misconduct were, like those caused by exposure to asbestos, slow to develop and unknowable at the time of the occurrence. We do not agree.
We believe that there are substantial distinctions between cases involving exposure to asbestos or other dangerous substances, in which the risk of harm is not immediately apparent, and cases involving events that give rise to an immediate awareness of injury. In rejecting a similar contention, this court in Golla explained:
“In those cases, the plaintiffs did not discover that they suffered any injury until long after the tortious conduct occurred. Application of the discovery rule in such cases was necessary to prevent the unfairness of charging the plaintiff with knowledge of facts which were ‘unknown and inherently unknowable.’ Urie v. Thompson (1949), 337 U.S. 163, 169, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 1292, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1024; see generally W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 30, at 165-67 (5th ed. 1984).
In this case, on the other hand, the plaintiff knew that she suffered injuries at the time of the accident. She does not contend that her immediate injuries were not compensable. In fact, she tacitly admits that she could have filed suit for such injuries, related medical expenses and pain and suffering within the limitations period. Thus, the present case involves, not a plaintiff who failed to discover any injury, but a plaintiff who failed to discover the full extent of her injuries before the statute of limitations expired. There is no requirement that a plaintiff must discover the full extent of her injuries before the statute of limitations
begins to run. Because the plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of the accident both that she was injured and that the injury may have been wrongfully caused, the limitations period commenced at that time.” (Emphasis in original.) Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 367.
We believe that a similar result must obtain here. The plaintiff does not contend that she repressed memories of the abuse allegedly committed by Kuhl, or that she was not aware that his misconduct was harmful. Rather, the plaintiff asserts that she did not discover, until years later, the full extent of the injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the childhood occurrences. As the court determined in Golla, however, a plaintiff‘s failure to learn the full extent of the injuries caused by the defendant‘s acts will not toll the statute of limitations. Accepting the plaintiff‘s argument in support of delayed discovery of the injury would improperly create a subjective standard by which accrual of a cause of action would have to be measured.
The plaintiff briefly raises two other theories in opposition to the statute of limitations defense. First, the plaintiff argues that the present matter is similar to cases involving fraudulent concealment, for here Kuhl allegedly used his position of trust and authority to abuse the plaintiff and to secure her silence. We do not agree. Under Illinois law, the fraudulent concealment will toll the statute of limitations if the plaintiff pleads and proves that fraud prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Finally, the plaintiff asks that the cause be remanded so that she can further amend her complaint, if the statute of limitations is found to bar the present action. The plaintiff contends that further attempts to amend the complaint in the circuit court would have been futile, for the appellate court‘s opinion in M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1996), aff‘d on other grounds, 177 Ill. 2d 207 (1997), then the controlling authority, characterized all instances of childhood sexual abuse as sudden traumatic events for statute of limitations purposes. We note that the appellate court decided that case after the plaintiff had already commenced the present action; moreover, even in the face of that decision, the plaintiff later amended her complaint to add allegations in support of her delayed discovery of her injury. The plaintiff does not suggest what further allegations might be made in support of her action, and we do not believe that remandment is appropriate or would be helpful in these circumstances.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
The majority affirms the trial court‘s dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff‘s third amended complaint. I disagree with this result. Under the discovery rule, as the majority correctly states, a party‘s cause of action does not accrue for limitations purposes until the party “knows or reasonably should know of an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused.” 189 Ill. 2d at 608 (citing, inter alia, Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981)). The majority acknowledges that the issue of whether an action has been brought within the time allowed by the discovery rule should ordinarily be resolved as a question of fact. 189 Ill. 2d at 609. However, the majority concludes that in this case the pleadings establish that plaintiff‘s suit is untimely as a matter of law. 189 Ill. 2d at 610.
Although the majority never states whether plaintiff actually “knew” or merely “reasonably should have known” before January 1994 that she had sustained a wrongfully caused injury, either conclusion would be suspect in light of the allegations contained in the third amended complaint. Plaintiff explicitly stated that she did not incur any physical harm from Kuhl‘s sexual abuse, nor did she realize until June 1994 that her childhood molestation had caused her any psychological harm. The complaint also contains the allegation that Susan Phipps Yonas, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who had examined the plaintiff, was of the opinion that many
The cornerstone, if not the entire edifice, of the majority‘s analysis is Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995). See 189 Ill. 2d at 611-13. Golla was a case in which an automobile driver was involved in an accident in September 1985. It was conclusively established that plaintiff sustained physical injuries in the accident of which she was aware at the time. She did not file suit until August 1989, after the relevant limitations period had expired. Plaintiff argued that her suit was nevertheless timely because she had not become aware of the extent of her injuries until March 1988. This court rejected plaintiff‘s argument and affirmed the circuit court‘s grant of summary judgment to defendant. We held that there was
“no requirement that a plaintiff must discover the full extent of her injuries before the statute of limitations begins to run. Because the plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of the accident both that she was injured and that the injury may have been wrongfully caused, the limitations period commenced at that time.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 367.
