Joannou v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes
162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- Portugese Bend prehistoric slide was reactivated by 1956 road work and has caused slow, continuous downhill movement of roughly one square mile of hillside for decades.
- Two houses originally on Lots 40 and 41 migrated across Palos Verdes Drive onto city-owned Lot 1; appellants own the houses now at 40 and 41 Cherryhill Lane.
- Joannou (and 25 Oak, LLC) sought to quiet title to part of Lot 1 under the Cullen Earthquake Act after the City refused a lease/repair agreement; appellants argue the Act covers boundary shifts from gradual slides.
- The City moved for summary judgment; trial court ruled the Cullen Act applies to disasters (sudden events) and not to ongoing, gradual earth movements, and that landsliding land is not "fixed" as required by the Act.
- Appeal presents only statutory-interpretation issues on undisputed facts: whether the Cullen Act covers gradual, ongoing landslides and whether land affected by such movement can be "fixed" for replatting.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Cullen Earthquake Act applies to gradual, ongoing earth movements (slow landslides). | Cullen Act's broad language on "slides, subsidence, lateral or vertical displacements" covers gradual movements; "disaster" can include slow events. | "Disaster" in the Act refers to sudden, calamitous earth movements (e.g., earthquakes); Legislature distinguished gradual slides elsewhere. | The Act does not apply to gradual, ongoing earth movements; "disaster" implies sudden events. |
| Whether property boundaries can be "fixed" under the Act when land continues to move. | Even if gradual movement counted, equitable reestablishment and filing of a conclusive plat is appropriate for present locations. | Ongoing movement means boundaries are not "fixed"; the Act requires a single conclusive replatting after a discrete event. | Ongoing landsliding means boundaries are not "fixed," so the Act's replatting/quieten-title scheme cannot apply. |
Key Cases Cited
- MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc., 134 Cal.App.4th 1076 (Cal. Ct. App.) (summary-judgment statutory interpretation standard)
- Alejo v. Torlakson, 212 Cal.App.4th 768 (Cal. Ct. App.) (statutory construction and context)
- Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 215 Cal.App.4th 1385 (Cal. Ct. App.) (ambiguity and use of legislative history)
- T. L. Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 215 Cal.App.3d 876 (Cal. Ct. App.) ("disaster" implies sudden event; gradual loss over years not a disaster)
- People v. Arias, 45 Cal.4th 169 (Cal.) (ejusdem generis and limiting general terms by specific examples)
- Grupe Dev. Co. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.4th 911 (Cal.) (limited weight of failed legislation)
- Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal.3d 458 (Cal.) (when unpassed bills can inform intent)
- Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Cal.App.3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App.) (legislative-history principles)
- Britts v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.App.4th 1112 (Cal. Ct. App.) (giving consistent meaning to statutory terms across contexts)
- Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Cal.App.4th 890 (Cal. Ct. App.) (presumption legislature uses consistent meanings)