GAY LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
S.F. No. 23625
Supreme Court of California
May 31, 1979
24 Cal. 3d 458
GAY LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
David C. Moon, Robert E. Mann, Richard Gayer and John Eshleman Wahl for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Thomas F. Coleman, Steven T. Kelber, Donald C. Knutson, Paul Freud Watman, Barbara E. Weiner, Patti Roberts, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Erica Black Grubb, Armando M. Menocal III and Lois Salisbury as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Warren J. Abbott, Assistant Attorney General, Carole R. Kornblum and Richard N. Light, Deputy Attorneys General, Alan C. Nelson, James S. Hamasaki, Calvin A. Mendonca, Harold R. Crookes, Robert V.R. Dalenberg and Gerald H. Genard for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
TOBRINER, J.-In June 1975 plaintiffs, four individuals and two associations organized to promote equal rights for homosexual persons, filed the present class action against Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (PT&T)1 and the California Fair Employment Practice Com-
PT&T demurred to the complaint, maintaining that even if it had adopted the alleged policy of employment discrimination against homosexuals, California law did not bar such discrimination. The FEPC filed an answer to the complaint, taking no position as to the propriety of the action as to PT&T, but asserting that the California Fair Employment Practice Act (FEPA) does not authorize FEPC action as to employment discrimination based upon “sexual orientation,” i.e., homosexuality. The trial court sustained PT&T‘s demurrer without leave to amend, denied plaintiffs’ prayer for mandate against the FEPC, and accordingly entered judgment for all defendants. For the reasons discussed below, we have concluded that the judgment in favor of PT&T should be reversed but that the judgment in favor of the FEPC should be affirmed.
1. Summary of proceedings
The issues before us on this appeal turn on the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ pleading. Plaintiffs’ complaint presents independent claims on behalf of one separate subclass against PT&T and a second subclass against the FEPC. We summarize first the allegations against PT&T.
The causes of action against PT&T are brought on behalf of a subclass composed of homosexuals who are past, present, or future applicants for employment or employees of PT&T, and have been or will be adversely affected by PT&T‘s alleged discrimination against homosexuals. This subclass is represented by two individual plaintiffs-Robert Desantis, who alleges that his application for employment with PT&T was rejected because of his homosexuality, and Bernard Boyle, who claims that
The complaint alleges that “PT&T has maintained and enforced a policy of employment discrimination against homosexuals,” and that “PT&T has, since at least 1971, had an articulated policy of excluding homosexuals from employment opportunities with its organization.” Plaintiffs adduced detailed allegations to support this charge, including the allegation that “Plaintiff Desantis was refused permission to even apply for employment with Defendant PT&T when Defendant Silverman [the PT&T job interviewer] learned of his homosexual orientation.” Exhibits attached to the complaint additionally support plaintiffs’ further charge that PT&T follows a policy of discrimination against “manifest” homosexuals.4
Plaintiffs explain the economic impact of PT&T‘s alleged discriminatory policy: “PT&T employs over 93,000 people. . . . Many of PT&T‘s jobs require skills useful only in telephone companies, and not in the electrical or electronics fields generally. Thus persons having acquired such skills from PT&T or other telephone companies will be effectively denied employment in California if they are known or thought to be homosexual, as will PT&T employees who cannot obtain advancement within PT&T because of their homosexuality or who are fired in whole or in part for this reason.”
In addition to declaratory relief, plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction barring PT&T from continuing to refuse to employ or promote persons because of their sexual orientation. Plaintiffs further ask the court to
Plaintiffs filed their cause of action against the FEPC on behalf of a second subclass of homosexuals who have complained or will complain to the FEPC of employment discrimination, but have been or will be refused assistance by the FEPC. All individual and organizational plaintiffs allege that they have been refused assistance by the FEPC because of that agency‘s policy of not accepting jurisdiction over complaints of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Plaintiffs therefore seek declaratory relief and mandate to compel the FEPC to accept jurisdiction over complaints of employment discrimination based upon homosexuality.
PT&T demurred to plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. Answering plaintiffs’ complaint, the FEPC admitted the pertinent allegations but denied that it has jurisdiction to accept complaints of discrimination based on sexual orientation. After hearing argument the trial court sustained PT&T‘s demurrer without leave to amend; the court also denied plaintiffs’ request for mandate and declaratory relief against the FEPC. The court thereupon entered judgment for defendants on all causes of action. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment.