I believe the majority‘s reliance on Golla is misplaced.
“when a plaintiff sustains an immediate personal injury as a result of a sudden, traumatic event, such as the car accident in this case, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the accident. The limitations period is not tolled and does not begin anew simply because a latent injury may arise from the same traumatic event.” (Emphasis added.) Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 371-72.
Accordingly, unless this case involves a “sudden, traumatic event,” the majority‘s reliance on Golla is misplaced.
Our appellate court has succinctly explained the difference between “sudden, traumatic event” cases and cases involving “disease“:
“The essential question is the same in both instances, i. e., when was or should have plaintiff been aware of a right to sue; however, the limitations period begins to run at a different time under each line of cases, depending upon the nature of the injury. ‘Traumatic injury’ cases involve situations where the injury is such that the plaintiff knows or should know that someone may be legally responsible for it. [Citations.] Thus in ‘traumatic injury’ cases, the limitations period commences when a plaintiff learns of his injury. [Citations.]
‘Disease’ cases, on the other hand, involve injuries which do not themselves put the plaintiff on notice that someone may be legally at fault. In ‘disease’ cases the limitations period does not commence when the plaintiff learns of his injury, but only after the plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know that he or she has a physical problem and also that someone is or may be responsible for it.’ ” Witherell v. Wei-mer, 77 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1979), aff‘d in part & rev‘d in part, 85 Ill. 2d 146 (1981).1
Golla reaffirmed that a distinction must be drawn between “sudden, traumatic event” cases and cases involving “nontraumatic” events, and that in the latter type of case the discovery rule must toll the limitations period “until the plaintiff either knew or reasonably should have known that he was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 366. See also Hutson v. Hartke, 292 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415 (1997), stating:
“In some types of cases, the awareness of a physical problem carries with it the awareness of a wrongful causation, and the running of the limitations period begins. In some cases, a person may have the knowledge of a physical problem without the knowledge of any ‘wrongful cause.’ In such cases, the limitations period does not begin to run until a reasonable person would or should know of a wrongful cause.”
I am a layman with respect to matters psychological, but I would suggest that it is uncontroversial that psychological dysfunction can occur without an outside causative agent. Accordingly, I believe it is improper to hold as a matter of law that a plaintiff‘s awareness of any psychological distress automatically puts him on notice that his distress may potentially have an external causative agent, therefore starting the limitations clock running.
More fundamentally, however, even if this case were governed by the sudden, traumatic event rule, basing our result on Golla puts the cart before the horse. Golla
The majority several times notes that plaintiff does not contend that she repressed her memories of the abuse. Although the majority does not explicitly so state, the implication seems to be that awareness of childhood sexual abuse is tantamount to awareness of injury—that if one is aware of having been sexually abused, one must
I see no reasoned distinction between this case and cases involving toxic exposure, in which the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff realizes or should realize that a past event has harmed him. See, e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 169-71 (1981). The toxic exposure cases are not based on “repressed memory” of the event which caused the injury—the plaintiff in Nolan had worked with asbestos products for over 32 years. Rather, the timeliness of the filing of such cases is evaluated according to
The only support marshaled by the majority is two cases which it cites for the proposition that there exists a legal presumption of an intent to harm and a resulting injury from the type of acts plaintiff alleges Kuhl to have committed. See 189 Ill. 2d at 611 (citing Doe v. Montessori School, 287 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297 (1997), and Scudder v. Hanover Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 921, 928-29 (1990)). But this presumption does not constitute a basis for imputing to the plaintiff knowledge that she had been psychologically injured by the sexual abuse she had suffered as a child. To so hold would turn Doe on its head. In Doe, defendants argued that the complaint (filed by the victim‘s parents during her minority) should have been dismissed as unripe because the victim did not remember the events which allegedly caused her injury. See Doe, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 298-99. Far from utilizing the presumption to impute awareness to the victim, however, the Doe court relied on the presumption to conclude that the case was ripe because the victim had been injured
To paraphrase an earlier case, if the plaintiff were barred from prosecuting this action because she must be said, as a matter of law, to have been psychologically injured prior to January 1994, she would have had only a delusive remedy against defendants. It would mean that at some past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, plaintiff was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of her mind. Under this view her failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a mental disease of whose symptoms she may not even have been conscious would constitute waiver of her right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery and disability. See Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 168, quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 1292, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1024 (1949). With this result I cannot concur, and I respectfully dissent.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.