Joaquin Andres Acosta v. United States of America, 5:18-cv-00369

Background

In Aug. 2015 Acosta engaged in fire suppression; he was cited by USFS officer Mark Snyder and later tried in Jan. 2017 before Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym; Acosta was acquitted.
Acosta (pro se) filed a February 2018 complaint naming the United States, USFS San Bernardino National Forest, the U.S. Attorney General, multiple federal employees (including Snyder, Anwer Khan, Eileen Decker, Joseph Widman, Deveree Kopp), and unspecified domestic partners/betrotheds, asserting torts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, and a Penal Code § 118.1 claim.
Several defendants moved to dismiss on jurisdictional and failure-to-state grounds; the court gave Acosta leave to file a First Amended Complaint to clarify parties/claims but he refused and instead filed a notice of non-consent.
The court found numerous defendants were never properly served (Decker, Michael Dier, Judge Pym, and unnamed domestic partners) and ordered dismissal of unserved parties.
The court recommended dismissal of (a) common-law tort claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because FTCA administrative exhaustion was not pled or shown; (b) Penal Code § 118.1 claim for failure to state a private right of action; and (c) all § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim because § 1983 does not apply to federal actors (and related Bivens issues/prosecutorial/judicial immunity), recommending dismissal without leave to amend.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court has jurisdiction over common-law tort claims	Acosta contends FTCA exhaustion not required for his § 1983 claims and denies asserting FTCA claims	Defendants argue FTCA is exclusive remedy for torts by federal employees/agencies and plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies	Dismissed: FTCA exhaustion is jurisdictional; Acosta did not exhaust; tort claims dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
Whether Penal Code § 118.1 creates a private right of action	Acosta asserts a § 118.1 cause of action against officers/prosecutors	Defendants: § 118.1 is a criminal statute and provides no private civil remedy	Dismissed: No private right of action under § 118.1; claim fails to state a claim
Whether § 1983 claims against federal actors are cognizable	Acosta insists § 1983 applies and that federal actors can be treated as "state" or otherwise be suable under § 1983	Defendants: § 1983 applies only to state actors; federal agencies/employees are not proper § 1983 defendants; sovereign immunity bars suits against the United States	Dismissed: § 1983 claims against federal actors and the U.S. barred; plaintiff offered no Bivens pleadings; related claims dismissed for failure to state a claim
Whether individual defendants (prosecutor/judge/officers) are immune	Acosta alleges malicious prosecution and other misconduct by prosecutor and judge	Defendants: Prosecutors have absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts; judges have judicial immunity	Dismissed: Prosecutorial absolute immunity bars § 1983/Bivens claims against the prosecutor regarding prosecutorial acts; judicial immunity bars claims against Judge Pym; those claims dismissed

Key Cases Cited

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.) (judicial immunity principles)
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (definition and scope of judicial acts for immunity)
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (FTCA administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional)
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors)
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal remedy analogous to § 1983)
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (Bivens does not provide a cause of action against the United States)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (burden on plaintiff to establish subject-matter jurisdiction)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not taken as true; pleading standards applied)
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (prosecutorial immunity scope)