2. Plaintiffs’ allegations of arbitrary employment discrimination against homosexuals state a cause of action against PT&T.
We begin with a consideration of plaintiffs’ claims against PT&T. PT&T asserts, in essence, that its employment practices are subject to no greater legal restrictions than the employment practices of any other employer in this state. Accordingly, PT&T argues that the provisions of the FEPA, which we discuss below, constitute the sole limitations on the company‘s authority to engage in discriminatory employment practices. As we shall explain, however, we have concluded that, contrary to PT&T‘s assertions, the equal protection clause of the California Constitution (
(a).
Plaintiffs contend that PT&T‘s alleged discriminatory employment practices violate the equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution by arbitrarily denying qualified homosexuals employment opportunities afforded other individuals. In analyzing this constitutional contention, we begin from the premise that both the state and federal equal protection clauses clearly prohibit the state or any governmental entity from arbitrarily discriminating against any class of individuals in employment decisions. (See, e.g., Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 578 [79 Cal.Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645, 38 A.L.R.3d 1194]; Kotch v. Pilot Comm‘rs (1947) 330 U.S. 552, 556 [91 L.Ed. 1093, 1096-1097, 67 S.Ct. 910].) Moreover, past decisions of this court establish that this general constitutional principle applies to homosexuals as well as to all other members of our polity; under California law, the state may not exclude homosexuals as a class from employment opportunities without a showing that an individual‘s homosexuality renders him unfit for the job from which he has been excluded. (See, e.g., Morrison v. Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 [82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375].) Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. (See, e.g., Norton v. Macy (D.C. Cir. 1969) 417 F.2d 1161; Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton (N.D. Cal. 1973) 63 F.R.D. 399; Saal v. Middendorf (N.D. Cal. 1977) 427 F.Supp. 192, 199-203; Martinez v. Brown (N.D. Cal. 1978) 449 F.Supp. 207, 211-213; In re Kimball (1973) 33 N.Y.2d 586 [347 N.Y.S.2d 453, 301 N.E.2d 436]; cf. Major v. Hampton (E.D. La. 1976) 413 F.Supp. 66; Bruns v. Pomerleau (D.Md. 1970) 319 F.Supp. 58; Mindel v. United States Civil Service Commission (N.D. Cal. 1970) 312 F.Supp. 485; Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction (Iowa 1974) 216 N.W.2d 339. See generally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (1976) pp. 365-368.)5
In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366-367 [113 Cal.Rptr. 449, 521 P.2d 441, 65 A.L.R.3d 1266], however, in analyzing the reach of section 7, subdivision (a)‘s predecessor provision, which similarly contained no explicit state action requirement,7 our court explained that the history of the constitutional provision offered no suggestion that the provision was intended to apply broadly to all purely private conduct. In Kruger, we rejected plaintiff‘s suggestion that we interpret the constitutional provision as applicable without regard to any state action doctrine whatsoever.
In the instant case, the question with which we are presented is a narrow but important one: Is the California constitutional equal protection guarantee violated when a privately owned public utility, which enjoys a state-protected monopoly or quasi-monopoly, utilizes its authority arbitrarily to exclude a class of individuals from employment opportunities? As we explain, we conclude that arbitrary exclusion of qualified individuals from employment opportunities by a state-protected public utility does, indeed, violate the state constitutional rights of the victims of such discrimination.
In California a public utility is in many respects more akin to a governmental entity than to a purely private employer. In this state, the breadth and depth of governmental regulation of a public utility‘s business practices inextricably ties the state to a public utility‘s conduct, both in the public‘s perception and in the utility‘s day-to-day activities. (See generally
Moreover, we believe that PT&T‘s present claim-that it enjoys the power arbitrarily to exclude classes of individuals from its numerous employment opportunities without regard to constitutional constraints-is particularly untenable. Protection against the arbitrary foreclosing of employment opportunities lies close to the heart of the protection against “second-class citizenship” which the equal protection clause was intended to guarantee. An individual‘s freedom of opportunity to work and earn a living has long been recognized as one of the fundamental and most cherished liberties enjoyed by members of our society (see, e.g., Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U.S. 33, 41 [60 L.Ed. 131, 135, 36 S.Ct. 7]; Sail‘er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 17 [95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 46 A.L.R.3d 351]) and, as one jurist has aptly noted, “discrimination in employment is one of the most deplorable forms of discrimination known to our society, for it deals not with just an individual‘s sharing in the ‘outer benefits’ of being an American citizen, but rather the ability to provide decently for [oneself and] one‘s family in a job or profession for which he qualifies and chooses.” (Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Company (5th Cir. 1970) 421 F.2d 888, 891.)
For a number of reasons arbitrary discrimination in employment particularly flouts constitutional principles when it is practiced by a state-protected public utility. First, from the point of view of the individual seeking employment, both the injurious effect of arbitrary exclusion and the risk of such exclusion loom significantly larger in the case of a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic public utility than in the case of an ordinary employer. An individual who is arbitrarily rejected by a single private employer is generally free to seek a job with that employer‘s competitors; if he is a qualified applicant, he may well have a good chance of gaining a position in his chosen field of employment
Second, unlike discrimination by a private employer, employment discrimination by a public utility can be particularly pernicious because, in light of the utility‘s position, the general public cannot avoid giving indirect support to such discriminatory practices. In the case of the ordinary private employer, members of the public who disapprove of the employer‘s employment discrimination can avoid supporting such a practice and attempt to eliminate it simply by refusing to purchase the employer‘s product or service. In the case of a public utility such as PT&T, by contrast, the necessitous service of the utility, not available through other enterprises, means that the general public lacks any choice but indirectly to support the utility‘s discriminatory practices. (See United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (5th Cir. 1977) 553 F.2d 459, 470.)
Finally, employment discrimination by a public utility is particularly incompatible with the values underlying our constitutional equal protection guarantee because a public utility‘s monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic authority over employment opportunities derives directly from its exclusive franchise provided by the state. For example, PT&T‘s monopoly over nearly 80 percent of the market for telephone service in California-and thus over tens of thousands of jobs-is guaranteed and safeguarded by the state Public Utilities Commission, which possesses the power to refuse to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity to permit potential competition to enter these areas and which establishes rates for telephone service that guarantee PT&T a reasonable rate of return. (See
Accordingly, we conclude that in this state a public utility bears a constitutional obligation to avoid arbitrary employment discrimination.
Although, as we have noted, the federal decisions do not always provide an unfailing guide in this area, we believe that the relevant United States Supreme Court authorities are consistent with this conclusion. As we shall see, those decisions have made it clear that when the state grants a private entity monopoly power over employment opportunities, the private entity-like the state itself-may not use such power in an unconstitutional fashion.
Steele v. L. & N. R. Co. (1944) 323 U.S. 192 [89 L.Ed. 173, 65 S.Ct. 226] is perhaps the seminal decision in this line of federal cases. In Steele, the Supreme Court faced the question whether a union which, under the terms of the
As the Supreme Court pointed out, the exclusive bargaining agent status of the union, which we analogize to the exclusive state-granted franchise enjoyed by PT&T, provided the union with monopoly control over an individual‘s fundamental right to work. “[R]equiring carriers to bargain with the representatives so chosen, operates to exclude any others from representing a craft. . . . The minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute of the right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a representative of their own . . . . Unless the labor union
Thus, because Congress had adopted a collective bargaining system under which the majority union was provided monopoly control over employment opportunities, the Steele court recognized that the union was not free to exercise its power arbitrarily or discriminatorily, but rather was obligated to avoid discrimination in its operations. (See also NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp. (8th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 471; cf. Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1979) 598 F.2d 136.)
Subsequent to Steele, the high court has on numerous occasions recognized that unions which are afforded monopolistic control over employment by virtue of federal law may not violate the constitutional rights of their members with impunity. In Lavoie v. Bigwood (1st Cir. 1972) 457 F.2d 7, 13-14, Judge Coffin, in a scholarly opinion, traced the progression of Supreme Court cases from Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson (1956) 351 U.S. 225 [100 L.Ed. 1112, 76 S.Ct. 714] to Machinists v. Street (1961) 367 U.S. 740, 749-750 [6 L.Ed.2d 1141, 1149-1151, 81 S.Ct. 1784] to Lathrop v. Donohue (1961) 367 U.S. 820 [6 L.Ed.2d 1191, 81 S.Ct. 1826], demonstrating that these cases, building upon Steele, establish the proposition that a private entity which, by virtue of state action, is afforded monopoly control over employment opportunities, is not free to exercise its power without regard to constitutional constraints. More recently, the Supreme Court emphatically reiterated this principle in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 226, 234 [52 L.Ed.2d 261, 278-279, 283-284, 97 S.Ct. 1782].9
Accordingly, we conclude that under the equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution a state-protected public utility may not arbitrarily or invidiously discriminate in its employment decisions. (Cf., e.g., Weise v. Syracuse University, supra, 522 F.2d 397, 403-408 (employment discrimination by private university found to constitute state action under federal Constitution); Peper v. Princeton U. Bd. of Trustees (1978) 77 N.J. 55 [389 A.2d 465, 476-478] (employment discrimination by private university held violative of state constitutional equal protection guarantee). See generally Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra, at p. 1172.)
We emphasize that our holding in this regard in no way abridges a public utility‘s right to prefer the best qualified persons in reaching its hiring or promotion decisions. The equal protection clause prohibits only arbitrary discrimination on grounds unrelated to a worker‘s qualifications. Thus, while we hold that the California Constitution
In the instant case, of course, plaintiffs have alleged that PT&T has adopted an arbitrarily discriminatory employment policy against homosexuals. In light of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action against PT&T under
(b).
In addition to violating the provisions of the state equal protection clause, PT&T‘s alleged employment discrimination against homosexuals also violates the explicit statutory prohibition of discrimination by a public utility embodied in
Although the outer boundaries of the “public service enterprise” category have not been precisely delineated, in contemporary times a public utility, such as PT&T, undoubtedly constitutes a paradigm example of an enterprise “affected with a public interest.” Endowed by the state with a legally enforceable monopoly, and authorized by the state to charge rates which guarantee it a reasonable rate of return, such a public utility is capable of wielding enormous control over activities and individuals which fall within its realm, free from many of both the checks and hazards encountered by a competitive enterprise.
Having, by force of law, specifically guaranteed the public utility‘s monopoly status, the Legislature was not oblivious to the need to guard against the misuse of monopoly power. Drawing upon the well-established common law doctrine that a monopoly is not free to exercise its power arbitrarily, the Legislature enacted a specific and comprehensive statutory provision to prohibit discrimination by any public utility.
PT&T argues, however, that despite its broad language
For a number of reasons, we do not believe that
(1) Statutory language
First, and perhaps most obviously, PT&T‘s proposed narrow construction of
(2) Legislative history
Second, the legislative history of the provision confirms the fact that the section‘s broad ban on discriminatory conduct was intended to reach beyond rate and service discrimination. review of the utility‘s practices is entirely appropriate. Since the very issue in controversy here is whether or not
In 1909, however, the Legislature enacted a more comprehensive transportation regulatory scheme that placed considerably more restrictions on the activities of California public utilities. (Stats. 1909, ch. 312, p. 499 et seq.) The 1909 legislation contained two provisions, sections 33 and 34, which represent the predecessors of the current
Thus, the 1909 legislation, by setting forth the ban on unjust discrimination in two separate sections, clearly contemplated that the statutory prohibition on discrimination would reach beyond discrimination in rates and services; moreover, by stating the prohibition of discrimination in the broadest possible language (“in any respect whatsoever“), the legislation evidenced a clear intent to preclude all discriminatory practices by regulated utilities.
This legislative history demonstrates that
(3) Common law restrictions on discrimination by public service enterprises
Third, the prohibition against discrimination in
Chief Justice Gibson‘s renowned opinion for a unanimous court in James v. Marinship Corp. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900], represents, of course, the seminal decision in this evolving line of common law authority. In Marinship, a union which had entered into a closed shop contract with Marinship Corporation refused to permit any black workers to join its Local No. 6 which negotiated contracts, handled grievances and dispatched workers to their jobs. Plaintiff, a skilled black worker who had been denied membership in Local No. 6, brought suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated black workers against both the union and the employer, seeking to enjoin the union‘s discriminatory practices and to prohibit the employer from giving effect to such discrimination. After a hearing, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction which both prohibited the union from “preventing the employment at Marinship of . . . Negro” workers and also enjoined the employer “from directly or indirectly discharging or refusing to employ or re-employ plaintiff and other Negro workers similarly situated.”14
On appeal, defendants attacked the trial court‘s decision on the ground that the union, as a private voluntary association, retained the traditional common law right enjoyed by such associations to limit membership as the association saw fit. In Marinship, however, our court emphatically rejected the suggestion that a union with a closed shop agreement could be equated with an ordinary private voluntary association. Chief Justice Gibson declared: “Where a union has, as in this case, attained a monopoly of the supply of labor . . . such a union occupies a quasi public position similar to that of a public service business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same freedom from
As Chief Justice Gibson explained, a union‘s legal obligations under such circumstances flowed from the long-established common law doctrine, noted above, which prohibited the holder of monopoly power from using its power in an arbitrarily discriminatory fashion. Quoting from the decision of the New Jersey Court of Chancery in Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers’ Union (1938) 123 N.J.Eq. 347 [197 A. 720], Marinship emphasized that a “‘monopoly raises duties which may be imposed against the possessors of the monopoly. This has been recognized from earliest times. The rule that one who pursued a common calling was obliged to serve all comers on reasonable terms, seems to have been based on the fact that innkeepers, carriers, farriers, and the like, were few, and each had a virtual monopoly in his neighborhood. 17 Harv. Law. R. 156. A monopoly is under a common-law duty to charge only reasonable rates. . . . The question in the instant case is not one of prices or of serving the public but one of employment. . . . However, the principle is the same; the holders of the monopoly must not exercise their power in an arbitrary, unreasonable manner so as to bring injury to others. The nature of the monopoly determines the nature of the duty.‘” (Italics added.) (25 Cal.2d at p. 732.) Since the local union enjoyed a monopolistic control of employment at Marinship, our court concluded that the trial court had, under common law principles, properly enjoined the union from exercising its authority in an arbitrarily discriminatory manner by excluding all blacks from membership. (25 Cal.2d at pp. 740-741.)
In a series of decisions subsequent to Marinship our court has invoked this common law principle to prohibit, in a variety of circumstances, discriminatory labor union policies which have arbitrarily excluded workers from employment opportunities. (See, e.g., Bautista v. Jones (1944) 25 Cal.2d 746 [155 P.2d 343]; Williams v. Int. etc. of Boilermakers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 586 [165 P.2d 903]; Thorman v. Int. Alliance etc. Employees (1958) 49 Cal.2d 629 [320 P.2d 494]; Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 42 [48 Cal.Rptr. 710, 409 P.2d 934].)
Moreover, California courts have repeatedly recognized that the common law concept of “public service enterprise,” articulated in
In the instant case, we need not directly decide whether California common law, in and of itself, prohibits a public utility from engaging in arbitrary employment discrimination; in the case of public utilities the Legislature has codified the antidiscrimination doctrine of the common law in
Although PT&T acknowledges that the Marinship line of decisions has applied common law restrictions on discrimination by public service enterprises to discriminatory restrictions on employment opportunities, PT&T suggests a number of factors to distinguish the past Marinship authorities from the instant case, distinctions which it claims should lead us to restrict the apparent scope of
PT&T initially argues that the Marinship decision relates only to racial discrimination and does not apply to the discrimination against homosexuals alleged in the instant case. This characterization of the common law principle recognized and applied in Marinship is patently inaccurate. In Bautista v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.2d 746, a companion case decided the same day as Marinship, we applied the common law principles of Marinship in affirming an injunction which prohibited a union with monopoly control over employment from arbitrarily excluding all self-employed milk distributors from membership; Bautista demonstrates beyond question that the common law restrictions on monopoly exclusion from employment extend beyond racial discrimination and reach all forms of arbitrary discrimination. Indeed, almost all of the post-Marinship decisions relate to exclusions based on grounds other than race. (See, e.g., Thorman v. Intl. Alliance etc. Employers, supra, 49 Cal.2d 629; Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d 42; Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, supra, 12 Cal.3d 541.)
PT&T secondly maintains that neither the Marinship doctrine, nor the broad statutory language of
Accordingly, we believe that the general principles underlying the Marinship line of authorities support plaintiffs’ contention that the provisions of
(4) Constitutional considerations.
Finally, in addition to all the foregoing factors, the constitutional analysis set forth in section 2(a), ante, supports a construction of
In sum, in view of (1) the language of the statute, (2) the statute‘s legislative history, (3) the evolution of the common law principle which the section codifies and (4) constitutional considerations, we conclude
In light of our interpretation of
3. Plaintiffs’ complaint additionally states a cause of action against PT&T for interfering with plaintiffs’ political freedom in violation of Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 .
Over 60 years ago the California Legislature, recognizing that employers could misuse their economic power to interfere with the political activities of their employees, enacted
These statutes cannot be narrowly confined to partisan activity. As explained in Mallard v. Boring (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 390, 395 [6 Cal.Rptr. 171]: “The term ‘political activity’ connotes the espousal of a candidate or a cause, and some degree of action to promote the acceptance thereof by other persons.” (Italics added.) The Supreme Court has recognized the political character of activities such as participation in litigation (N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 429 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 415-416, 83 S.Ct. 328]), the wearing of symbolic armbands (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503 [21 L.Ed.2d 731, 89 S.Ct. 733]), and the association with others for the advancement of beliefs and ideas (N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449 [2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 1163]).17
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common feeling that homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual worker must conceal from his employer and his fellow workers. Consequently one important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce homosexual individuals to “come out of the closet,” acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate with others in working for equal rights.
In light of this factor in the movement for homosexual rights, the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint assume a special significance. Plaintiffs allege that PT&T discriminates against “manifest” homosexuals and against persons who make “an issue of their homosexuality.” The complaint asserts also that PT&T will not hire anyone referred to them by plaintiff Society for Individual Rights, an organization active in promoting the rights of homosexuals to equal employment opportunities. These allegations can reasonably be construed as charging that PT & T discriminates in particular against persons who identify themselves as homosexual, who defend homosexuality, or who are identified with activist homosexual organizations. So construed, the allegations charge that PT&T has adopted a “policy . . . tending to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees” in violation of
In Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481 [171 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701], our court established the principle that an
4. The California Fair Employment Practice Act does not encompass discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, and the trial court correctly refused to grant plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandate against the Fair Employment Practice Commission.
The California Fair Employment Practice Act, in
Plaintiffs nevertheless maintain that the act affords a remedy for such discrimination. They contend that the legislation should be construed to ban discrimination against homosexuals, either on the theory that the act bars all forms of arbitrary discrimination or on the theory that discrimination against homosexuals is “sex discrimination” within the meaning of the act.
Plaintiffs’ contention that the act bars all arbitrary discrimination rests upon an analogy to the Unruh Civil Rights Act (
The defect in plaintiffs’ argument, however, lies in the fact that whereas the Unruh Act represented a codification of the common law principle barring all discrimination by public accommodations in the provision of services, the prohibitions on employment discrimination contained in the FEPA are in no sense declaratory of preexisting common law doctrine but rather include areas and subject matters of legislative innovation, creating new limitations on an employer‘s right to hire, promote or discharge its employees. Under these circumstances, the rationale of Cox is inapplicable to the FEPA, and the specifically enumerated categories as to which discrimination is prohibited cannot be viewed as simply “illustrative.” Indeed, the fact that the Legislature has repeatedly amended the FEPA in recent years, protecting successively the categories of sex (Stats. 1970, ch. 1508, § 4, p. 2995), age (Stats. 1972, ch. 1144, § 1, p. 2211; Stats. 1977, ch. 851, § 2, p. 2553), physical handicap (Stats. 1973, ch. 1189, § 6, p. 2501), medical condition (Stats. 1975, ch. 431, § 5, p. 925) and marital status (Stats. 1976, ch. 1195, § 5, p. 5461), affords a rather strong indication that the Legislature itself does not regard the original 1959 act as a bar to all forms of arbitrary discrimination.
Plaintiffs alternatively argue that discrimination against homosexuals constitutes discrimination on the basis of “sex” within the meaning of the FEPA. Plaintiffs point out that discrimination against homosexuals is in effect discrimination based on the gender of the homosexual‘s partner, and, analogizing to a series of racial discrimination cases,18 plaintiffs assert that such discrimination is discrimination on the basis of sex. Although, as a semantic argument, the contention may have some appeal, we think, when viewed in terms of expressed intent, the Legislature, in proscribing discrimination on the basis of “sex,” did not contemplate discrimination against homosexuals. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Moreover, the FEPC, the agency charged with administering the act, has since 1970—when the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex was added to the statute—consistently refused to accept jurisdiction over complaints charging discrimination based on sexual orientation. Such “[c]onsistent administrative construction of a statute over many years, particularly when it originated with those charged with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to great weight . . . .” (DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept. of Employment (1961) 56 Cal.2d 54, 61-62 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487].) Accordingly, we conclude that the FEPA‘s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex should not be construed to encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that despite the legislative history and administrative construction of the act, this court should nevertheless interpret the act to bar discrimination against homosexuals in order to preserve the statute‘s constitutionality. Plaintiffs contend, in this regard, that because the Legislature has afforded a statutory remedy against discrimination based on race, religion, sex, etc., homosexuals would suffer a denial of the equal protection of the laws if we were to construe the FEPA as withholding its protection from this alleged “discrete and insular minority.” (Cf. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144, 152, fn. 4 [82 L.Ed. 1234, 1241-1242, 58 S.Ct. 778].) Plaintiffs, however, cite no authority in support of the proposition that a remedial statute which affords a benefit to one or a number of historically aggrieved groups is unconstitutional if the same benefit is not afforded to all historically aggrieved groups.
Plaintiffs’ position founders on the ruling in the United States Supreme Court case of Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) 384 U.S. 641, 657 [16 L.Ed.2d 828, 839, 86 S.Ct. 1717]: “[T]he principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is inapplicable [when the constitutional challenge relates only to] a limitation on a reform measure . . . . Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a ‘statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,’ . . . , that a legislature need not ‘strike at all evils at the same time,’ . . . and that ‘reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,’ . . . .” (Italics in original.) Under these principles, the FEPA cannot be struck down as unconstitutional simply because the Legislature has declined to extend its remedies to all potentially aggrieved groups. (Cf. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. (1973) 414 U.S. 86 [38 L.Ed.2d 46, 94 S.Ct. 32].)
Accordingly, we conclude that the FEPA does not grant the FEPC jurisdiction to act on complaints charging employment discrimination on the basis of homosexuality. The trial court correctly upheld the FEPC‘s contention in this regard.
5. Conclusion
If this court were to accede to PT&T‘s sought sanction for its alleged arbitrary discriminatory practices, we would approve of a rule that would extend beyond the subject of employment discrimination against homosexuals. We would necessarily empower any public utility to engage in an infinity of arbitrary employment practices. To cite only a few examples, the utility could refuse to employ a person because he read books prohibited by the utility, visited countries disapproved by the utility, or simply exhibited irrelevant characteristics of personal appearance or background disliked by the utility. Such possible arbitrary discrimination, casting upon the community the shadow of totalitarianism, becomes crucial when asserted by an institution that exerts the vast powers of a monopoly sanctioned by government itself. We do not believe a public utility can assert such prerogatives in a free society dedicated to the protection of individual rights.
The judgment in favor of PT&T is reversed. The judgment in favor of the FEPC is affirmed.
Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., and Newman, J., concurred.
1. Equal Protection of the Laws
The majority, relying upon the equal protection clause of the state Constitution (
The majority apparently acknowledges that the due process and equal protection guarantees of our state Constitution (
Nevertheless, the majority reasons that employment decisions made by PT&T constitute state action because “the state has granted [PT&T] a monopoly over a significant segment of the telephonic communications industry in California” (ante, p. 468), and also because “the breadth and depth of governmental regulation of a public utility‘s business practices inextricably ties the state to a public utility‘s conduct . . .” (ante, p. 469). Accordingly, under the majority‘s analysis, the arbitrary exclusion of homosexuals from employment opportunities by PT&T constitutes state action which violates the equal protection provisions of
a) PT&T‘s Status As A Regulated Monopoly.
First, for purposes of legal analysis, it is irrelevant that PT&T enjoys closely regulated monopoly power in the telephone industry. But for such power and regulation, the telephone communications business would be apportioned among a handful of competing private firms, each of which would have the right to hire, fire, promote and demote whomever they choose, subject only to the specific limitations of FEPA which, as the majority concedes, do not include discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Why should PT&T‘s regulated monopoly status automatically abrogate this freedom of choice?
Moreover, it cannot be fairly argued that PT&T‘s “monopoly” position in the industry extends to the area of employment opportunity. Although some PT&T technicians may work at specialized tasks not useful to other employers, surely most of its employees (including managerial, clerical and secretarial personnel, accountants, economists, lawyers and general technicians) enjoy more generalized skills. There is substantial and continuing movement of employees across the whole employment spectrum, public and private. As to these employment opportunities which is the critical relationship here, PT&T‘s “monopoly” control plays no role whatever. Accordingly, the state action principle should be wholly inapplicable to employment decisions affecting the substantial majority of PT&T personnel. Yet the majority opinion inexplicably seems to indicate that its equal protection holding shields all PT&T employees from “arbitrary” employment decisions.
b) Applicability of Article I, Section 8.
The majority stops too soon in its reading of article I of the state Constitution. It fails to appreciate the force and significance of the very next section, section 8, which immediately follows the general equal protection provision on which the majority relies.
2. Public Utilities Code Section 453, Subdivision (a)
a) The Statutory Language. On its face, it is readily apparent that
The foregoing conclusion is entirely consistent with our own previous judicial interpretations in related areas. It is well established that, with exceptions not pertinent here, the courts and the Public Utilities Commission share concurrent jurisdiction over controversies involving alleged violations of the Public Utilities Act. (See
The fact that
I acknowledge that the commission has recently determined that its statutory authority to supervise the efficiency of operation and level of rates of a public utility permits it to inquire regarding a utility‘s alleged discriminatory employment practices, but only insofar as they relate to utility efficiency or rates. (See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1977) 82 Cal.P.U.C. 422, 423.) The foregoing commission decision does not rely, however, upon
b) The Legislative History. The majority attempts to support its interpretation of
As noted above, one unfortunate effect of the majority‘s holding herein will be to enmesh the Public Utilities Commission in future disputes between disappointed applicants for employment or promotion within various public utilities throughout the state. Predictably and inevitably, the commission will find itself besieged with complaints from asserted victims of employment discrimination. Necessarily, the commission will be required to develop procedures to resolve these disputes. This will entail valuable commission resources consumed in hearing and determining matters in which the commission has neither experience nor expertise. The majority‘s decision makes no sense policy-wise.
The majority‘s thesis creates another anomaly, namely—homosexuals claiming to be victims of utility employment discrimination may obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission; every other victim of claimed discrimination must follow the procedures of the Fair Employment Practices Commission.
The applicable legislative history conclusively establishes an intent to limit
c) The Common Law Authorities. The majority attempts to bolster its expansive reading of
The majority speculates that
The majority needs not struggle so to find the applicable common law principle for it is both very clear and very well established. Recently speaking for our unanimous court, and quoting from 9 Williston on Contracts, Justice Sullivan wrote: “‘[T]he courts have not deemed it to be their function, in the absence of contractual, statutory or public policy considerations, to compel a person to accept or retain another in his employ . . . .’ [§ 1017, p. 134.]” (Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 727, fn. 12 [73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325]; Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp. (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 147, 167; Marin v. Jacuzzi (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 553.) Thus, as a general common law proposition, an employer can hire or fire whomever he pleases, with or without cause, and regardless of the apparently arbitrary nature of his decision in a particular case.
d) The “Constitutional Considerations.” Finally, the majority refers back to its reliance upon
3. Labor Code Sections 1101 and 1102
The majority holds that the present complaint states a cause of action against PT&T for abridging plaintiffs’ political freedom.
The majority‘s reliance on these sections is invalid, and the very fact that it makes the attempt betrays the fundamental weakness of its legal position. It is readily apparent that the complaint herein fails to allege any attempted control or coercion by PT&T of any employee or applicant
The gist of plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint herein is that plaintiffs have been damaged by reason of PT&T‘s alleged refusal to hire or promote “manifest homosexuals.” As the “introduction” to the first amended complaint alleges, “PT&T has, since at least 1971, had an articulated policy of excluding homosexuals from employment opportunities with its organization.” Again, in the “fact allegations” of the complaint, it is alleged that “. . . PT&T has maintained and enforced a policy of employment discrimination against homosexuals . . . . PT&T refuses to hire any ‘manifest homosexual’ which [sic] may apply to it for employment at any occupational level or category.” Nowhere in the complaint, from beginning to end, do plaintiffs allege that PT&T‘s asserted policy of discrimination is directed toward any of plaintiffs’ political activity or affiliations. Rather, plaintiffs contend, and the gravamen of their complaint is, that employment discrimination is based solely on the overt and manifest nature of their sexual orientation itself.
4. Conclusion
I fully concur in the majority‘s concern toward homosexuals who have suffered the detriment, trauma, or indignity of employment discrimination. They are entitled to all of the rights, protections, and privileges of other citizens, no less and no more. In the contemplation of the law, homosexuals stand neither burdened by prejudice nor blessed with preference. Nonetheless, it is not our function to tell employers, large or small, whom to employ. Courts should not attempt to police general employment practices in the absence of some clear constitutional or statutory authority. Neither exists in the matter before us.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
The petition of respondent Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company for a rehearing was denied July 25, 1959. Clark, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
